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Abstract 
In recent decades, changes in post-separation parenting arrangements in 
Australia have led to an increase in the small but significant group of 
mothers with shared (i.e., equal or near-equal time) or minority-time, and 
mothers liable to pay child support to fathers.  
While the Child Support Scheme is ostensibly gender-neutral, gender-
neutral policy does not necessarily produce gender-neutral outcomes. 
Research with separated parents with more ‘traditional’ arrangements 
indicates that fathers who spend time with their children are more likely 
to comply with their child support than those who rarely or never see 
them. But might social norms for ‘good’ mothers and ‘good’ fathers differ? 
Gendered norms of mothering as ‘ever present’ suggest the same 
relationship between parenting time and money might not apply. 
The present study uses data from the Child Support Reform Study, a 
national random sample of separated parents in Australia. In total, 185 
mothers with a child support liability were identified. Drawing on reports 
from separated mothers and fathers liable to pay child support in 2008 
(Time 0), the study found that 43% of liable mothers had shared- or 
more-time, and their children were older. Mothers worked fewer hours in 
paid employment, often had a self-employed former partner, and a 
negative (particularly fearful) relationship than liable fathers.  
Using a typology of liable mothers developed for the study, differences in 
socio-demographic characteristics, family dynamics, and wellbeing 
emerged between the four liable mother groups (i.e., those with less-time, 
equal-time, more-time, and split-residence). In addition, parenting time 
was negatively related to perceived fairness of child support and 
compliance—both decreasing as parenting time increased. 
Although there was no significant difference between liable mothers’ and 
liable fathers’ compliance when measured as in full and on time, mothers 
were significantly less likely to pay any of the liability, and marginally 
less compliant where payment was transferred between parents privately. 
   
 vii 
Nonetheless most mothers contributed in-kind support, including all 
mothers who did not pay their liability in full.  
Odds of non-compliance for liable mothers increased as their time with 
their child increased, and was higher for mothers with split-residence. 
Low levels of inter-parental conflict over money also related to non-
compliance.  
The study’s findings highlight the complexity of liable mothers’ family 
circumstances compared to liable fathers. They illustrate the importance 
of taking a gender perspective to policy. Liable mothers and liable fathers 
differ in a number of important ways. This points to gender norms as 
important in understanding the compliance of mothers with a child 
support liability in Australia.  
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GLOSSARY 
Active caseload: cases registered with the Child Support Agency/Child 
Support Program with a current assessment, including cases with no 
current liability 
Adjusted taxable income: income used in the administrative 
assessment of child support. Taxable income from last relevant year (that 
is, year before the start of the child support period) plus (i) foreign 
income, net rental property losses and reportable fringe benefits, and (ii) 
tax-free pensions and benefits and other net investment losses (from July 
2008) and (iii) reportable superannuation contributions (from 2009–10) 
Adult child: former relationship child aged 19 to 24 living with the 
respondent or their former partner 
Blended family: couple family with a biological or adopted child of the 
couple and one or both parents have a child from a previous relationship 
Centrelink: The agency managing government payments. Centrelink is 
part of the Department of Human Services  
Child support period: A child support period is a period of time to which 
a child support assessment applies. The date of the start of the child 
support period determines which financial year of income the Registrar 
uses to make the assessment1 
Child Support Collect: the Child Support Agency/Child Support 
Program collects the expected payment from the liable parent (either 
voluntarily or enforced) and disburses to the payee 
Compliance: the expected amount of child support paid in full and on 
time 
Daytime-only: parent spends some time with the focal child in the 
daytime but has no overnights 
                                       
1 <http://guides.dss.gov.au/child-support-guide/2/3/1> (viewed 9 June 2017) 
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Domestic violence: ‘a pattern of abusive behaviour in an intimate 
relationship that over time puts one person in a position of power over 
another and causes fear’2 
Equal-time: roughly 50/50 time split between parents, that is 48%/52% 
nights 
English-speaking Western country: Australia, New Zealand, USA, UK 
and Canada 
Former couple sample: respondents who were (i) a liable parent and 
their former partner was a payee and both were interviewed or (ii) a payee 
and their former partner was a liable parent and both were interviewed  
Government payment: payment made by the government to support an 
individual such as Newstart (for those seeking employment), Parenting 
Payment or Disability Support Pension  
Less than regular-time/care: revised Scheme time category where the 
parent has 0–13.9% nights, 0–51 nights 
Major time/care: original Scheme time category where the parent has 
60–69.9% nights, 220–255 nights  
Majority-time parent: parent has 70% or more nights (or 65% from 1 
July 2008); parent with more overnights 
Minor time/care: the parent has 0–29.9% nights, 220–255 nights: 
unofficial term under the original Scheme time categories  
Minority-time parent: parent has less than 30% time (or 35% from 1 
July 2008); parent with less overnights, includes parents who spend little 
or no time with their child 
Newstart: a means-tested government payment made to an unemployed 
adult looking for work  
Nil paid: pays none of the liability. This contrasts with no current 
liability (see below) 
                                       
2 <https://www.1800respect.org.au/family-friends/common-questions/what-is-domestic-family-
violence/> (viewed 23 November 2016). 
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No current liability: has an active case but neither meant to pay or 
receive child support in the current child support period. This contrasts 
with nil paid (see above).  
Non-compliance: payment not in full and/or not on time, includes nil 
paid 
Nordic country: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 
Original Scheme: Child Support Scheme that applied until 1 July 2008 
Parenting arrangement: where the child/children live and how much 
time they spend with each parent. Includes formal and informal 
arrangements 
Prescribed item: payee’s childcare or pre-school fees; school fees; 
uniforms or books; essential medical or dental costs; payee’s share of 
rent or mortgage; payee’s utility costs; and payee’s motor vehicle 
expenses  
Prescribed Non-Agency Payments: credit of up to 30% of the liability in 
Child Support Collect cases for payment of a prescribed item. Credit does 
require agreement from the payee  
Primary carer: majority-time parent  
Principal carer: ‘someone who is responsible for the day to day care, 
welfare and development of a child under 16 years of age. Only one 
person at a time can be a principal carer of a child and this is generally 
the person who provides the greater amount of day to day care, such as a 
parent or guardian’3  
Private Collect: child support payments are transferred privately 
between parents  
Regular care/time: revised Scheme time category where the parent has 
14–34.9% nights; 52–127 nights 
Research with liable-father cases: research with nonresident fathers 
and/or resident mothers, that is child support research that focuses on 
                                       
3 <https://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/enablers/mutual-obligation-requirements-and-
exemptions-principal-carers> (viewed 23 November 2016) 
   
 xx 
payments from liable fathers to payee mothers regardless of the parent 
whose reports were analysed 
Revised Scheme: Child Support Scheme that applied from 1 July 2008 
Shared-time: each parent has 30–69.9% of nights (35–65% nights from 1 
July 2008). Also, original Scheme time category where the parent has 40–
59.9% nights [where specified only] 
Soft compliance: payment of less than the liability by agreement, or in-
kind or other contribution in lieu of cash child support. Parents are also 
considered ‘soft’ compliant where they substantially comply (i.e., pay 
mostly on time or at least 90% of the liability).  
Sole-time/care: original Scheme time category where the parent has 
70% or more nights, 256–365 nights  
Split-residence: siblings have different parenting arrangement where the 
mother has majority-time of one or more former relationship children 
and the father has majority-time of another child or children. Also 
includes arrangements where one or more children are in shared-time 
and one or more children have majority-time with either parent. 
Stepfamily: couple family with no biological or adopted child of the 
couple and one or both parents have a child from a previous relationship 
Substantial time/care: original Scheme time category where the parent 
has 30–39.9% nights, 110–145 nights 
With child rate: higher rate of Newstart paid to a person with at least 
14% day-to-day care of a child 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Child support is money transferred between separated parents (or 
parents who never lived together) to help raise their children. The typical 
arrangement is a nonresident father paying a resident mother. Mothers 
who are liable to pay child support to fathers are a small group in 
Australia.  
A common perception among fathers’ groups, and possibly the broader 
population, is that nonresident mothers never pay child support (Dads 
on the Air 2008; Karvelas 2011). The founder of the Lone Fathers 
Association Australia, Barry Williams, asserts that:  
[n]on-custodial mothers are getting an easy ride from the Child Support 
Agency...They [the Child Support Agency] seem to have a culture where if 
you’re female, it doesn’t seem to matter...With dads, they hound them and 
hound them and hound them [to pay] (Barry Williams quoted in Packham 
2008).  
But evidence for this view is limited and inconclusive. It is not known if 
mothers pay child support when they should, and if not, why not?  
Financial support, caregiving and decision-making are key parental 
responsibilities. But how they are maintained after separation varies. 
Media reports on child support compliance regularly refer to ‘deadbeat 
dads’ (Hockey 2006; Karvelas 2010a; Viellaris 2011) not deadbeat 
parents. This stereotype focuses on men’s financial responsibilities 
whereas a nonresident mother is portrayed as an ‘abandoning mother’ 
(Eardley & Griffiths 2009; Thompson, R & Laible 1999). These differing 
perceptions of post-separation parenting roles emphasise caregiving over 
financial responsibilities for mothers.  
  Gender and post-separation parenting 
Although child support law and policy are gender-neutral, parenting is 
gendered which, according to Funder (1998: 52), relates to ‘the values, 
expectations, and rules men and women learn about how they can or 
should parent’. Gender-normative roles mean that mothers can expect to 
have the main responsibility for day-to-day care of children post-
separation and fathers to pay child support. Research in Australia and 
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elsewhere highlights the gendered nature of child support (see, for 
example, Coltrane & Hickman 1992; Cook, K & Natalier 2012; Natalier 
2012; Summerfield et al. 2010) and family law (see, for example, Kay 
2002; Moloney 2001b; Parkinson 2001; Rhoades, Graycar & Harrison 
2001). In Australia, this ‘gender war’ has been fought through 
submissions to government inquiries into different aspects of post-
separation parenting (Fogarty & Augoustinos 2008; Kaye & Tolmie 1998; 
Rhoades 2010). Indeed self-help resources produced for separated 
parents imply that men’s and women’s financial priorities are vastly 
different (compare Bickerdike et al. 2009; Rogers et al. 2010).  
Around the world child support research almost exclusively focuses on 
nonresident fathers and resident mothers, with mothers’ reports on child 
support receipt dominating. Until recently, responses from nonresident 
mothers and resident fathers were either merged within the larger 
groupings, or omitted from analysis altogether (Vnuk 2010)—an analytic 
approach necessitated by the few respondents in these atypical groups. 
Some studies of nonresident fathers provide reasons for non-compliance, 
although it is unclear whether these explain mothers’ non-payment. 
Little is known about Australian mothers who should pay child support, 
especially from their reports. This thesis provides a different perspective 
on child support by applying a contemporary gender lens to parental 
financial responsibility and the flow of money between households. 
  Language and the economics of separation 
Some clarification about the language used in this thesis is warranted. 
Language describing modern post-separation relationships is 
challenging, not just because of the complex nature of interpersonal 
relationships (and families) but also because of their dynamic nature. 
Over the past two decades in Australia legal terminology describing 
parents who mainly live apart from children after separation (mostly 
fathers) has shifted from ‘noncustodial parent’ to ‘nonresident parent’ 
and, recently, to ‘the parent the child spends less time with’. This shift 
reflects a general drift in many countries to gender-neutral language in 
family law and a move away from win/lose terminology. The complex and 
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fluid nature of post-separation parental responsibilities means a 
resident/nonresident dichotomy is less precise in defining parental roles 
or child support liability as the separation (and nonresidence) often exists 
between parents rather than a parent and child.1 Hereafter ‘minority-
time’ or ‘less-time’ (depending on the context) is used. The language of 
parenting ‘time’, rather than ‘care’, de-emphasises the view that one 
parent is now less a parent or is the ‘non’ parent who ‘visits’ their child.  
The official terms used in the Australian child support legislation are 
payer and payee. According to the Macquarie Dictionary, payer means ‘a 
person who pays money for something’; by contrast, a payee is ‘a person 
to whom money is paid or is to be paid’ (The Macquarie Dictionary Online  
2013). For clarity, the term ‘liable parent’ rather than ‘payer’ is used as it 
is unclear whether payer includes a non-paying (that is, non-compliant) 
parent. This distinction is philosophically important because it gives 
primacy to parental financial responsibilities over children’s living 
arrangements. Indeed while both time and money are important for 
children and parents emotionally and psychologically—with much of the 
recent debate consumed by parenting time, with money as a buttress to 
this—little has been written about the many ways in which money can 
influence a separated parent’s self-identity and behaviour, and act as a 
‘tracer of relationships’ in separated families (but see, for example, 
Millman 1991; Smyth & Rodgers 2011). 
Parental separation changes living arrangements but critically it also 
unpacks the economic unit (Smyth & Weston 2000). The ‘fruits of 
complementary pursuits’ (Smyth 2005b: 8) common in traditional 
families (that is, the traditional division of labour based on the 
homemaker/breadwinner model) can no longer be shared when the 
family unit splits into two separate (bi-nuclear) units, with children the 
biological and emotional thread that join each.  
                                       
1 This is particularly pertinent in Australia as parents with shared or majority-time can 
still be liable under the Child Support Scheme, a situation not applicable in many 
other jurisdictions. 
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The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows. The first 
section provides a brief background to the Australian Child Support 
Scheme (hereafter ‘the Scheme’) and administrative data on liable mother 
cases. The second section outlines policies and social trends which 
potentially affect the number of liable mothers covered by the Scheme. 
The third section outlines the limited data on compliance by gender. The 
final section sets out the research questions and theoretical approach, 
and situates these within the broader child support policy context. 
  The Australian Child Support Scheme 
The Australian Scheme was introduced in 1988, with administrative 
assessments commencing in October 1989. The reasons for its 
introduction were the high numbers of lone parents2 receiving the 
Widows Pension or Supporting Parents Benefit and the need for savings 
on social security expenditure. The court system for setting and enforcing 
child maintenance orders was inadequate. Coverage of the lone parent 
population was limited and amounts ordered to be paid were low (at the 
time the ‘going rate’ was about $20 a week) and rarely updated for costs 
of living increases. Amounts paid were even lower (see, for example, 
Cabinet Subcommittee on Maintenance 1986; Edwards, M, Howard & 
Miller 2001; Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005). Some 
scholars argue that government savings were the primary motivator 
(Heron 1987; Ingleby 1994; Kliger 1988). Others assert that concern for 
children living in poverty in lone parent families, highlighted in 
influential the mid-1980s Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) 
research on financial consequences of divorce (McDonald 1986), was 
equally important (Fehlberg & Maclean 2009; Harding & Szukalska 
2000; Ridge 2005). After extensive consultation, the Hawke Labor 
government determined that child maintenance should be based on a 
simple formula, be administratively rather than judicially determined, 
                                       
2 The term ‘lone’ parent/mother/father is used in Chapter 1 in a historical context: 
generally when one parent had ‘sole care’ after separation and the other parent had 
limited (if any) involvement. 
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and collected via automatic withholding using the taxation system 
(Edwards, M, Howard & Miller 2001).  
Concern about low receipt of maintenance centred on lone mothers who 
were more likely than lone fathers to receive the Sole Parent Benefit and 
to remain on income support for longer (Cass 1993; Lambert 1992). 
Nonresident mothers were rarely expected to pay, with the limited 1980s 
research involving lone fathers noting nonresident mothers’ 
unemployment or very low income as probable reasons (McClelland & 
Trethewey 1987; Wilson, J 1990). Two-thirds of lone fathers applied for 
maintenance3 with 29% successfully obtaining an order or agreement 
compared with 74% of lone mothers (AIFS data cited in Child Support 
Evaluation Advisory Group 1992: 129-130). Less than 2% of fathers on 
the Sole Parent Benefit received maintenance, although the rate for lone 
mothers was also low, at around 20–25% (Raymond 1987: 59).  
  The original Scheme 
The original Scheme was based on a modified continuity of expenditure 
principle. Put simply, ‘wherever possible children should enjoy the 
benefit of a similar proportion of parental income to that which they 
would have enjoyed if their parents lived together’ (Child Support 
Consultative Group 1988: 67).  
The basic formula required liable parents (mostly fathers) to pay a 
percentage of taxable income after a self-support component was 
deducted. The amount payable depended on the number of children. 
The resident parent’s income reduced the liability where it exceeded a 
relatively high threshold, equal to average weekly earnings for all 
employees ($45,505 in 2008). Prior to 1999, parents with an income 
below the self-support amount were not required to pay.4 The fixed 
                                       
3 Until 1988 maintenance payments paid to women for children were not taxed whereas 
any maintenance payment received by men incurred a tax liability. According to Berns 
(1993), this represents both the improbability of the payment and its ideological 
incongruity. If a man received maintenance, the Tax Office considered this as a wage 
for work unlike mothers who had a moral obligation to provide care as part of their 
mothering role. 
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minimum assessment was $5 per week, subsequently indexed for 
inflation from July 2006, payable where a child lived mainly with one 
parent (70% of time or more, hereafter ‘majority-time’). Lower 
percentages applied for parents from 30% of nights (hereafter ‘shared-
time’) with no minimum payment required. For shared-time, and where 
siblings were split between parents (that is, each parent had majority-
time with at least one child,5 hereafter ‘split-residence’), both parents 
could apply for an assessment and the net amount payable, if any, 
determined the liable parent.  
  The revised Scheme  
The Scheme remained largely unchanged until major reforms in 2006–
2008 based on recommendations from an independent Ministerial 
Taskforce on Child Support (2005). This review was in response to a 
parliamentary report on child custody arrangements in the event of 
family separation, known as Every Picture Tells a Story (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs 
2003). The Taskforce recommended reforms to the Scheme to reflect 
substantial changes in Australian society since 1988. The Taskforce was 
motivated by a concern that ‘children need parents who will provide 
more than just financial support for them...Arguments about money, or 
concerns about the fairness of the…Scheme…get in the way 
of...cooperation’ (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005: 42).  
Since 1 July 2008, liabilities are calculated using a formula based on an 
‘income shares’ approach and revised estimates of the cost of children in 
Australia. The Cost of Children Table reflects that older children cost 
more than younger children; the proportion of income spent on children 
reduces at higher incomes; and parents who have 52–127 nights a year 
(hereafter ‘regular-time’)6 incur costs for infrastructure. The liability 
reflects the income and care percentages of both parents with more 
                                                                                                                
 
5 Split-residence includes one or more children in shared-time and a sibling in majority-
time with their father or their mother. 
6 The official term is ‘regular care’. Here ‘regular time’ is used because of the loaded 
meanings of the word ‘care’ in the context of post-separation parenting.  
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shared time leading to less child support transferred and more spending 
directly on children. Low income parents with regular-time are not 
required to pay the minimum assessment. Shared-time applies from 
35% of nights (128 or more nights), up from the previous 30% (110 or 
more nights).  
The Scheme is administered by the Department of Human Services 
under its Child Support Program (CSP), previously the Child Support 
Agency (CSA).7 In 2014–15, there were 789,500 cases covering around 
1.2 million children (Department of Social Services 2015). 
 Scheme coverage 
For reasons of equity and efficiency, the Scheme is open to all parents 
(Cabinet Subcommittee on Maintenance 1986: 20)8 with official estimates 
of coverage between 85–90% (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Family and Community Affairs 2003: 127) and 94% of 
separated parents (Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support 2005). The 
high coverage of separated parents in Australia is most likely related to 
the rules governing eligibility for family assistance payments (this is 
discussed in further detail in Section 1.3.1). Most parents in the Child 
Support Scheme have an administrative assessment. A small group (3% 
of the caseload in 2008, Child Support Agency 2009b) have a formal 
agreement registered by the Agency. Just over half of payees collect 
payments privately (hereafter ‘Private Collect’) and the Department of 
Human Services collects and disburses payments for the remainder 
(hereafter ‘Child Support Collect’). These groups are not fixed, with 
movement between collection methods depending on payee choice and 
circumstances (for example, acrimony or non-compliance). 
                                       
7 The Child Support Agency (CSA) was fully integrated into the Department of Human 
Services from July 2011. CSA or Child Support Program (CSP) are used in this thesis 
as appropriate. Child support policy is the responsibility of the Department of Social 
Services (DSS), formerly the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), while service related matters are the responsibility 
of the Department of Human Services (DHS). 
8 The Family Law Act 1975 (s 66E) prevents a court from making an order for child 
support where children are covered by the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, 
except in limited circumstances. 
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  Liable mothers: a small but growing group in the Scheme 
caseload? 
There is no reliable estimate of the prevalence of liable mothers. 
According to official data the proportion of ‘payers’ in the CSA caseload 
who were female increased from 8.4% in 1996 (Child Support Agency 
1996: 13) when data by gender were first reported, to 12.5% in 2009; the 
latest report. (The Department of Human Services ceased to publish 
annual data on the Scheme in 2009.)9 Although still a minority, this 
represented a 50% increase in the 10 years from 1999 to 2009. In 
addition, the CSA data highlight that the father applied to receive child 
support in 21–24% of newly registered cases in the years 2005 to 2009 
(Child Support Agency 2009a: 27; Ellison 2007).  
As shown in Table 1.1 below, as at June 2009 there were 103,109 ‘female 
payers’ in the overall Scheme caseload, that is active cases (those with a 
current assessment) and cases ended with arrears. 
  
                                       
9 A CSA media release marking the 100th anniversary of International Women’s Day in 
2011 noted that the number of women paying child support was ‘the highest ever’ at 
13% and ‘over 100,000’ (Child Support Agency 2011; Griffin 2011). 
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Table 1.1  Percentage of female payers 
in the CSA caseload 1996–2009 
Year 
Percentage of payers who 
were female 
Number of female 
payers 
1996 8.4 Not stated 
1997 7.7 33,848 
1998 8.1 39,921 
1999 8.4 44,336 
2001 9.6 58,367 
2002 10.0 65,393 
2003 10.3 69,114 
2004 10.6 75,438 
2005 10.9 79,552 
2006 11.1 86,600 
2007 11.4 91,233 
2008 11.6 93,432 
2009 12.5 103,109 
Notes: Data compiled from CSA Facts and Figures. Data are as at June each year. Data 
include ‘active cases’ (those with an assessment including those with no current 
liability) and cases ended with arrears. Data for 2009 include 40,000 mirror cases 
administratively created by the CSA to implement the 2008 reforms.  
Although official data suggest an increase in liable mothers, data 
reflected in Table 1.1 are not straightforward. If split-residence or shared-
time apply, both parents can, and may be required to, register with the 
CSP. (Section 1.3.1 details the policy underpinning this.) Parents in 
reciprocal cases10, where the liability in one case is the reverse of the 
other (hereafter ‘mirror cases’), are officially counted in caseload data as 
both payees and payers (Bowen 2010; Child Support Agency 2011). 
Importantly, they are counted even if they have no current liability, that 
is, the assessment results in neither parent being required to pay in the 
current child support period. In May 2008 there were 30,000 mirror 
cases with no current liability (Department of Families Housing 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 2008). 11 In July 2008, an 
additional 40,000 cases were administratively created to cover parents 
                                       
10 Under the previous (pre-July 2008) Scheme, reciprocal cases occurred when both 
parents applied for child support. The same children are in each case. Each parent is 
the ‘payee’ in one case and the ‘payer’ in the other, hence the term ‘reciprocal cases’.  
11 These cases are counted as active as the case includes an eligible child—a change in 
income or parenting time could result in an amount of child support payable.  
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with split-residence or shared-time who had not previously applied for an 
assessment (Child Support Agency 2009a).12 
The unavailability of trend data (or any annual Scheme data) since 2009, 
and lack of an accepted definition of ‘payer’, highlight a research gap and 
the challenges of identifying liable mothers for this study. (This is 
discussed further in Chapter 4.) In addition, the percentage of liable 
parents who are mothers and who are ever liable during the life of the 
case is larger than the percentage at a single point-in-time.  
  Child Support Scheme data 
Little information is provided about liable mothers in official data other 
than percentage of liable parents by gender (see Table 1.1) and collection 
method. To provide some context to the present study, Table 1.2 shows 
Child Support Agency caseload data at June 2008. (2008 data are 
presented to match the Child Support Reform Study data used in the 
present study.) Table 1.2 details parenting-time using the parenting-time 
categories ‘sole’13, ‘substantial’, ‘shared’ and ‘major care’ as defined in the 
original Scheme. (Hereafter ‘time’ is used instead of ‘care’ for reasons 
detailed previously.) As in Table 1.1, active cases include those with no 
current liability. 
  
                                       
12 From July 2008 a ‘case’ is defined as ‘the administrative assessments for child 
support for all children who are the children of both parents of the child’ (Section 5 of 
the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989). Administratively this meant that split-
residence and shared-time arrangements required two cases. 
13 The use of the term ‘sole’ reflects the official terminology and is not intended to imply 
that the other parent is uninvolved. 
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Table 1.2  Original Child Support 
Scheme: number of cases by nights with 
payee per year (June 2008) 
Category 
Percentage of 
nights 
Number of 
nights 
Cases with 
payees in this 
category: June 
2008 (%) 
Substantial 30–39.9 110–145 0.7 
Shared 40–59.9 146–219 6.8 
Major 60–69.9 220–255 3.2 
Sole 70 or more 256 or more 89.3 
Total   100.0 
Notes: Data on percentage of cases in each category are based on Table 2.9 from Facts 
and Figures 2007/08 (Child Support Agency 2009b: 25) and includes cases ended with 
arrears, no current liability, and mirror cases.  
The payee had sole time in 89% of cases. Most (90%) cases involved one 
or two children. Few parents had other children for whom they received 
relevant dependant allowance: 8% of cases involved new or another 
previous relationship child. The average liability for active cases 
(excluding international and pre-1989 court order cases) was $4,284 and 
$6,272 if minimum liability and no current liability cases were excluded. 
In 2008, 57% of cases had liabilities above the minimum assessment 
($339). The median annual taxable income of all payers with active cases 
was $38,660 with 22% in receipt of government payments (Child Support 
Agency 2009b: 25–31). Private Collect applied to 52% of active cases. 
Female payers comprised 11.6% of all payers with active cases and those 
ended with arrears and 12.5% of Private Collect cases (Child Support 
Agency 2009b).  
  Policy and social trends 
Several policy and social trends could affect the proportion of liable 
mothers in the Scheme caseload—either individually or combined—and 
include trends previously noted as contributing to changes in post-
separation parenting over time (Smyth & Moloney 2008). These are 
discussed below. 
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  Government policies and low-income parents 
The size and composition of the child support caseload in Australia 
reflects the interaction between the legislation applying to child support 
and that applying to family assistance. Legislation is informed by the 
policy position of the government of the day about the appropriate 
balance between private and public contribution to the cost of children.  
Payments to low income families increased in amount and coverage 
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s; an increase of around 250% in 
real terms since the introduction of the Scheme (Senate Standing 
Committee on Community Affairs 2006: 15). By OECD standards, 
assistance to families in Australia is generous (Whiteford 2013). 
Assistance for lone parent households is the second highest in the OECD 
in absolute terms, and relative to median incomes (Whiteford & Adema 
2006).  
Family Tax Benefit Part A (hereafter ‘FTB’), the main means-tested 
payment for families with dependent children, is a per child payment set 
at a level sufficient to meet the direct costs of raising children in families 
wholly dependent on government payments (Ministerial Taskforce on 
Child Support 2005). FTB is paid to low income parents whether on 
government payments or in work, with a base amount for middle income 
families, usually paid fortnightly. An estimated 75% of families are 
eligible, with only high income families excluded (McDonald 2008). In 
couple families FTB is paid to the ‘primary carer’ usually the mother, and 
is often the sole income for mothers not in paid employment. (An 
additional payment, FTB Part-B, is made to sole-earner households.) 
The economics of separation mean that low income parents with resident 
children are entitled to higher government payments after separation 
than when partnered. This provides incentives for parents to promptly 
notify Centrelink14 of their separation. To receive more than the base rate 
                                       
14 Centrelink is the agency managing government payments. Centrelink is part of the 
Department of Human Services. An appointment with Centrelink to organise post-
separation financial support such as Parenting Payment Single or more than the base 
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of FTB15, parents with at least 30% time (35% from 1 July 2008), must 
take ‘reasonable action’ to receive child support. The Maintenance Action 
Test (hereafter ‘the MAT’) requires an application for an administrative 
assessment or acceptance of a child support agreement by the Child 
Support Program.16 Crucially, the MAT applies even if an assessment will 
result in no current liability. Child support reduces FTB by 50 cents for 
each dollar above a free area until base rate.17  
Consequently, while only compulsory for Sole Parent Pensioners in the 
early years of the Scheme, the wider coverage of FTB has increased the 
numbers of parents required to register for child support. This highlights 
the strong link between child support and family assistance. In 2014, 
82% of payees received FTB and of the 1.5 million families who received 
payments, 40% had a child support child18 (Department of Social 
Services & Department of Human Services 2014 ). Between 1999 and 
July 2008 FTB could be split where parents had at least 10% time. FTB 
is worth substantially more than child support for low income parents, 
and includes benefits such as a health care card and rental assistance.  
FTB increases money available within households while child support 
moves money between households. Entitlement to more than the base 
rate can affect decisions made on parenting arrangements at separation 
and after, and which parent takes the ‘primary carer’ and ‘primary 
earner’ roles (or whether roles and FTB are shared), and therefore which 
parent is liable. Family payments policy forms a significant backdrop to 
                                                                                                                
rate of FTB is one of the first steps in the separation process for many resident 
parents. 
15 At the time of this study (2008) the base rate of FTB was $48.30 a fortnight. The 
maximum rate of FTB for a child aged 13–15 years was $196.84 per fortnight payable 
on an annual income up to $44,552. The maximum rate reduced by 20c for each 
dollar above $44,552 until it reached base rate. Base rate was paid on an annual 
income up to $94,316. <http://guides.dss.gov.au/family-assistance-guide/3/6/1> 
(viewed 4 June 2017]. 
16 Prior to 1 July 2008, agreements had to be at least the assessed amount if the payee 
received more than base rate FTB. Parents have 13 weeks from the date of separation, 
birth of the child or change in parenting arrangements to meet the MAT. The MAT 
applies unless a full or partial exemption is granted (for example, where a payee is 
assessed by a Centrelink Social Worker as at risk of violence if payment is pursued).  
17 For more details about family assistance in Australia and historical payment rates 
and thresholds <http://guides.dss.gov.au/family-assistance-guide/3/6 > (viewed 7 
July 2017) 
18 That is, the person receiving FTB was either a liable parent, a payee or partner of a 
liable parent/payee. 
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child support as changes to FTB can influence decision-making even 
where parents do not have correct knowledge of the rules (Smyth et al. 
2012). 
The symbiotic relationship between FTB and child support makes it 
particularly important in low income households. There is a ‘clear and 
strong income gradient’ in separation rates (Bradbury & Norris 2005: 
442); lower income couples are more likely to separate. Because of 
assortative mating, that is, ‘partnering of individuals with more traits in 
common than likely through random partnering’ (Worner 2006: 3)19, in 
many cases child support involves transfer of money between low income 
households.  
Mothers with resident children and no partner frequently move between 
casual, low paid jobs and income support (Baxter, Jennifer & Renda 
2011; Gregory 2002; Tannous & Smith 2013). Welfare-to-work policies, 
introduced in Australia in 2006, require part-time workforce 
participation by parents receiving Parenting Payment once their 
youngest child turns six. Census data show a subsequent increase in 
employment among mothers with a youngest child aged 8–15 years who 
were not living with a partner (Baxter, Jennifer 2013a). While policy 
impacts of welfare-to-work on payee mothers have been examined 
(Summerfield et al. 2010), consequences for liable mothers remain 
unexplored. 
How ‘income’ is defined for child support purposes is relevant. When the 
minimum liability was introduced in 1999, it could only be reduced to 
nil (that is, no current liability) if a parent’s annual ‘personal income’ 
was below $260. Unlike income used for assessments generally, personal 
income for this purpose included tax-exempt disability pensions; 
allowances made to prisoners for personal needs; and child-specific 
payments such as FTB. Liable mothers were more affected by including 
FTB than fathers as more mothers had resident children and no partner 
                                       
19 Usually measured by education qualification. 
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or were ‘dependent’ spouses with FTB as their sole personal income 
(Vnuk 2000).20  
  Children living apart from their mother 
The number of children in Australia living apart from their mother is 
increasing. In 1997, 12% of children with a parent living elsewhere did 
not live with their mother, rising to 16% in 2003, 18% in 2006–07, 19% 
in 2009–10 and 21% by 2012–13 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997, 
2004, 2008, 2011, 2015). Although not high compared with children 
living apart from their father, it is more common in older age groups. 
Around 4% of 10–14 year olds and 6% of 15–17 year olds lived mainly 
with their father in 2009–10 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011).  
Rates are higher among recent cohorts (Maguire 2011). Changes made 
to the Family Law Act 1975 and associated service reform in 2006 
promote meaningful involvement of children with both parents wherever 
safe to do so (see s 60CC (2)). Data from 10,000 parents who separated 
after these reforms (Kaspiew et al. 2009) indicate an increase in 
children living mainly with their father in all age ranges, peaking at 17% 
among 15–17 year olds (Kaspiew 2010: 119). Census data indicate an 
increase of 14% in lone father households between 2006 and 2011 (albeit 
from a low base); a growth rate twice that of lone mother households, 
with the fastest growing group those with all children 15 years or 
younger (Salt 2013b). 
Around one-in-five fathers (18–19%) are ‘successful’ in contested court 
cases (i.e., where parents are unable to agree on parenting arrangements) 
based on data collected since the 2006 family law reforms.21 In 2007–08, 
fathers gained majority-time in 17% of litigated cases (Family Court of 
                                       
20 Although child-specific payments are no longer counted as income, the introduction of 
a minimum assessment had the perverse outcome that partnered mothers with no 
personal income yet lived in the highest income households could seek an 
exemption. These mothers were ineligible for means-tested FTB although their 
husbands received a personal tax concession for a dependent spouse (Vnuk 2000).  
21 See data on contested Family Court cases at Figure 4 in Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers & 
Son (2014: 134), Table 6.4 in Kaspiew et al. (2009:125) and Table 3.30 in Kaspiew, 
Carson, Qu, Horsfall, Tayton, Moore, Coulson & Dunstan (2015: 62) where data cover 
the Family Court, the Federal Circuit Court and the WA Family Court. 
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Australia 2009: 2). Customised tables from the Family Court for the 
period 2007–08 to 2011–12 discussed in Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers and 
Son (2014) indicate that fathers were awarded majority-time more 
frequently than shared-time in contested cases. Although only five per 
cent of cases require judicial determination, these are the most 
intractable, characterised by mental health concerns, and/or allegations 
of domestic violence or child abuse (Perkins 2016). Where an order is 
made for the father to have majority-time, issues of parenting capacity 
are often present (Family Court of Australia 2009; Moloney 2001a). Less 
complex cases are heard in the Federal Circuit Court who handle the 
bulk of cases. Recent data for this jurisdiction (covering 2009–10 to 
2013–14) from Kaspiew, Carson, Qu and others (2015) show a 
comparable trend to the Family Court data. 
Fathers may have majority-time by agreement. Fathers in couple families 
are more involved than past generations (see, for example, Craig, Mullan 
& Blaxland 2010; Smyth et al. 2013). An estimated 10% of families have 
a ‘stay-at-home dad’ (Fletcher 2011) by choice or because of 
unemployment (Salt 2013a; Smyth et al. 2013). Fathers with greater 
amounts of time with their child post-separation reported higher pre-
separation involvement in their child’s day-to-day activities (Kaspiew et 
al. 2009: 147). 
  Shared-time22  
A related trend is shared-time. Already rising before the 2006 family law 
reforms (Smyth, Chisholm et al. 2014; Weston et al. 2011), shared-time 
(here defined as 35–65%) substantially increased in all judicially 
determined cases from 2% pre–2006 to 13%; from 4% to 34% where the 
hours were specified; and in consent cases from 17% to 22% (Kaspiew et 
al. 2009: 132–133). 
                                       
22 Consistent with prior studies in the US and Australia (for example, Baker & Townsend 
1996; Melli & Brown 2008; Smyth et al. 2014) ‘shared-time’ is defined here as 
arrangements that involve children spending at least 30% of time with each parent, 
unless otherwise specified. 
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Using a 30% parenting time threshold, 7% of children in separated 
families had shared-time in 2009–10 with 3% in equal-time 
arrangements (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011). Shared-time was 
higher in the Scheme active caseload at 12.8% (Child Support Agency 
2009a) and 17% of newly registered cases in June 2008 (Smyth 2009). 
However, Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers and Son (2014) using customised 
Child Support Program data indicate that shared-time has plateaued at 
15–16% of children of recently separated parents.  
It is unclear what trends in shared-time may mean for liable-mother 
cases. Shared-time has a greater impact in Australia as it is one of a few 
countries where equal-time can create a liability (Skinner & Davidson 
2009). Liability is determined by the interaction of time and income of 
both parents and mothers with shared-time typically are tertiary 
educated, in paid work with relatively high personal incomes (Cashmore 
et al. 2010: 27; Kaspiew et al. 2009; Smyth 2005a).  
  Parental employment 
Although the common pattern in Australia is for one parent to work full-
time and the other part-time, in around one-third of couple families with 
children aged 12–17 both parents work full-time (Baxter, Jennifer 
2013b). The employment rate of mothers increased from 59% to 66% for 
partnered mothers and 46% to 60% for lone mothers between 1997 and 
2009 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010). Two opposing trends are 
relevant to socioeconomic status and parenting, with decreases in paid 
employment and income for men more evident among working class 
families and a move towards a ‘symmetrical breadwinner model’ 
(Broomhill & Sharp 2005: 114) with both parents working in higher 
income jobs in more affluent families. A mother’s participation choices 
are shaped by her partner’s work hours (Williams 2010) at both ends of 
the socioeconomic spectrum. Further female breadwinners (that is, 
where the mother was the higher income earner) are more common 
among low and middle income dual-earner couples: 25–27% had a 
female breadwinner in 2011 (Cassells et al. 2013). 
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Majority-time fathers report lower education and employment (Kaspiew 
et al. 2009: 141). The shift towards less stable employment for men 
could provide an incentive for separated fathers who were at home 
caring for children pre-separation to claim government payments that 
rely on the presence of young children in the household rather than on 
irregular wages from casual employment (Hunter 2005). In 2009, 
among fathers with a child aged under 15 years, 55% of lone fathers 
and 85% of partnered fathers were in full-time employment and 15% 
and 6% in part-time employment (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010).  
The labour force participation rate of mothers is particularly relevant for 
child support systems such as in Australia where both parents’ incomes 
are considered. Policy changes such as those under the 2006 welfare-to-
work reforms increased the employment rate among lone parents, 
especially lone mothers; 56% of lone mothers were in paid employment in 
2016 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). The employment rate of lone 
fathers is also key with 72% of lone fathers in paid employment in 2016 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). Another reason that employment 
is critical to the assessment is that a separated mother who is not in 
paid employment would not be liable in split-residence and shared-time 
cases unless she had other (non-employment) income above the self-
support amount (Vnuk 2000). Under the original Scheme she would be 
liable for the minimum assessment if she had less than 30% time.23  
  Scheme caseload complexity and fluidity 
Change affects many separated families (Caruana & Ferro 2004), 
precipitated by instability and conflict or signalling flexibility to children’s 
developmental needs (see, for example, Smyth 2009; Trinder 2010). A 
change in parenting-time of one or more children can cause a change in 
the parent who is liable in the child support case (hereafter ‘churn’). 
Churn can occur without a corresponding change in nights if the 
relativity between parents’ incomes changes. 
                                       
23 Under the revised Scheme the minimum liability would apply to a mother with income 
below the self-support amount if she had less than 14% time of all the children in the 
case. 
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The quantum of churn in the Scheme caseload and the impact on the 
number of mothers who have been the liable parent at any time has not 
been explored. Nonetheless, based on data on stability of different 
parenting arrangements, churn outward (that is, a change from being 
liable to being a payee or having no current liability) and movement in 
the opposite direction (from payee to liable parent) is probably more 
common for liable-mother cases than in typical cases: those with 
children mainly with their mother. Arrangements where the father has 
majority-time, split-residence and shared-time appear less stable 
(Cashmore et al. 2010; Kaspiew et al. 2009; Smyth & Moloney 2008; 
Smyth et al. 2008). This observation was confirmed by data from the 
AIFS Looking Back Survey—a retrospective study of 2,002 parents who 
separated in 2005 and formed the pre-family law reform cohort for the 
AIFS evaluation. That study found that the most stable parenting 
arrangements four to five years after separation were those where the 
mother had majority-time, followed by equal time. Less durable 
arrangements were where the father had majority-time and unequal 
shared-time where the mother had more nights (Kaspiew et al. 2009: 
127). Analysis of three waves of data from the Longitudinal Study of 
Separated Families (LSSF) (Qu et al. 2014) found unequal shared-time 
where the father had more nights was the least stable.  
Smyth and colleagues (2008) highlight the move of children over time 
from shared-time to living mainly with their mother (hereafter ‘maternal 
drift’, see Brown, Joung & Berger 2006). In the US, research by Brown, 
Joung and Berger (2006) and Administrative Office of the Courts, 
California research (Administrative Office of the Courts California 2000) 
indicated ‘paternal drift’ from shared-time was almost as frequent as 
maternal drift. A similar pattern appears to apply to recent cohorts of 
separated families in Australia (Lodge & Alexander 2011; Weston et al. 
2011). Changes in parenting arrangements could create a liability for a 
mother who was previously the payee in the case. 
Longitudinal research suggests that mothers have shorter spells as the 
liable parent than fathers. Comparing across waves of LSSF data, 37% of 
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mothers liable in 2008 were not liable one year later (Qu & Weston 2010: 
120). By five years later, half of the 2008 liable mothers were no longer 
liable. In contrast, 87% of fathers remained liable across all three waves 
(Qu et al. 2014: 120). 
  Changes to the Scheme  
While the policies and social trends detailed above could lead to an 
increase in liable mothers, the 2006–08 changes to the Scheme might 
counteract potential increases. For example, some minority-time mothers 
who were liable for the minimum amount under the original rules could 
be reassessed to have no current liability if they have regular-time with 
at least one former relationship child. The distributional analyses of the 
impact of the 2008 child support formula changes and FTB produced by 
the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) reported on paying and 
receiving parents in the Child Support Agency caseload. They estimated 
that 51% of liable parents would experience a net gain, 33% a net loss 
and 16% no change (Department of Families Housing Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs 2008: 4). Their analysis reflected the 
combined impact of child support and FTB changes as it was ‘not 
possible to isolate the effect of any one feature…independently…[and] will 
be dependent on the “mix” of formula components…relevant to their 
circumstances’ (Department of Families Housing Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs 2008: 3).  
Smyth and Henman (2010) highlighted that specific subgroups of liable 
parents had different net outcomes compared with the liable parent 
population overall. Net gains tended to be associated with policy reforms 
that benefited higher income parents: reduction of the income cap on 
payments and the new Cost of Children Table. In contrast, 66% of 
parents with second families were expected to have a net loss. No change 
was expected for the 45% of liable parents receiving government 
payments but Smyth and Henman found 35% faced a net loss; 
marginally higher than for the overall liable parent population (Smyth & 
Henman 2010: 21).  
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While the general conclusion in the research and commentary on the 
reforms was that fathers ‘gained’ and mothers ‘lost’ (see, for example, 
Cook, K & Natalier 2013; Karvelas 2006; Peatling 2006; Wardill 2006), 
this was premised on fathers being liable parents. However, as Smyth 
and Henman (2010: 26) highlight: ‘The child support policy arena is one 
in which gender and socio-economic status can intersect in complex 
ways’. 
  Prevalence of liable mothers in other countries 
The type of child support system in place could influence the prevalence 
of liable mothers. Australia, like New Zealand, Denmark, Norway and 
UK, is classified as having an agency-based child support system 
(Skinner, Bradshaw & Davidson 2007). Countries with agency-based 
systems have higher rates of liable mothers than countries with 
discretionary court-based systems.24 UK is the exception. While cultural 
and policy differences and measurement issues make comparisons with 
other countries risky, official data suggest Australia could be like Nordic 
countries where more fathers have majority or shared-time. In Sweden 
18.5% of liable parents are mothers (Hiilamo 2006) and in Norway 13% 
of payees are fathers (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2011: 226). New Zealand data indicate that 18% of liable 
parents are mothers (Birks 2011), making it the only comparable 
English-speaking Western country.  
In contrast, resident fathers in the US have significantly lower rates of 
child support orders than resident mothers (29% compared with 53%) 
with 2011 data revealing a decrease from a peak of 42% in 1993 (Grall 
2013). In the UK the proportion of nonresident mothers registered with 
the CSA has always been small (for example, 5% in 2008, see Brennan 
1999).25 Canadian data tell a similar story, with mothers comprising 4% 
                                       
24 Some countries have no provision for mothers to be liable or recently changed their 
laws to extend child support liability to mothers (see, for example Israel, Yaron 2015). 
25 In the UK nonresident mothers have been described as ‘a hidden population’ 
reluctant to reveal their role because of ‘perceived social stigma’ (Corlyon et al. 2009: 
12).  
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of liable parents (Sinha 2014), probably because fathers with more time 
have higher incomes (Juby, Le Bourdais & Marcil-Gratton 2005).  
  Child support compliance 
As noted earlier, assertions that mothers do not pay child support in 
Australia when they should are based on anecdotal evidence with little 
empirical data to confirm or refute this view. Much depends on whose 
responses are reported (for example, payees only) and what is being 
measured.  
The strictest measure of compliance is payment in full and on time. In 
Australia this measurement is not as straightforward as in other English-
speaking Western countries. First, Private Collect is a flexible 
arrangement allowing formal and informal trade-offs. Second, liable 
parents with Child Support Collect have some control over payments: 
prescribed in-kind payments such as school fees, essential medical 
expenses and the payee’s housing costs can count for up to 30% of the 
liability without requiring agreement. Agreed in-kind payments are 
credited in full. Third, official Child Support Program data are an 
amalgam of actual payments made via Child Support Collect and an 
assumed 100% compliance in Private Collect (more than half the 
caseload). Timeliness is rarely reported. 
In contrast compliance research is dominated by US studies where 
flexibility is limited, meaning only formal payments are measured. 
  Compliance by gender: administrative data  
Virtually all of what we know about the compliance of liable mothers is 
from snippets in newspaper reports based on ad-hoc media releases from 
CSA.26 Non-payment of child support is regularly portrayed in the media 
as male behaviour. A previous Minister for Human Services famously 
declared war on ‘deadbeat and negligent dads...who are ripping off...their 
                                       
26 Although newspaper reports are not a strong source of evidence, no other sources of 
compliance rates using administrative data are available. For example, CSA Facts and 
Figures 2008–09—the most recent comprehensive report of CSA data—only reports on 
the percentage of payers and payees who are female; all other data are aggregated 
figures. 
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own flesh and blood’ (House of Representatives 2006: 176). Following 
complaints of gender bias, official data releases use gender-neutral 
language, although the media tend to ignore this by highlighting 
‘deadbeat dads’. The media focus on non-compliant fathers is 
unsurprising as they comprise most liable parents.    
The Department of Human Services does not routinely collect 
administrative data on compliance by gender. Limited data by gender 
produced for media requests are point-in-time snapshots pertaining to 
Child Support Collect debt. The earliest report (Haberfield & Wright 
2006) noted that ‘nine out of ten non-payers are dads’. It is unclear if this 
was a comparison of debts owed by mothers and fathers or reflected the 
gender split for liable parents in the caseload (then 90% male). In a 
December 2008 report, 27% of mothers and 35% of fathers had a debt, 
with around 10,000 mothers owing more than the annual minimum 
assessment ($340) and 14,700 owing less (Packham 2008). In June 
2009, Today Tonight (a tabloid style ‘current affairs’ television program) 
presented a story reputedly about ‘serial mothers’, announcing that 
22,000 mothers owed about $30 million, with $11 million of the debt due 
from mothers who had ‘left Australia’. The ‘top targets’ were described as 
‘10 Victorian women who had four children each with four different 
partners and who don’t look after their children and don’t pay a cent’ 
(Main 2009, 15 June).27  
The most recent newspaper report examining gender and compliance 
(May 2010) indicates 20.9% of mothers and 33.5% of fathers had a child 
support debt (Karvelas 2010b). These figures are difficult to interpret as 
they suggest a smaller proportion of mothers in Child Support Collect 
cases had a debt than fathers but this assumes that the percentage of 
mothers and fathers with a debt was calculated from the total number of 
parents with a positive liability excluding cases with no current liability.  
                                       
27 The quality of the data on which this story was based were highly questionable.  
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Whether mothers are less compliant than fathers remain unclear, 
particularly when what is being measured lacks detail. Clarity in 
measurement and reporting matter: payment (that is, any money 
transferred) and compliance (that is, expected amount of child support 
paid in full, or in full and on time) are not the same. For example, US 
census data indicate that resident fathers are less likely to be paid child 
support than resident mothers (Grall 2011) but other studies focusing on 
non-payment of liabilities using administrative data show that mothers 
had comparable compliance to fathers (Hall, Passarella & Born 2014) and 
lower rates of being in arrears (Myers, D 2004). Administrative data from 
New Zealand Inland Revenue reflect a similar view: 18% of liable parents 
were mothers in 2010 but 16.5% of parents with debt were mothers 
(Birks 2011). 
  Compliance by gender: survey data 
Empirical data on compliance by gender in Australia are limited because 
of the small sample size of liable mothers and payee fathers. The 
research on compliance is itself minimal (see Smyth, Vnuk et al. 2014 for 
a review of the Australian compliance research), with pre-2008 work 
reliant on payees’, rather than liable parents’, reports.  
Fathers report lower receipt than mothers. Qu and Weston (2008: 28) 
compared several datasets collected between 2003 and 200628 and found 
18–46% of resident fathers (range n=72–109) reported receiving child 
support. The rate depended on the question asked. Two survey questions 
referred to payment while the other measured compliance (here, paid in 
full and on time). The authors suggested one explanation for lower 
receipt was the higher likelihood mothers had a child of the relationship 
living with them and therefore were not liable to pay.  
In the one report that differentiated receipt by gender and repartnering 
status (de Vaus 2004), repartnered fathers had lower receipt than 
                                       
28 The dataset examined were the Housing, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) 2004, the Australian Bureau of Statistics Family Characteristics Survey 2003 
and the Australian Institute of Family Studies General Population of Parents Survey 
(GPPS) 2006. 
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repartnered mothers. Eighteen per cent of lone father families, 6% of 
stepmother families and 2% of blended families (i.e., with a stepmother 
and a new child) reported receipt of financial support. Although this 
suggests that a lower proportion of repartnered fathers received any 
support than lone fathers (and mothers whether repartnered or not), this 
finding should be treated as tentative because of the small number of 
stepmother families surveyed. 
In the limited research restricted to cases where child support was 
expected and both liable and payee parents were asked, payee fathers 
reported the lowest compliance and liable fathers the highest, with the 
two groups of mothers in the middle. Based on three waves of data, 73% 
of liable fathers reported paying in full and on time compared with 59% 
of liable mothers in 2008 (Kaspiew et al. 2009: 195), 55% in 2009 (Qu & 
Weston 2010: 124) and 60% in 2012 (Qu et al. 2014: 124). 
In summary, the limited survey data provide basic information on 
compliance, with analysis constrained by the scope of questions asked 
about child support and/or small sample size for liable mothers. 
  Why compliance matters 
Money matters for children’s wellbeing. Poor financial circumstances can 
affect outcomes for children in separated families (Pryor & Rodgers 
2001). Child support reduces poverty (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2011)—either directly or via the MAT which 
links registration of a child support case with payment of the often larger 
and more valuable FTB. Further, as mentioned earlier, there is a 
symbiotic relationship between FTB (tax-payer funded) and child support 
(parental funded) payments for children. Compliance in full and on time 
reduces taxpayer expenditure on children in separated families. 
But child support should not be viewed solely through a poverty lens. 
The impact on child wellbeing extends beyond its monetary value. 
Although at low liabilities it is largely symbolic rather than meeting the 
cost of children, for poor families even small amounts make a difference. 
Children view both time and money as symbolising caring (Haugen 2003) 
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and fathers view payment of child support as ‘substantially improving 
their children’s quality of life’ (Natalier & Hewitt 2010: 496).  
Child support legislation is gender-neutral. Studies examining attitudes 
to child support reveal almost universal agreement for the principle that 
parents have primary responsibility to financially support their children 
(see for example, Braver, Ellman & MacCoun 2014; Child Support 
Agency 1999; Funder 1998; Funder & Smyth 1996a, 1996b; Smyth & 
Weston 2005). This view applies regardless of the gender of the 
nonresident parent and is particularly strong in Australia for nonresident 
mothers’ obligations. 
The Child Support Agency’s (2010: 4) compliance policy lists four key 
factors influencing a parent’s ability or motivation to comply: (i) the 
relationship between parents and level of cooperation, (ii) the parent–
child relationship and time, (iii) attitude to the Scheme, particularly 
beliefs about fairness; and (iv) financial situation and regularity of 
employment. But this is based on research with resident mothers and 
nonresident fathers. Behavioural responses to ostensibly gender-neutral 
laws could be influenced by gender norms and expectations for mothers 
and fathers.  
Can compliance be unaffected by gender? Some reasons for non-
compliance such as uncertainty about parentage are exclusively male 
concerns. Importantly, children who never lived with both parents are 
rarely in shared- or majority-time father arrangements: most liable 
mothers were previously part of a family economic unit. Nonresident 
mothers spend more time with their children than nonresident fathers 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006; Headey & Warren 2008; Headey, 
Warren & Harding 2006; Smyth & Ferro 2002) and many have a child of 
the relationship in their household at least part-time. 
Evidence for whether the nonresident parent role is experienced 
differently by gender is mixed with support for similarity in behaviours 
(see, for example, Doherty, Kouneski & Erickson 1998; Stewart 1999a; 
Thompson, R & Laible 1999; Wilson, G 2006) and specific differences by 
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gender (Hawkins, Amato & King 2006; Kielty 2005; Lyngstad 2010; 
Walker & McGraw 2000). However, this research focused on the shared 
experience of living apart from children rather than being liable to pay 
child support.  
  Research questions and theoretical framework  
The aim of this thesis is to improve understanding of liable mothers and 
their compliance, and to inform child support policy more broadly. As it 
covers a group of separated parents not comprehensively studied in 
Australia to date, it is largely exploratory. Three research questions 
guided the present study: 
Question 1: “What are the characteristics of mothers with a child support 
liability in Australia and what are the key differences between liable 
mothers and liable fathers?” 
Question 2: “Are liable mothers less compliant than liable fathers?”  
Question 3: “What are the apparent reasons for non-compliance by liable 
mothers?” 
Previous child support research is not very pertinent to these issues nor 
does it provide an obvious theoretical framework as a guide in answering 
these questions. Several theoretical frameworks have possible utility: 
social identity; planned behaviour; social exchange; and feminism. The 
first three have been advanced by Smyth (2004) as useful frameworks to 
explain paternal disengagement (of which non-compliance can be one 
facet). A brief explanation of these four frameworks and relevance to the 
present study follows. 
Social identity theory relates to ‘the meanings associated with being a 
member of a social category’ (Stets & Burke 2000: 225). It has been 
classified as a ‘mini theory’ within the symbolic interaction framework 
(White & Klein 2008: 103). Identification with a social group is via ‘social 
categorisation, social comparison, social identity and self-esteem’ (Trepte 
2006: 256). Individuals can have a range of identities (for example 
mother, wife, worker) with identities that are the most salient, dominant. 
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Individuals will spend time undertaking activities that represent a salient 
identity rather than those that relate to an identity that has less meaning 
for them (Pasley, Petren & Fish 2014). In this sense there is ‘a link 
between commitment to an identity [and] behaviour’ (Pasley, Petren & 
Fish 2014: 311). 
A planned behaviour framework takes the view that ‘behaviour is guided 
by…beliefs about the likely consequences,…beliefs about the normative 
expectations of other people, and beliefs about the factors that may 
further or hinder performances of the behaviour’ (Ajzen 2002: 665). For 
example, in relation to non-compliance, this framework suggests that an 
individual weighs up whether they would expect to be penalised if they 
did not comply.  
Exchange frameworks assume that individuals are ‘rational actors’ and 
interchangeable: individuals facing the identical situation would make 
the same choice (White & Klein 2008: 73). A social exchange framework 
can relate to the level of investment made in a relationship where ‘the 
more positive the reward–cost ratio, the more invested in the relationship 
the individual will be’ (Braver et al. 2005: 303). Other analysts have 
utilised a similar approach to child support payment that highlighted a 
relationship of ‘balanced reciprocity’ where money is exchanged for time 
(Bradshaw et al. 1999: 208).  
A feminist29 framework is based on ‘an organizing principle of men’s 
superiority and social, political and economic dominance over women’ 
(Whiteley 2014: 2). As Wood (1995: 104) explains, ‘the axis of feminist 
enquiry is gender, which consists of deeply ensconced social meanings 
and their derivative, power’. Women are expected to enact their role as a 
mother within the socially constructed ideology of a ‘good’ mother. A 
feminist approach to compliance requires a ‘gender lens’.30 Gendered 
parental norms are likely to mean that separated mothers will continue 
                                       
29 It may be more correct to refer to ‘feminisms’ as there are a range of theoretical 
approaches under this broad umbrella with the shared tenet that ‘places gender 
inequality at the crux of social life’ (Palkovitz, Trask & Adamsons 2014: 412). 
30 In the present study ‘feminist approach’ and ‘gender lens’ are both used. 
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to ‘do gender’ (Natalier & Hewitt 2014), that is, be a ‘good’ mother. 
Consequently, it is likely that mothers’ non-compliance will differ from 
fathers’ non-compliance, both in rate and factors associated with this 
behaviour. 
The present study seeks to establish whether gender matters for 
compliance, that is, whether there are key differences between liable 
mothers and liable fathers and their compliance with their child support 
liability and how this relates to gendered norms of mothering. 
Consequently, a feminist theoretical framework is preferred over the 
other three frameworks that fundamentally treat the individual ‘actor’ as 
gender-neutral and interchangeable. In particular, the present study 
takes a feminist theoretical framework and a quantitative methodology to 
answer the three research questions. (This is further discussed in the 
methodology chapter in Section 4.5.1.) Feminist approaches (which vary 
widely, including liberal, socialist, cultural, and radical31) explicitly seek 
to illuminate gender differences and highlight that ‘experiential and 
developmental trajectories differ by gender’ (Palkovitz, Trask & Adamsons 
2014: 414). Further, as Fox and Murry (2000: 1168) point out in their 
literature review of family research, even when married couples describe 
their roles as non-gender specific ‘subtle power processes…[are] both 
visible and latent’. 
Taking a gender lens to policy is an approach used by women’s groups in 
Australia to examine the specific impacts on women—both in policy 
development and when policy changes are proposed (see, for example,the 
post-budget analyis put out by the National Foundation for Australian 
Women in Coleman 2016, 2017). In addition, examination of gender and 
child support compliance has parallels with the research into more 
extreme areas of human behaviour. The consensus in criminology, for 
example, is that maleness and criminality go together and theories 
                                       
31 See, for example, White and Klein (2008: 226–231) for details of the different feminist 
approaches generally and Doucet and Lee (2014) for different feminist approaches to 
mothering. 
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relevant to men are not applicable to women (Whiteley 2014).32 This 
somewhat more extreme parallel suggests that a feminist theoretical 
approach to understanding mothers’ non-compliance is appropriate. 
  Gender and parenting 
Gender is a social status ‘carefully constructed through prescribed 
processes of teaching, learning, emulation, and enforcement’ (Lorber 
1994: 17). As Lorber (1994: 32) explains, ‘individuals produce gender [by] 
behaving in ways they have learned were appropriate for their gender 
status, or resisting or rebelling against these norms’. 
It is not just men and women who are shaped by gender roles. Mothers 
and fathers are specifically affected: parenting is highly gendered. While 
some flexibility in gender roles occurs for those without children, the 
mother role remains rigid in Australia. Palkovitz, Trask and Adamsons 
(2014: 417), while noting role convergence in parenting, argue that 
‘important distinctions exist in affective and cognitive components of 
their parenting thus changing the meanings…processes and outcomes’. 
Behavioural norms for ‘good’ mothers and ‘good’ fathers do differ. 
‘Intensive mothering’ (or, as Arendell (1999) conceptualises it, ‘hegemonic 
motherhood’) is child-centred and ever present (Hays 1996). While this is 
a Western, white, middle-class view of mothering and thus less 
representative of other racial, cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds 
(see, for example, Bassin, Honey & Kaplan 1994; Christopher 2012; 
Collins 1994; Lim & Skinner 2012), it remains powerful. This is the case 
‘despite cultural contradictions and diverse arrangements and practices, 
[this view is] the normative standards, culturally and politically, by which 
mothering practices…are evaluated’ (Arendell 2000: 1195).  
Child support focuses on the ‘provider’ identity but breadwinning is 
experienced differently by gender (Stocks 2007). While ‘a marker of 
masculinity’ (Wilson, F & Stocks 2007: 96), providing is not essential to 
being a ‘good’ mother. Paid work may be central to a mother’s personal 
                                       
32 The ‘doing gender’ approach has been used in criminology research. 
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identity, but not central to her gender identity (Garcia 2012). Some 
mothers in paid employment may construct their notion of good 
mothering around providing both emotionally and economically for their 
children. Research suggests full-time employed mothers provide more 
and different care (Craig 2006; Doucet 2006). Some stigma lingers in 
Australia towards non-normative parental roles of breadwinner mother 
and homemaker father (Baxter, Janeen & Hewitt 2013). Where mothers 
are the sole income earner, they integrate their worker–mother identity to 
still see themselves as following intensive mothering (Johnston & 
Swanson 2007; Medved 2009). Conversely, stay-at-home fathers share 
caregiving rather than reverse roles. Responsibility for caregiving remains 
overwhelmingly women’s (Baxter, Jennifer 2017; Doucet 2013).  
  Gender and mothering post-separation  
Parenting in couple families is one area where men and women ‘do 
gender’ (West, C & Zimmerman 1987). Separation has the potential for 
‘undoing’ (Deutsch 2007; Lorber 2000) or ‘redoing’ gender (Walzer 2008). 
Both personal and community expectations of gendered parenting roles 
are relevant. For parents receiving government payments as a ‘principal 
carer’ of children, some paid employment may be expected regardless of 
whether the full-time carer mother role was preferred as a couple family.  
Parents who were already in employment before separation (particularly 
full-time) may opt for shared-time with international research suggesting 
that shared-time parents value their worker identity as highly as their 
parent role (Bakker & Karsten 2013).  
  Gender and money 
This thesis applies a gender lens to policy to improve the understanding 
of post-separation parenting and money. Feminist research on gender 
and money commonly focuses on the private world of money within 
relationships and households. Child support is explicitly about money 
between households. Nyman and Reinikainen (2007: 59) highlight the 
role of money in ‘doing couple’, by ‘blurring the line between her money 
and his money so that their money emerged’. In this sense, separation is 
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about disestablishing and disentangling (and perhaps distancing) 
themselves as a couple but not as co-parents.  
Money is used ‘to create, define, affirm, represent, challenge or 
overturn…social ties’ (Zelizer 1998: 1378). Divorce generates its own 
distinct monies—alimony and child support—leading to new kinds of 
disputes over domestic monies and property, changing strategies for 
negotiating rights over economic resources and special guidelines on how 
those monies should be transferred (Zelizer 1989, 2006). Private 
agreements about allocation of resources within an intact family are not 
subject to external enforcement. Child support makes money a public 
issue—and a policy concern. Indeed, child support can be seen, at least 
in part, as ‘poor people’s money’ (Cozzolino 2014: 16; Zelizer 1994). 
Meanings attached to money differ because parenting is gendered. This is 
highlighted by liable fathers’ and payee mothers’ views on how child 
support should be spent (see, for example, Hewitt & Natalier 2010; 
McCarthy, Edwards & Gillies 2003; Natalier & Hewitt 2014; Simpson 
1997). According to Skinner (2002: 7), the key to understanding fathers’ 
non-payment is ‘to recognise the fundamental nature of financial 
obligations—that it is all about giving money’. Skinner argues that the 
obligation is more explicit than providing support within an ‘intact’ 
household as the requirement to transfer money, either directly to their 
former partner or via the CSA, disrupts the father’s provider role. (This 
approach assumes that the liable parent is the father.) 
On the other hand, research with couple families reveals that mothers’ 
spending is more family-focused (Pahl 1995). Responsibility for child-
related purchases mainly lies with mothers, often from their ‘personal’ 
spending money (see, for example, Goode, Callender & Lister 1998; 
Nyman 1999; Pahl 2000). Government benefits are more likely to be 
spent on children when paid to mothers (Lundberg, Pollak & Wales 1997; 
Woolley 2004). Even when physically absent such as in transnational 
families, mothers remit more money and more consistently than fathers 
do (Abrego 2009).  
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This suggests liable mothers would be more rather than less compliant 
because an integral part of the mother role is identifying with children’s 
needs and putting them first. Further, women are generally more 
compliant with taxation law than men, although this may be less 
applicable for ‘non-traditional’ women and those with more education (for 
a review of the literature see Richardson & Sawyer 2001). 
Feminist theorists critique both the gender-neutral assumptions of 
neoclassical economic models explaining compliance that centre on the 
‘rational man’ (Wyss 1999) and whether economic models can apply to 
parent–child relationships. A gender-neutral model ‘fails to recognize 
both love, which does not assume self-interest, and obligation, which 
exists despite self-interest’ (Estin 1995: 1021). Gender norms of 
parenting and money are interlinked, therefore, as Cozzolino (2014: 7) 
explains, ‘understanding the exchange of child support…illustrate[s] the 
meanings and mechanisms through which personal relationships and 
economics intertwine’. 
This thesis explores the role of gender in child support compliance, and 
is informed by a feminist perspective of parenting as gendered and by 
economic sociology about the meaning of money in relationships. As 
Arendell (2000: 1202) points out: ‘Feminist conceptual models…allow us 
to acknowledge the gendered character of mothering, as well as of most 
caregiving’. In the present study it is argued that post-separation, 
mothers continue to be influenced by gendered norms of parenting and 
the concept of the ‘good’ mother as the ever-present caregiver. If, as the 
present study argues, mothers ‘judge and defend their own mothering 
according to dominant cultural themes’ (Arendell 1999: 21), mothers’ 
compliance behaviour will differ from fathers’, both in rate and in the 
factors associated with this behaviour. The alternative is that if gender is 
not relevant then existing theories explaining fathers’ non-compliance 
can apply equally to mothers.  
  Why this research matters for policy 
Child support can be described, to borrow Horst Rittel’s phrase 
(Churchman 1967: B141), as a ‘wicked problem’: more socially than 
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technically complex. Unlike compliance with taxation or business 
regulations that only involve a client–regulator relationship, other 
relationships—between parents and parent–child—matter. Solutions to 
wicked problems require behavioural change rather than reliance on law 
and regulation (Australian Public Service Commission 2007; Fien & 
Wilson 2014; Head 2010). Further, ‘the policy design process should be 
fundamentally shaped by the defining characteristics and culture of the 
particular...group with whom the policy problem resides’ (Australian 
Public Service Commission 2009: 27).  
We know how money operates in the ‘typical’ Australian post-separation 
family (although not everything) as liable-father cases comprise the bulk 
of cases, but knowledge of financial responsibilities among small groups 
such as liable mothers and payee fathers is negligible. There is policy 
value in studying ‘special populations’ (Smyth 2004; Vnuk 2010) not only 
because these groups could be larger in the future but also ‘sometimes 
what lies at the margins can be important for [understanding] what 
happens at the centre’ (Smyth & Wolcott 2004: 2).  
Policy responses meant for all parents but reliant solely on evidence 
about fathers (albeit the largest group) risk being ineffectual for mothers. 
As Vnuk (2010: 73) asserts: 
[I]t is necessary to explore whether an implicit gender blind approach 
to…compliance remains appropriate…[This] approach…locate[s] gender 
differences in compliance behaviour in the margins despite …[their] 
potential importance…for understanding compliance behaviour from a 
range of perspectives…This line of inquiry is not merely academic—it has 
important implications for the wellbeing of children. 
  Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 review the relevant 
Australian and international research respectively. Chapter 4 describes 
the Child Support Reform Study’s methodology, measures and data. 
Chapter 5 through Chapter 9 set out the results.  
Specifically, Chapter 5 and 6 answer Question 1: “What are the 
characteristics of mothers with a child support liability in Australia and 
what are the key differences between liable mothers and liable fathers?” 
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They do this by first comparing liable parents on socio-demographic, 
family dynamics, and wellbeing variables and identifies the key 
differences between liable mothers and liable fathers. Second, a typology 
of liable mothers developed for the present study is introduced and 
detailed. This chapter describes differences between four subgroups of 
liable mothers with different parenting arrangements.  
Chapters 7 and 8 answer Question 2: “Are liable mothers less compliant 
than liable fathers?” They do this by comparing liable parents on a range 
of child support and compliance variables. This chapter also compares 
compliance across all liable parents and payees and explores the level of 
concordant reports on child support paid among ex-couples where both 
former partners were interviewed. Chapter 8 provides a similar analysis 
of in-kind contributions.  
Chapter 9 answers Question 3: “What are the apparent reasons for 
non-compliance by liable mothers?” It does this by examining the odds of 
non-compliance across a range of variables, and identifies the key factors 
associated with non-compliance for liable mothers.  
Chapter 10 discusses the key findings from each chapter and the policy 
implications arising from these findings. This chapter also provides 
insights for service delivery, and future research.  
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Chapter 2  Literature review of nonresident mothers: 
Australian studies 
This chapter reviews the Australian studies of nonresident mothers and 
the related child support research. It is in three parts, broadly reflecting 
the three research questions relevant to the present study: (i) What are 
the characteristics of liable mothers? (ii) Are liable mothers less 
compliant than liable fathers? and (iii) What are the apparent reasons for 
non-compliance by liable mothers? Details of all the studies are 
summarised in Appendix A, Table A1. Relevant international literature is 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
The international literature is separated from the Australian literature as 
differences in law and policies, different social and economic conditions, 
cultural expectations, and gender specific norms of ‘good’ mothering and 
fathering, restrict direct transferability. The review concentrates on 
mothers’ reports. The small literature on lone and resident fathers (see, 
for example, Pike 2000; Turner, Monk & Mudaly 1998; Wilson, J 1990) 
are excluded as they do not deal with child support. The research 
reviewed in this chapter (and Chapter 3 covering the relevant 
international literature) mainly uses the term ‘nonresident’ to refer to 
parents with minority-time with at least one child where this term was 
used in the original research. 
  What are the characteristics of liable mothers in Australia? 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, while small numbers of mothers lived apart 
from their children in the previous century in Australia, child support 
was rarely ordered to be paid and few mothers were liable for child 
support in the early years of the Child Support Scheme (Child Support 
Evaluation Advisory Group 1992). Consequently, the research is scant. 
Where nonresident mothers were examined as a group of interest, the 
emphasis was on the mother role and child support was not explored. 
(McMurray (1992) is the exception.) 
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  Studies about nonresident mothers  
Early research exploring post-divorce circumstances only briefly 
mentioned nonresident mothers, that is, mothers with a child living 
elsewhere and no children in their household (see, for example, Burns 
1980) as part of a larger study whose focus was ‘traditional’ post-
separation arrangements. This approach concealed those mothers with 
both nonresident and resident children within the lone mother group 
(see, for example, Hughes 2000; Smyth & Weston 2000), leading to small 
sample sizes. Such post-separation population studies showed that being 
a minority-time mother of all their children was not a common 
arrangement; many so-called ‘nonresident’ mothers had other children in 
their household, often from the same former relationship. As a later 
study of minority-time mothers (Buskens 2002) revealed, mothers often 
did not stay living apart from their children, with a subsequent return to 
parenting some or all their children a frequent outcome.  
Of the two studies that were exclusively focused on nonresident mothers 
only one mentioned child support. This is not unexpected. Studies of 
separated parents have generally viewed child support from resident 
parents’ perspective (mainly mothers) and, less often, nonresident 
fathers’ perspective (for example, Hawthorne 2005). Few studies collect 
data on child support from liable mothers and none to date focus 
primarily on mothers’ reports.33 Until the early 2000s, where nonresident 
mothers were beginning to be included in the research on separated 
parents, their small numbers and consequential lack of statistical power 
meant responses were either briefly mentioned and then omitted from 
the analysis (for example, Harrison 1993) or aggregated under a generic 
nonresident parent category.  
In one of the two Australian studies of nonresident mothers Buskens 
(2005: 276), detailed the individual stories of 15 women who ‘chose to 
leave their husband and children’, focusing on the experience of 
                                       
33 Although the Millward, Campo and Fehlberg (2011) paper focused on liable mothers, 
their findings were mainly drawn from payee fathers’ reports. 
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mothering while ‘not actively mothering full-time’. The mothers had 
experience of the nonresident role at varying times: 1950s to the early 
2000s. Highlighting the high expectations placed on mothers in 
Australia, Buskens (2002: 36) noted the ‘double standard inherent in 
“parenting”’…mothers who left were judged more harshly than fathers’. 
Only one pre-2008 research article concentrated on nonresident mothers 
included questions about child support. In the early 1990s McMurray 
(1992) interviewed 43 previously married nonresident mothers in 
Western Australia. The aim of the research was to explore the mother–
child relationship from the mother’s perspective, and to inform 
professionals who might encounter nonresident mothers in clinical 
counselling practices. As was common with the small body of research in 
this area, all the mothers mentioned social stigma and, for some, the lack 
of support from their family or anyone who could understand their 
situation. Limited finances were reported as a factor in custody 
relinquishment, particularly when the mother had the children living 
initially with her, and a key difficulty in the mothers’ current situation. 
For the few mothers in the study who were liable to pay child support, 
payments and the rigidity of the system were areas of particular concern.  
One other report warrants discussion under this first research question. 
It gives some insights into individual expectations of mothering 
regardless of the parenting arrangements in place after separation, and 
provides a background to the present study. Funder and Smyth (1996a) 
explored attitudes to parental responsibilities in an evaluation of 1996 
reforms to the Family Law Act 1975. This study was a notable (first) 
exception to research that omitted or aggregated reports from 
nonresident mothers. Data were collected from the general population, 
and from a national sample of 495 divorced parents with dependent 
children who separated after the introduction of the Scheme (n=40 
nonresident mothers). The respondents were randomly selected from the 
1994 electronic White Pages (residential phone numbers database).  
A comparison of responses from resident mothers, resident fathers, 
nonresident mothers and nonresident fathers found gendered differences 
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in attitudes about parental responsibility, and in actual behaviour. Most 
divorced parents felt financial responsibilities should be shared (Funder 
& Smyth 1996a: 306). Although divorced parents accepted the principle 
of shared responsibilities for care, ‘contact’ and financial support, 
mothers felt ‘they took most of the responsibility for...[core] functions, 
whether or not they lived with the child or apart’ (Funder & Smyth 
1996a: x). Differences in behaviour between nonresident mothers and 
nonresident fathers were ‘consistent and very sizable’ (Funder & Smyth 
1996a: 46). 
  Government-funded research 
One reason that there is little information about liable mothers in 
Australia is because of the limited research interest in mothers with 
minority-time. In contrast to the international nonresident mother 
literature, minority-time mothers as a category of ‘mother’ appear absent 
from the work on contemporary mothering in Australia (see, for example, 
The Good Mother, Goodwin & Huppatz 2010). Consequently, information 
about liable mothers is predominantly found in government-funded child 
support and family law research. The rest of this literature review mainly 
refers to this work. Other work coming out of the Child Support Reform 
Study (CSRS, the data source used in the present study) is not discussed 
in this literature review. The previously published work using the CSRS 
(for example, Smyth, Rodgers, Son, Allen & Vnuk 2012: Smyth, Vnuk, 
Rodgers & Son 2014; Son, Rodgers & Smyth 2014) predominantly relates 
to separated mothers and separated fathers, or liable fathers and payee 
mothers. As the literature covered in this chapter purposely does not 
canvass all the Australian child support work for reasons of space and 
relevance, the omission of these studies is justified. 
Two studies commissioned by the Child Support Agency provide some 
further detail on the characteristics of liable mothers. The first covers the 
Scheme caseload from 1997 to 2001 and the second, a subgroup of the 
caseload—parents with a minimum liability case. Inclusion of liable 
mothers in these two reports is incidental to the main aim of the work. 
As will be discussed further in the next section on ‘are liable mothers 
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compliant’, this work continues the previous analytic approach of 
omitting analyses of liable mothers’ reports or aggregating them with 
those of liable fathers.  
Silvey and Birrell (2004) used the Child Support Agency administrative 
data to explore the financial circumstances of a cohort of registrants who 
separated in 1997 and remained in the caseload until at least 2001. The 
researchers aimed to establish how nonresident parents’ income changed 
after separation and to test anecdotal evidence that payers ‘seek to 
evade…obligations by reducing their engagement in the labour market’ 
(Silvey & Birrell 2004: 45); that is, the so-called ‘stuff-it’ option. 
Administrative data are useful for this type of analysis as they include 
detailed income information from the Australian Taxation Office. Analysis 
focused on male payers and female payees, including parents with no 
current liability. Mothers in the 1997 cohort, whether expected to pay or 
receive child support, generally had low incomes both at separation and 
in 2001. Median income of the 5,023 female payers was around $9,500. 
Median liability of female payers was $0 at registration and $260 in 2001 
reflecting the new minimum assessment. Silvey and Birrell concluded 
that the income profile of female payers closely matched both male and 
female payees, suggesting reliance on government income support, such 
as parenting payments or unemployment benefits. 
The other CSA study was an evaluation of the 1999 introduction of a 
minimum assessment by Wolffs and Shallcross (2000). This involved 
1,500 parents liable to pay the minimum amount drawn from a random 
sample of 8,000 payers from the Agency caseload (Child Support Agency 
2001). Wolffs and Shallcross (2000: 28) noted that 15% of payer 
respondents were female. This was almost double their representation in 
the caseload but matched the 14% of minimum assessments with a 
liable mother. Their circumstances were quite complex: 13% of mothers 
had more than one case, compared with 4% in the total caseload. Forty 
per cent of mothers had repartnered, indicating some were supported by 
a new partner and had little income of their own. 
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These two early studies indicate that many liable mothers have low 
incomes and low liabilities and that the introduction of the minimum 
liability may have particularly affected low-income minority-time mothers 
who previously had no liability to pay because their income was below 
the self-support amount. The policy had been promoted as a means to 
reinforce responsibility for disengaged fathers and this outcome was not 
foreshadowed (or likely foreseen) by those promoting this policy change 
(Vnuk 2000). 
The remainder of this chapter reviews findings on child support from a 
group of large, government-commissioned research projects undertaken 
by the Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS). Their main purpose 
was to evaluate the 2006 and 2012 reforms to the family law and system. 
Specifically, the first set (the Longitudinal Study of Separated Families 
(LSSF)) comprises three waves of data from 10,000 parents who 
separated after the 2006 family law reforms (Kaspiew et al. 2009; Qu & 
Weston 2010; Qu et al. 2014). The second (the Survey of Recently 
Separated Parents (SRSP) 2012 and 2014) involves two cohorts of 
parents, 6,119 who separated in 2011 and 6,079 in 2013, that is before 
and after the 2012 family violence and child safety reforms (De Maio et 
al. 2013; Kaspiew, Carson, Dunstan et al. 2015). The 2012 reforms had 
the objective of ‘placing greater emphasis on protecting children from 
harm in making post-separation parenting arrangements…[This 
includes] a wider definition of family violence [and] greater emphasis on 
the principle of protecting children [and] prioritising [this] over the 
meaningful involvement principle’ (De Maio et al. 2013: 2).  
This AIFS work shares common features: (i) the sampling frame was the 
Child Support Agency active caseload for cases registered in the year 
before the survey34 (ii) the average time since separation was 17–18 
months for the survey or first wave; (iii) questions about one (focus) child 
of the relationship, who was on average preschool age in 200835 and 
                                       
34 Wave 3 involved 5,755 parents from Wave 1 and a ‘top up’ group of 3,372 selected 
using the same sample extraction, that is, separated July 2006 to December 2007 and 
registered a case between January and May 2008. 
35The focus child was the first listed for the case in the administrative database: mainly 
the youngest child, with 58% under 3 years old (Qu & Weston 2010: 4). The inclusion 
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primary school age by Wave 3 (LSSF) or aged seven (SRSP); and (iv) a 
standard set of child support questions. The sample unit was the case to 
maximise the number of former couples where both parents were 
interviewed. The sample was stratified by liable parents’ gender, with 
sampling rates designed to achieve the highest probability of selecting 
cases with a liable mother.  
These studies are discussed as a group as findings build on previous 
waves and/or studies. One other study, a longitudinal qualitative 
research project (Fehlberg, Millward & Campo 2010), is reviewed 
alongside this work as it similarly was an evaluation of the 2006 family 
law reform and covered a comparable time period. This post-2008 work 
can be seen as ‘second generation’ studies (Smyth 2009: 52).36  
Two of these studies provide some descriptive analysis of relevance to 
this research question. The first, as part of profiling parenting-time 
arrangements of parents who separated after the 2006 family law 
reforms, included profiling of mothers in cases where the focus child 
spent most of the time with their father (Kaspiew et al. 2009); 5% of 
families in the LSSF Wave 1. This group included split-residence mothers 
where the focus child was with the father. Details for mothers with no 
time were based on fathers’ reports. The mothers were more likely to (i) 
have an older adolescent; (ii) be in full-time employment; (iii) be living 
with a current partner; and (iv) be less involved with their child prior to 
separation. Many of these mothers had a resident child. Notably, not all 
mothers in this group were liable parents. 
This first AIFS report highlighted the challenge in identifying liable 
mothers; a difficulty common to work that use the CSA administrative 
data as a sample frame. This is indicative of the issue mentioned in 
Section 1.2.4, that is, the Agency’s inclusion of parents with no current 
                                                                                                                
of parents who had never lived together contributed to the younger age of the focus 
child (De Maio et al. 2013: 11). Mean age of the focus child in the SRSP 2012 and 
2014 was seven years; older than in the LSSF as parents who never lived together 
were omitted from the SRSP sample (De Maio et al. 2013).  
36 The Child Support Reform Study (CSRS) used for the present study is the other main 
second-generation work. 
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liability as ‘payers’. Of the 683 mothers identified in CSA records as 
payers, 195 mothers actually reported that they were liable at Wave 1 
(Kaspiew et al. 2009 Appendix B Table 9). Four percent of mothers in the 
LSSF were supposed to pay child support and 16% reported neither 
paying nor receiving child support, reflecting cases with no current 
liability. Further analysis of the LSSF showed few mothers with equal or 
majority-time (here, more than 65% time) were required to pay and 
although higher proportions of mothers had a liability as their percentage 
of overnights reduced, it did not exceed 50% for any of the parenting 
arrangements reported (Weston 2010). In comparison, 87–91% of fathers 
reported they were liable to pay child support when they had less than 
35% time with the focus child (Kaspiew et al. 2009: 193). 
While the AIFS work did not describe liable mothers as a group in any 
detail, another family law evaluation did. Liable mothers with more than 
minority-time were included in the mothers profiled in the second 
relevant study. In their 2011 paper, Millward, Campo and Fehlberg 
explored a small group of liable-mother cases as part of their larger 
longitudinal qualitative study involving 60 separated parents and 
interaction of time, property settlement and child support after the 2006 
family law reforms (see Fehlberg 2008; Fehlberg, Millward & Campo 
2009a, 2009b, 2010; Fehlberg et al. 2013). Parents were recruited 
through newspaper and online advertisements or via mediation/family 
court services in Victoria. The recruitment strategy targeted separated 
parents with primary school aged children and oversampled for shared-
time. Their paper on liable mothers used information from the first 
interview in 2009, a year after the child support reforms. 
Of the 11 cases where the mother was liable to pay, four interviews were 
with the mother. Three of these mothers had ‘substantially shared’ 
arrangements (43–70% time) and one had equal-time. In all other cases 
including all those where the father had primary (at least 90%) time, the 
father was the parent interviewed. Four fathers had primary time, one 
had majority (57%) time and two had equal-time. This research 
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highlights the wider range of mothers who are liable. The impact of this 
on child support arrangements is discussed later in this chapter.  
  Compliance rates of liable mothers 
This section covers the small amount of literature relevant to the second 
research question: are liable mothers less compliant than liable fathers? 
Returning to the two CSA commissioned studies mentioned above, some 
limited information can be gleaned. Wolffs and Shallcross (2000: 29) in 
their evaluation of the minimum liability found mothers were less likely 
than fathers to report they ‘always paid on time’ (47% compared with 
51%) and more likely to report they ‘never paid’ (26% compared with 
21%). The researchers did not say if any statistical tests were applied to 
these results so it is unclear if these differences were significant. 
Findings of this study relate to liable parents with the lowest incomes, 
and may not be an indication of compliance in the overall caseload.  
In the other CSA study, Silvey and Birrell (2004) noted that the mean 
liability of mothers in 2001 was $803 and their mean debt was $225. 
Their median liability was $260 (that is, the minimum liability under the 
Assessment Act). In contrast, fathers had a liability of $3,262 and a debt 
of $936. Their median liability was $1,695 (Silvey & Birrell 2004: 47). 
Notably, mothers had a lower mean debt than fathers, partly because of 
lower liabilities, often the minimum. 
One other study from the mid-2000s is relevant to refer to when 
reviewing the literature for this research question. Natalier, Walter, Wulff, 
Reynolds and Hewitt (2008), as part of their work that explored child 
support and housing outcomes, briefly mentioned mothers who paid 
child support. Using data from Wave 4 of the Housing and Family 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey collected in 2004–05 and the 
category of ‘parents apart’ to be inclusive of ‘all parents...of dependent 
children who do not, or no longer, reside in the same household as the 
other parent of their child’ (Natalier et al. 2008: 6), the researchers found 
that 39% of mothers with a nonresident child reported paying child 
support. This was significantly lower than the 78% of fathers who paid 
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something (Natalier et al. 2008: 33). Further discussion of child support 
was not disaggregated by gender. 
This research is an example of where findings about mothers and their 
payment of child support can be misinterpreted by the general reader. 
Response categories in HILDA Wave 4 did not distinguish between 
situations where no child support was meant to be paid (that is, where 
there was no arrangement for payment in place or no current liability) 
and not paying an expected amount in full (that is, actual non-
compliance). Thus, this research shows significantly lower rate of 
payment by mothers than fathers but no substantial information about 
their compliance. Moreover, the number of nonresident mothers in Wave 
4 was small (n=36) as the researchers excluded those with both resident 
and nonresident children (n=54). The reduced pool of potential liable 
mothers may be important as another HILDA analysis indicated almost 
half of mothers with a nonresident child had a resident child from the 
previous relationship (Parkinson & Smyth 2003: 4). 
  Child support compliance rates for recently separated 
parents: family law evaluations 
The main source of compliance information about liable mothers comes 
from the three waves of the LSSF. Analysis of data from liable mothers 
and payee fathers in the first two waves of the LSSF were restricted to 
rates of compliance. Information was available for 195 liable mothers at 
Wave 1: 59% reported paying in full and on time compared with 74% of 
liable fathers. In contrast, just half of payee fathers reported receiving 
child support in full and on time, with 21% receiving payments neither in 
full nor on time (Weston 2010). Further analysis was limited to liable 
fathers and payee mothers.  
At Wave 2, analysis of parents who participated in both waves (Qu & 
Weston 2010: 124) found no change in liable mothers’ compliance at the 
aggregate level (56% compared with 55%), although more mothers 
reported paying neither in full nor on time than in 2008 (26% compared 
with 19%).(The number of liable mothers was not stated, but probably 
less than 200 based on other questions in the section on child support). 
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Payee fathers reported lower compliance than liable mothers at 34%; 
lower than at Wave 1 (Qu & Weston 2010: 125).  
At Wave 3, of the 211 liable mothers, 60% reported being compliant, 
again lower than liable fathers (73%) but higher than previous waves. A 
third of payee fathers reported full compliance, the same as Wave 2 (Qu 
et al. 2014). Liable mothers had higher rates of paying neither in full nor 
on time than liable fathers at all waves (17–26% compared with 3–6%) 
(Qu et al. 2014:124). No tests of significance comparing liable parent 
responses were noted at any wave.  
Comparing reports across LSSF waves, the impact of churn (that is, 
movement out of the liable parent group) warrants consideration: 37% of 
mothers liable in 2008 were no longer liable one year later compared with 
one-in-ten liable fathers (Qu & Weston 2010: 119). Analysis of the 
continuing sample at Wave 3 revealed that half of mothers liable at Wave 
1 were payees or had no current liability in 2012 (Qu et al. 2014). 
Consequently, compliance for liable mothers and payee fathers in 
particular represented a different group of parents at each wave. Further, 
any impact of time since separation on compliance was difficult to 
identify as this did not necessarily equate with time liable for around half 
of liable mothers at Wave 3.  
Compliance information was more limited in the SRSP 2012 (De Maio et 
al. 2013) and SRSP 2014 (Kaspiew et al. 2015) than in the LSSF Wave 3. 
Reports from liable parents are restricted to fullness as a programming 
error meant that only payees were asked about timeliness. Liable 
mothers in the 2012 cohort (n=251) reported significantly lower rates of 
full payment than liable fathers (87% compared with 95%). In contrast, 
liable mothers in the 2014 cohort (5% of mothers) had similar rates of 
full payment to liable fathers (94% and 95%) and were significantly more 
likely to pay in full than liable mothers in 2012. Patterns of compliance 
for payees confirmed results from the three waves of the LSSF showing 
lower reports of compliance by payee fathers than payee mothers (40% 
compared with 49% in 2012 and in 2014) and were significantly more 
likely to report that the payment was neither in full nor on time than 
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payee mothers (De Maio et al. 2013: 111; Kaspiew, Carson, Dunstan et 
al. 2015: 175 ). 
  Qualitative reports on compliance  
Unlike the AIFS studies based on survey data, Millward, Campo and 
Fehlberg’s (2011) qualitative study noted that the liable mothers did not 
have lower compliance than liable fathers. Seven of the 11 mothers paid 
periodic child support, direct costs or both. Most mothers had Private 
Collect and preferred to pay directly for their children’s clothing, medical 
or school costs because they ‘were closely focused on children’s daily life 
and needs and…generally organised children’s weekly activities... 
regardless of the type of parenting arrangements in place’ (Millward, 
Campo & Fehlberg 2011: 70), or felt that the father was financially 
irresponsible. The researchers noted that where the mother paid directly 
for their children’s expenses, it appeared that they paid more than 
required by the formula.  
  Reasons for non-compliance by liable mothers 
This section reviews the very limited literature on reasons for non-
compliance by liable mothers. The AIFS studies described above did not 
explore reasons for non-compliance in liable mother cases. However, 
perception of fairness; attitudes on a range of statements reflecting views 
that could affect compliance; and experiences of violence/abuse were 
reported by gender of the liable parent in some of the AIFS reports and 
are discussed later in this section for background. Only two studies thus 
far have reported any possible reasons for non-compliance. One study 
was restricted to liable parents with the lowest incomes in the CSA 
caseload; the other uses data from four in-depth interviews with parents 
in cases with a liable mother.  
In Wolffs and Shallcross’s (2000: 29) evaluation of the minimum liability, 
affordability was the reason given for non-payment by 43% of mothers. 
Other reasons for non-compliance were not detailed. As payment was 
required from parents whose sole income was FTB or a Disability 
Support Pension, this finding was unsurprising.  
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Millward, Campo and Fehlberg (2011) described four cases where the 
liable mother was not paying in full. In three of the four cases the father 
was the parent interviewed and he agreed to the non-payment because of 
shared-time or other reasons specific to that case. The one mother who 
conceded that she was not paying in full was in dispute with the Child 
Support Program about the assessment and was angry that the father 
had not paid her when he was the liable parent (Millward, Campo & 
Fehlberg 2011). It would appear from this work that some ‘non-
compliance’ reflected agreed arrangements not to pay in full. In another 
paper from this study, the authors suggested that coercion was a reason 
for accepting less child support for payee mothers but was not reported 
by any payee fathers (Fehlberg, Millward & Campo 2010).  
The next part of this section discusses some issues that could potentially 
be relevant to non-compliance and is discussed mainly for the purposes 
of background to the present study.  
At Wave 3 of the LSSF, the researchers reported compliance rates based 
on whether the respondent had or had not experienced violence or abuse 
from their former partner in the previous 12 months. These were 
measured based on reports of being physically hurt or experiencing 
emotional abuse (for example, threats, belittling or circulating derogatory 
comments about you) (Qu et al. 2014: 21). Data were collected at all 
three waves but not previously reported. Compliance was significantly 
lower at Wave 2 for liable mothers who experienced violence/abuse but 
not significantly different in other waves (Qu et al. 2014).37 Compliance 
did not differ for liable fathers. However, based on the figures provided 
with this table in the report, most liable mothers experienced 
violence/abuse at Wave 1 and 2 (77% and 60%) and half at Wave 3. 
Whether the lower rate of compliance was because of the violence/abuse 
was not investigated further. Liable mothers who experienced 
violence/abuse may differ from those that did not in other ways that 
                                       
37 Compliance was significantly lower in Waves 1 and 3 for payee fathers who 
experienced violence/abuse (Qu et al. 2014). As with liable mothers, fathers reported 
high rates of experiencing violence and abuse: 66% at Wave 1, 52% at Wave 2 and 
42% at Wave 3. 
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were not tested or another factor could be associated with both non-
compliance and violence/abuse. 
Data on physical hurt and emotional abuse were also collected in the 
SRSP 2012 and 2014 (using the same categories as the LSSF) but the 
section on child support in the two SRSP reports only contained data 
from payees.38 Further, information from the 2014 cohort of payees was 
presented by experience of physical abuse, emotional abuse or neither, 
not disaggregated by payee gender.  
At Wave 3 of the LSSF, parents were asked several one-off questions 
about whether they agreed with a set of attitudinal statements that 
previous research (that is research with payee mothers and/or liable 
fathers) suggest are potential reasons for non-compliance.39 Responses to 
these statements are informative for the present study as they have not 
been asked of liable mothers before. While there was a high rate of 
agreement by both liable mothers and liable fathers that the amount was 
affordable, the level of agreement differed for the other statements. 
Fathers more often agreed that the amount was ‘more than the child 
needs’ and that they resented paying because of ‘no say in spending’ and 
because of the amount of time they had with their children, than liable 
mothers (Qu et al. 2014). The high level of agreement by fathers to the 
latter statements is not unexpected (see for example, Hawthorne & 
Linings 2008; Natalier & Hewitt 2010). As reasons for non-compliance 
were not explored in this report, it is uncertain what impact or 
association, if any, liable mothers’ less strong support for these views 
had on actual compliance behaviour. 
It is useful under this broad discussion of non-compliance to examine 
findings from the LSSF and the SRSP about differing perceptions of 
fairness of the amount of child support payable by liable parents. These 
                                       
38 Payee fathers in the SRSP 2012 who reported physical violence or emotional abuse 
reported lower compliance: 32–34% compared with 57% for payee fathers with no 
experience of violence or abuse (De Maio et al. 2013: 113). Again, the majority (64%) 
reported experiencing physical hurt or emotional abuse, predominantly the latter. 
39 The Department of Human Services (DHS) paid for the attitudinal questions to be 
asked at Wave 3. (The Attorney-General’s Department funded the survey overall.) The 
reasons for possible non-compliance, and how these were subsequently worded in the 
survey, were provided by DHS.  
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are reported by gender and, in the SRSP, by gender and parenting 
arrangement. Liable mothers were the least likely of the four groups 
(liable mothers, liable fathers, payee mothers and payee fathers) to report 
that the amount was fair across all five AIFS reports: 27–36% of liable 
mother rating child support as very unfair compared with 14–21% of 
liable fathers (De Maio et al. 2013; Kaspiew et al. 2009; Kaspiew, Carson, 
Dunstan et al. 2015 ; Qu & Weston 2010; Qu et al. 2014).  
When fairness was reported by parenting-time across the four groups for 
the two most recent cohorts of separated parents, differing perceptions of 
liable parents with shared time was the most striking finding. Among 
parents who registered a case in 2011, 65% of shared-time liable 
mothers described the amount of child support as ‘somewhat’ or ‘very 
unfair’ compared with 45% of shared-time liable fathers (De Maio et al. 
2013: 114). Rates were even higher among the cohort who separated in 
2013. Kaspiew, Carson, Dunstan and others (2015: 179) found that 73% 
of shared-time liable mothers described the amount as ‘somewhat’ or 
‘very unfair’ compared with 48% of shared-time liable fathers. It is 
possible that fairness may play some part in liable mothers’ non-
compliance but this was not tested.  
  Key points from the Australian literature 
The Australian research on liable mothers is small, patchy, and 
underdeveloped. The pre-2008 evidence relies on reports from a small 
number of self-selected nonresident mothers; 225 liable mothers with a 
minimum assessment; and analysis of the 1997–2001 Scheme caseload 
including mothers classified as ‘payers’ with no current liability. These 
studies provide only limited data to inform the present study. They 
suggest that separated mothers who live apart from one or more of their 
children generally remain connected to their children who lived elsewhere 
and that many so-called ‘nonresident’ mothers had a shared-time or a 
resident child. Further, based on older caseload data, female payers in 
general appear to have low incomes and low liabilities.  
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The studies highlight that mothers with a nonresident child appear less 
likely to pay child support than fathers but, as Vnuk (2010) has 
previously pointed out, non-payment due to no liability is difficult to 
disentangle from non-compliance. This presents a challenge in 
identifying and describing liable mothers. Although there is likely to be a 
significant overlap between minority-time (nonresident) mothers and 
liable mothers (the focus of the present study), these two groups are not 
the same. First, some liable mothers may have more than minority-time 
with one or more former relationship children. Second, some minority-
time mothers may not be liable mothers because they do not have a CSA 
case, or where labelled as ‘payers’ in the CSA administrative caseload 
data, may have no current liability.  
The post-2008 data from representative ‘second generation’ studies 
(Smyth 2009: 52) such as the LSSF and SRSP, show compliance rates 
but provide no detailed description of liable mothers, or how they might 
differ from liable fathers. Thus, the first research gap to address is to 
produce a comprehensive profile of liable mothers. 
The post-2008 data, provide a consistent story about compliance rates of 
cohorts of recently separated parents mainly with young (preschool or 
early primary school age) children 40 using reports from liable parents 
and payees. Liable mothers consistently report lower compliance than 
liable fathers (but whether significantly lower was not stated) and appear 
to view child support as less fair for them but reasons for this were not 
explored. The one longitudinal qualitative study provides a broader view 
of financial responsibility across a range of post-separation parenting 
arrangements, although mainly from payee fathers’ perspectives.  
Compliance rates are the area of previous work that has received the 
most research attention, reflecting the aim of including the range of 
separated families in the family law evaluation post-2008. Nonetheless, 
there is still a gap in understanding compliance for liable parents in the 
                                       
40 In 2009–10, 73% of children with a mother living elsewhere were over nine years of 
age (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011). 
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broader caseload and to understand how liable mothers’ non-compliance 
might differ from liable fathers’ non-compliance. These gaps include 
payment of none of the expected amount; reasons for non-compliance 
within the liable mother group (for example, by parenting-time, by 
income); and concordance of reports of payment from both former 
partners using dyadic data.  
The research to date has been descriptive and atheoretical. The only 
research that utilised a theoretical framework (Buskens 2005) did not 
cover child support. While gender and the different role expectations for 
mothers and fathers were raised in several studies, the focus was on 
differences between payee mothers and liable fathers.  
The Australian research does not appear to be informed by the 
international work on minority-time and/or liable mothers. Further, 
liable mothers are absent from shared-time studies that discuss child 
support (see, for example, Cashmore et al. 2010; Lacroix 2006; Rhoades, 
Graycar & Harrison 2000) with the exception of Fehlberg et al. (2013), 
highlighting a gap in the evidence base. 
The next chapter details findings from the international research, and 
explores their relevance for liable mothers in the Australian child support 
system.  
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Chapter 3  Literature review: international studies  
This chapter reviews the relevant international nonresident mother and 
child support research. The structure of this chapter follows that of 
Chapter 2 that is, broadly reflecting the three research questions relevant 
to the present study: (i) What are the characteristics of liable mothers? (ii) 
Are liable mothers less compliant than liable fathers? and (iii) What are 
the apparent reasons for non-compliance by liable mothers?  
The nonresident/liable mother literature is followed by three studies 
comparing nonresident parents’ child support payment by gender using 
reports from resident parents or payees. These are included as they test 
some relevant theoretical approaches. The final section discusses the 
applicability and limitations of the existing international literature and 
identifies gaps to be addressed by the present study. As in Chapter 2, the 
focus is on mothers’ reports and mainly uses the term ‘nonresident’ to 
refer to parents with minority-time with at least one child where this 
term was used in the original research. Details of all the nonresident 
mother and related child support studies are summarised in Appendix A, 
Table A2. 
Most of the international literature covered in this chapter is from the US 
with some work from Norway. However, the relevant work does not 
necessarily reflect the interest in child support research in general, for 
example, Canada, UK and New Zealand are under-represented in this 
review. In the case of the latter two countries this is because of a 
methodological approach to aggregate child support data from mothers 
and fathers into one group of nonresident/liable parents.  
  What are the characteristics of liable mothers?  
This section reviews the international literature relevant to the first 
research question, what are the characteristics of liable mothers. Most of 
the research on nonresident mothers, particularly the pre-2000s work, 
does not explore child support, or does so by brief reference incidental to 
the main theme of exploring the ‘nonresident’ mother role. This section 
begins with an overview of this nonresident mother work to provide 
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context for this research question and to inform the theoretical 
framework of gendered expectations of the mother role.  
Early work focused on the process of leaving children (‘how could she?’), 
and the mother–child relationship exploring how and why women lived 
apart from their children and their adjustment. The main themes were 
from psychology and social work, often with a therapeutic approach. In-
depth interviews about personal experiences prevailed. Some researchers 
suggested that the subject of ‘nonresident’ mothers lends itself to a 
qualitative rather than quantitative approach ‘given the role ambiguity 
and “outsider” status’ (Arditti 1995: 299). Early US and Canadian work 
(for example, Fischer 1983; Isenhart 1979; Larsen 1987; Polson 1977; 
Todres 1978) were convenience samples, often small-scale, utilising 
language of ‘deviancy’, ‘moral courage’, ‘childless mother’, ‘run-away 
wives’, and ‘natural mothers who terminate the primary parent role’. 
This was followed by 1980s and early 1990s work which comprised both 
academic dissertations and in popular book format (Edwards, H 1989; 
Franks 1990; Glubka 1983; Herrerias 1984, 1995; Koehler 1982; Meyers 
& Lakin 1983; Paskowicz 1982). Participants were mainly from the US 
but also Canada and the UK, recruited through newspaper and magazine 
ads, nonresident mother support groups or via personal contact. Some 
lacked a theoretical framework although others were informed by 
feminist theory or a symbolic interaction theoretical framework (Chesler 
1986; Herrerias 1984). Again, the titles emphasised the atypical role.41 
Most attempted to present nonresident mothers in a sympathetic light, 
featuring the authors’ personal experiences as nonresident mothers, 
while the UK study by Franks was more judgemental addressing the 
stigma and intense disapproval expressed towards these ‘unnatural 
women’. Chesler (1986) writing more broadly on custody disputes 
highlighted that any woman who acted outside the expected role of a 
                                       
41 For example, Paskowicz Absentee Mothers; Meyers and Lakin Who Will Take the 
Children?; Edwards How Could You? Mothers without custody of their children; and 
Franks Mummy Doesn’t Live Here Anymore.  
   
55 
 
‘good’ mother, by for example working outside the home, could risk 
losing her children if the father contested this in court.  
Some scholars criticise this group of work as ‘advocacy scholarship’ 
(Depner 1993: 52), as ‘[many] wrote about personally being noncustodial 
mothers…setting themselves up as the individual frames of reference in 
their studies’ (Herrerias 1984: 62). Others suggest ‘sharing common 
experiences and engaging with participants person to person creates a 
“safe” environment, helping to produce a setting where participants feel 
comfortable discussing their personal experiences’ (Bemiller 2005: 49).  
Payment of child support by the mother was rarely covered in this early 
research because an order for a mother to pay was still an unusual 
situation. As Franks (1990: 198) explained:  
Even the paying of maintenance, which can be perceived as a validation of 
parenthood, can be felt as punishment if it is imposed in a fashion 
suggesting the mother as miscreant. Women who leave and pay through 
choice are in some ways in a better position psychologically.  
Nonetheless, the lack of payment of child support by fathers was a 
dominant theme. For example, comparing 12 mothers who ‘voluntarily 
gave up custody’ mostly for economic reasons with a group of 
nonresident fathers, Chesler (1986: 202) found 
[h]igher earning fathers expressed no guilt about paying too little or no child 
support; the lower earning mothers all said they “wished” they could afford 
to send their children more or some money.  
  US nonresident mother studies including child support 
This section reviews several substantial studies of nonresident mothers 
(one that included shared-time arrangements) where child support was 
one issue addressed. This is followed by five qualitative studies that focus 
on some key issues in depth. (Other work with nonresident mothers is 
deliberately omitted from this review or discussed in less detail.) The first 
major work was by Greif (1986; Greif & Pabst 1988). In 1983, Greif 
surveyed 517 nonresident mothers from US and Canada, drawn from two 
self-help groups: Parents without Partners and Mothers without Custody. 
Additional in-depth interviews were conducted with survey respondents 
and other nonresident mothers between 1983 and 1987. Greif (1986: 87) 
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noted the difficulty of locating a representative sample and the absence of 
data on nonresident mothers, and suggested his study could be used as 
a baseline.  
Greif utilised a role theory framework, highlighting differing expectations 
of payment in the mid–1980s. Mothers expressed ambivalence, ambiguity 
and anger about child support and resented having to pay, particularly 
when they had a low income or earned less than the father. Again, lack of 
money in general, or because of fathers’ non-payment of child support, 
explained why children lived with their father. Greif and Pabst (1988: 
181) identified a role conflict with ‘few models to follow... [Mothers] are 
either held to no standard or to the same standard that is used for 
fathers’.  
Greif and Pabst (1988) did not ask mothers whether payment was court 
ordered or whether the full amount was paid. However, the researchers 
noted that mothers who paid (i) earned higher incomes; (ii) were less 
likely to have a child of the relationship living with them; and (iii) 
described themselves as more involved with their nonresident children 
(Greif & Pabst 1988: 143) 
In another influential piece of work, Maccoby, Mnookin, Depner and 
Peters (1992) covered a range of post-separation parenting arrangements 
of 1,100 Californian families who filed for divorce in 1984–85 and who 
were followed for three years. At Time 1, 32% of children were either in 
shared-time, mainly with the father or split between the parents 
(Maccoby et al. 1992: 74). Children were significantly more likely to live 
mainly with their father if the mother had low involvement in parenting 
pre-separation; the father had concerns about the child’s wellbeing; and 
the mother did not mistrust the father’s childrearing skills. Other factors 
included choice by an older child and the father exerting power over the 
mother (Maccoby et al. 1992: 88). 
Nonresident mothers were less likely to be ordered to pay child support 
than nonresident fathers (36% compared with 89–96%), mainly because 
of their lower income. When parents had shared-time, 67% of cases had 
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a child support order; 1% where the mother was liable (Maccoby et al. 
1992: 116–119). Analysis of compliance was restricted to liable fathers. 
Five qualitative studies involving nonresident mothers solely or in 
comparison with other separated parents (Babcock 1995; Heikes 1993; 
Bemiller 2005; Kartch 2013; Cozzolino 2014) provide some insight into 
views on how the mother role is experienced and on financial 
responsibilities including child support. Babcock (1995, 1998) 
interviewed 50 nonresident mothers with the aim of understanding the 
individualised meaning of nonresident motherhood. Mothers’ role identity 
was explored via a feminist framework. To address problems of non-
representative samples Babcock (1995: 50) adopted a comprehensive 
recruitment process: public court records of parents who divorced in 
1989–94 in Idaho, telephone directory searches, advertising and, to 
increase the diversity of her self-selected sample, recruited 10 mothers 
through the Gay and Lesbian Parents Coalition International.  
As in earlier studies, Babcock (1995) found the lack of economic 
resources was a significant factor in father custody but unlike previously, 
50–70% of mothers were liable (depending on the subgroup involved). 
Babcock (1995: 61) suggested this reflected the introduction of federal 
child support guidelines and a ‘more gender-neutral stance by the 
courts’. 
Mother identity remained salient for all but one of the respondents. They 
consistently defined themselves as mothers, not nonresident mothers. 
Ideas of motherhood were redefined to deal with ‘identity dissonance’ 
which Babcock (1995: 92) described as ‘the discomfort experienced by 
respondents when their self-perceptions as mothers do not match their 
perception of the societal (identity) standard of motherhood’. Redesign of 
their parenting style and the mother–child relationship to be more 
‘buddy-like’ (Babcock 1998: 147) was one example given.  
Comparisons with 20 nonresident fathers highlighted that fathers were 
more likely to be ordered to pay child support while mothers had more 
frequent in-person contact. While the fathers regarded paying child 
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support as part of their fathering identity, none of the mothers saw it as 
part of ‘nonresidential mothering’ (Babcock 1995: 106).  
Taking a similar theme and theoretical approach (here a synthesis of 
symbolic interaction and feminism), Heikes (1993) examined role-making 
and gender negotiation for 20 single custodial fathers and seven 
nonresident mothers in Texas. Confirming Babcock’s findings, the 
‘noncustodial’ aspect of motherhood did not appear to be part of mother 
identity. Heikes (1993: 105) suggested that by divorcing and choosing to 
be noncustodial mothers they were ‘doubly deviant’ and must necessarily 
portray their decision to relinquish custody as showing they were ‘good 
mothers’. Only two mothers paid child support regularly, one was still 
entitled to payment from her ex-husband under a previous court order 
and the remaining four had no order in place (Heikes 1993: 50). 
A decade later, Bemiller (2005) interviewed 16 nonresident mothers in 
Ohio located via flyers at university, social support agencies, coffee 
shops, laundromats and therapeutic services, and snowballing. 
Consistent with early approaches, such as Babcock’s, Bemiller (2005: 5) 
used a feminist framework as ‘this allows for the active participation of 
noncustodial mothers in defining and understanding their subjective 
experiences’. Most mothers ‘attempted to participate in intensive 
mothering strategies’ (Bemiller 2005: 157). Mothers who were unable to 
live up to dominant expectations of motherhood (that is, providing daily 
care by living with their child, meeting their child’s needs, buying things 
and paying for extra-curricular activities) reported a great deal of guilt 
and shame, which affected how they viewed themselves as mothers. 
Bemiller (2005: 133) pointed out that only five mothers resisted this 
dominant ideology of mothering. However, although 10 mothers were 
ordered to pay child support, few did. (Reasons for this are discussed 
further in Section 3.3.) All the mothers recounted experiences of violence 
or abuse (Bemiller 2008). A similar, high rate of domestic violence (75%) 
was noted in another US study (Herrerias 2008).  
More recently, Kartch (2013) used a symbolic interaction framework to 
explore the parental role focusing on parent–child communication. 
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Twenty nonresident mothers and 20 nonresident fathers recruited via 
Facebook, Craiglist and the university, completed in-depth interviews. Of 
the eight major parental roles, the provider role was the fourth identified 
by parents, with both mothers and fathers seeing this as ‘part of their 
continuing responsibility towards their nonresidential children’ (Kartch 
2013: 44). Mothers mentioned this role as often as fathers. A third of 
parents identified ‘providing’ as a method of enacting parenting, although 
further analysis suggested that providing for children included spending 
time and other financial contributions rather than solely child support. 
In noting that more than half of parents reported similar roles for 
mothers and fathers, Kartch (2013: 85) pointed to ‘a shift in the way 
society understands parenting’. Nonetheless, a substantial minority of 
the mothers still saw their role as a nurturer and the role of a father as 
provider. The shift in parental roles found by Kartch may be due to the 
predominantly college-level education of the participants, suggesting a 
more egalitarian attitude to parenting.  
Another qualitative study focusing on parental roles provides a different 
perspective to that raised in Kartch’s work. Cozzolino (2014) interviewed 
eight nonresident parents (n=2 mothers), seven resident mothers and six 
adult children of divorced/separated parents to explore how mothers and 
fathers determined the appropriate use of child support monies. The 
views of the two nonresident mothers reflected their prior resident 
mother role as well as their current role and the way that the child 
support system operated in the US for poor people. In their nonresident 
role they emphasised the unaffordability of payments and that ‘love, time 
and caring’ mattered more than money to children. (Cozzolino 2014: 46). 
The literature discussed above mainly focused on the mother role with 
some discusion of child support in the later work. As previously 
mentioned, this research was mainly qualitative. Another strand of work 
relevant to this research question involves large representative datasets 
used to identify similarities and differences between nonresident mothers 
and fathers. Although data from resident parents were more often used 
in the research than nonresident parents, particularly where child 
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support payment was the focus (see Section 3.4 where three analyses 
using a gender role theorectical aproach are described), a few did use 
nonresident mothers’ reports. Government-funded research exploring the 
characteristics and compliance of liable parents (predominantly minority-
time parents) undertaken to address the limited socio-demographic 
information on nonresident fathers and their ability to pay child support 
is covered in this subsection. This work reflects the formula-based child 
support legislation and an increased government investment in research 
to improve collection and enforcement (see, for example in the US the 
work from the Institute for Poverty Research and The Urban Institute, 
and in the UK the Department for Work and Pensions), and thus liable 
mothers were included. Although UK and New Zealand undertook 
research into child support compliance (see, for example, Atkinson & 
McKay 2005; Colmar Brunton 2009; Wikeley et al. 2001), the US work 
was the sole source of data where liable mothers were discussed as a 
separate group.  
Sousa and Sorensen (2006) used data from the 2002 National Survey of 
America’s Families (NSAF) to describe nonresident mothers in the general 
population. The NSAF was representative of 10 million nonresident 
parents: 2.2 million mothers. Nonresident mothers had similar age, 
education, and marital status as nonresident fathers but mothers had 
lower incomes, were less likely to be in paid employment, and were 
almost twice as likely to have a resident child. The researchers noted that 
differences could explain why resident fathers were less likely to have a 
child support award: 37% compared with 54% of resident mothers 
(Sousa & Sorensen 2006: 1).  
Further information was provided in a study funded by the Californian 
Department of Social Services investigating the characteristics and 
behaviours of nonresident parents (n=44 mothers) with child support 
arrears due for a child on welfare in one Los Angeles county (Becerra & 
Ong 2001). This analysis used survey responses from nonresident and 
resident parents and administrative data. However, the report although 
comprehensive, was descriptive and thus similarities and difference were 
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based on percentages and means with no statistical testing of the data 
for significant findings. Becerra and Ong (2001: 95) reported that apart 
from differences in age and ethnicity, nonresident mothers and fathers 
were more similar than different. The common characteristics included 
the lack of marketable skills and other barriers to employment such as 
mental and physical health problems; low education; and criminal 
records. Mothers and fathers had similar rates of paid employment 
although mothers’ mean household earnings were lower and they 
reported poorer health. Many of the mothers had lost, or never had, 
custody because of drug or alcohol abuse. Few were previously married, 
meaning children often lived with relatives or in foster care rather than 
with their father. Almost three-quarters of mothers stated that child 
support payments were more than they could afford, compared with 
around half of fathers, and mothers were twice as likely as fathers to say 
that the ordered amount was unreasonable (Becerra & Ong 2001: 94). 
Some early research on nonresident mothers and child support focused 
on systemic and policy issues. This work mainly reviewed court records 
of divorces and focused on whether amounts of child support ordered 
were fair because of mothers’ average lower incomes (Arditti & Madden-
Derdich 1993; Christensen, Dahl & Rettig 1990). Stirling and Aldrich 
(2012), in an up-dating of this earlier work, investigated whether mothers 
were ordered to pay a lower percentage of income than fathers. They 
reviewed child support orders made at divorce in Washington State in 
2000–01 and found that, even when controlling for income, mothers were 
required to pay less of their income for child support than fathers (10% 
compared with 21%). As was found in the Australian caseload research 
(Silvey & Birrell (2004), nonresident mothers had similar economic 
circumstances to resident mothers. Stirling and Aldrich found that 
nonresident mothers were worse-off post-separation than nonresident 
fathers and both resident fathers and resident mothers except where the 
nonresident mother and resident father were both on very low incomes.  
In a similar vein are cohort studies examining trends in shared versus 
sole-time orders (for example, Brown & Cook 2011; Brown, Joung & 
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Berger 2006; Cook, ST & Brown 2006; Krecker et al. 2003). This work 
informs the present study in two areas: (i) the frequency of mothers being 
liable at different levels of parenting time akin to the analysis undertaken 
by Kaspiew et al. (2009) in Section 2.2.1 and (ii) stability of 
arrangements. Subgroups of equal-time arrangements and those where 
the mother or father had more time were possible because 20–40% of 
parents in Wisconsin post-2000 had shared-time (Brown, Joung & 
Berger 2006: 9).  
Brown, Joung and Berger (2006) followed two cohorts of divorce cases 
(pre- and post-2000) with equal-time, unequal shared-time and majority-
time selected from the Wisconsin Court Record Data over three years to 
explore the interaction between parenting time and child support and 
whether child support orders were being changed to reflect actual 
parenting arrangements. The researchers found a substantial proportion 
of children in equal-shared and unequal-mother-more group moved to 
more time with their father. These changes may have created a liability 
for the mother but the child support orders were unchanged (Brown, 
Joung & Berger 2006: 24). In a third of cases in the post-2000 cohort 
where shared-time changed, it was to majority-time with the father based 
on mothers’ responses, pointing towards a ‘paternal drift’ rather than 
solely the maternal drift observed in earlier studies (Brown, Joung & 
Berger 2006: 33).  
As with the earlier work by Maccoby and colleagues, Brown, Joung and 
Berger found lower rates of child support orders overall for equal-shared 
and unequal-father-more, although when an order was made the father 
was the liable parent in 78% of cases when he had more time than the 
mother and 97% in equal-time cases. No mothers were liable when they 
had more time and higher incomes. Brown, Joung and Berger (2006: 41) 
suggest that this indicates less desire for child support by fathers; orders 
not made where the liability would have been quite small; or parents 
agreeing to cover costs when the child was with them.  
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  Nordic studies 
The other country with work relevant to this research question is 
Norway. 42 The focus on gender equality in family policy in Nordic 
countries and gender norms of sharing caregiving are probable reasons 
for this research interest. As in the US (see, for example, Stewart 1999; 
Sousa & Sorensen 2006), the Norwegian studies comparing nonresident 
mothers and fathers use large representative datasets. 
Thuen (2006) examined the psychosocial aspects of parenting for 1,823 
nonresident parents (n=145 mothers) six years after separation. Parents 
were identified from the National Insurance register and from the 
Norwegian Joint Custody Association. Although no significant differences 
were found between nonresident parents in regular contact or 
satisfaction with the arrangements, mothers were more likely than 
fathers to report anxiety or depression (48% compared with 28%).  
Kitterod (2006) compared non-resident parents using data from the 
Contact Arrangements and Child Maintenance survey 2004, a cross-
sectional survey of separated parents undertaken by Statistics Norway to 
evaluate the 2003 child support reforms. The 2004 survey involved 3,582 
separated parents (n=155 nonresident mothers) and included 1,020 
former couples (Kitterod & Lyngstad 2011). Kitterod (2006) found 
nonresident mothers saw their children more often; were more likely to 
share time; and lived closer to their children than nonresident fathers. 
Confirming findings from Thuen (2006), nonresident mothers were 
polarised at low and high incomes. To ensure findings did not reflect an 
exaggeration of the actual amount of time that nonresident mothers 
spent with their children, Kitterod re-did her analysis using data from 
resident parents confirming that the differences did exist. She concluded 
that this research supported Stewart’s gender role hypothesis (see 
Stewart 1999b) that mothers have more time with their children even 
when other differences are taken into account. (Another Norwegian study 
                                       
42 There was an earlier study of nonresident parents and contact patterns undertaken in 
1996 (Jensen & Clausen 1997) where tentative findings were made about nonresident 
mothers (n=46). This study is only available in Norwegian.  
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using the same dataset and theoretical approach to compare nonresident 
mothers’ and fathers’ payment of child support is reviewed in Section 
3.3.) 
  Studies from other countries  
While child support was covered more frequently in the nonresident 
mother literature in the 2000s than previously, this was mainly the case 
in the US and Norway. Child support is largely absent from the 
nonresident mother research in Canada (Kruk 2010, 2015; Thacker 
2005), with the exception of several auto-ethnographic studies (Eicher-
Catt 2004; Gustafson 2001) which referred to the personal experience of 
being a nonresident mother and liable parent.  
Similarly in New Zealand, nonresident mother research appears aimed at 
family therapists assisting mothers struggling with reconciling their 
mother and ‘nonresident’ mother role (Snowdon & Kotzé 2012). Where 
liable mothers are included in child support research, either numbers 
were too small to discuss in detail (Horwood 2004) or, where sufficient to 
report separately (for example, 25% of liable parents with an Inland 
Revenue case in 2009 were mothers), the analytical approach used was 
to aggregate the liable parent data (Colmar Brunton 2009). The latter 
approach, similarly adopted with large representative datasets in the UK 
(see, for example, Wikeley et al. 2008), suggests a specific policy focus for 
non-compliance on liable parents, and that gender is not perceived as 
relevant and/or that child support in lone mother households is 
prioritised. 
Some Canadian (Kruk 2010) and New Zealand (Elizabeth 2017) work 
featured the role of domestic violence post-separation. It focused on 
coercive control and the use of what Elizabeth (2017) has labelled 
‘custody stalking’, as a method to undermine the mothering role; in some 
circumstances, with the outcome reduced or no time with their child. 
Although the researchers make no explicitly link to a child support 
liability for the mother, this is a potential additional consequence, as 
seen in the US work above. In the UK, the small amount of work with 
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nonresident mothers is predominantly based on case studies from 
clinical practice (see, for example, Hart 2008); or, like the New Zealand 
work, aggregated liable parent/nonresident parent reports (for example, 
Atkinson & McKay 2005; Morris 2007; Peacey & Haux 2007).  
One UK exception was Kielty’s (2005, 2008a) narrative study of 20 
nonresident mothers. Participants were recruited via the support group 
MATCH, a common source for UK studies. Using a psychosocial 
theoretical framework Kielty (2008b: 376) examined how nonresident 
mothers retained a view of themselves as a ‘good mother’ and 
constructed either ‘justification or resistance narratives to defend against 
a “bad mother” label’. The mothers in Kielty’s (2006b: 82) study  
[f]elt that they already supported their children by continuing the provision 
of practical everyday items such as clothing and school equipment and by 
meeting other child care costs such as haircuts and day care fees. 
Kielty (2006b) highlighted the difficulty in comparing nonresident 
mothers with nonresident fathers because the two strands of work tend 
to focus on different issues. The nonresident mother research focuses on 
pathways into this role and qualitative aspects of the mother–child 
relationship rather than difficulties with ‘contact’ and child support, the 
focus of nonresident father research. Majority-time father arrangements 
and the non-normative behaviour of payment of child support by 
mothers were identified by Kielty as requiring further examination.  
Kielty’s work reinforced themes raised by US researchers such as 
Bemiller (2005) and Herrerias (2008): the need to be seen as a ‘good’ 
mother, particularly when mothers had not voluntarily chosen to live 
apart from their child, and in-kind and other support as part of financial 
responsibility for separated mothers.  
  Are liable mothers less compliant than liable fathers?  
This section reviews the international literature relevant to the second 
research question, are liable mothers less compliant than liable fathers. 
There is little international research that details compliance from 
nonresident mothers’ or liable mothers’ reports. The existing research 
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tends to focus on payment or relies on reports from other sources. For 
example, the latest US census data show that the receipt of child support 
by resident fathers and resident mothers with a child support order was 
not statistically different: 41% of fathers and 46% of mothers received all 
the payments due (Grall 2016). Nonetheless, several US studies provided 
some information from nonresident parents’ reports. These are discussed 
below. 
Stewart (1999b) used the 1987–88 National Survey of Families and 
Households (NSFH), a national probability sample of 13,008 
respondents, to examine the interaction between nonresident parents 
and their children. The NSFH provided detailed socio-demographic 
characteristics of nonresident parents (n=531 fathers and n=156 
mothers) and included a substantial number of children in nonparental 
care with grandparents or other relatives.  
Although this study was predominantly about differences in contact with 
children (mail, phone or in-person) and payment overall rather than 
compliance, Stewart’s work is relevant as it provides detailed analysis of 
payment from nonresident parents’ reports. This study highlighted a 
statistically significant difference between parents in child support 
payment: 75% of fathers and 32% of mothers paid something. Stewart 
(1999: 901) noted that this difference reflected that children with a 
nonresident mother were often in nonparental care where child support 
was rarely ordered. Further, mothers were more likely to pay when 
children lived with other relatives than with their father (36% compared 
with 27%). Another important finding was that although mothers had 
more frequent phone and written contact and longer periods of time with 
their child than fathers, payment was associated with frequency of 
contact for fathers but not for mothers (Stewart 1999b: 903). 
A few US studies reported on compliance rates (that is, where parents 
were expected to pay). However, unlike the work on non-payment, there 
is little evidence that liable mothers are less compliant than liable fathers 
using liable mothers’ reports. Greif (1997a) surveyed 187 previously-
married parents who never saw at least one of their children (n=109 
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fathers and 76 mothers). Compared with his earlier work (Greif 1986), 
parents were asked whether they were required to pay child support and 
then what they actually paid. Although mothers were less likely to have 
an order to pay (41 % compared with 66% of fathers), 86% of mothers 
and 80% of fathers ‘always paid’. (Greif 1997a: 81). Another US 
quantitative studies (n=294 nonresident fathers and n=100 nonresident 
mothers) found that liable mothers and liable fathers reported a similar 
high rate of compliance (Pearson & Anhalt 1994). 
This positive view has some support from work that used administrative 
data. This US study of arrears cases similar in purpose to the Becerra 
and Ong (2001) study discussed above (see Section 3.1.1), tracked a 
random sample of 6,653 cases with arrears in the Virginia state caseload 
(n=490 mothers). Myers (2004) found that although mothers were 12% of 
liable parents, only 7.4% of liable parents with arrears were mothers, and 
mothers owed just 6% of all arrears. Mothers’ share of arrears was lower 
because mothers’ average amount ordered was smaller ($142 per month 
compared with $220 for fathers). Mothers with arrears were significantly 
less likely to make payments within three months and within 12 months, 
and payments were significantly smaller than found for fathers. Myers 
noted that mothers had less capacity to pay ongoing child support and 
arrears because of lower employment and earnings. This research 
suggests that liable mothers as a group were less likely to be in arrears 
but once they were behind in their payments were slower at clearing their 
debt at least in this group of parents with arrears. 
Herrerias (2008) surveyed 285 mothers who lived apart from one or more 
of their children. Compared with her study 20 years before (Herrerias 
1984), child support was more salient: 77% of mothers with an order 
paid all or more than the amount due. Another 6% paid even though 
child support was not ordered. Some mothers reported that they earned 
less than the father and paid nothing by agreement. In addition, 71% of 
mothers paid for other items such as clothes and school-related expenses 
(Herrerias 2008: 19). Herrerias highlighted that the majority of mothers 
felt it was essential that they contributed whether by child support or in-
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kind regardless of whether the time they spent with their children was as 
frequent or satisfactory as they preferred. 
Benson and Pasley (1993), in their small study of 74 remarried parents 
who paid or received child support (n=10 liable mothers), found 90% of 
mothers and fathers were compliant. Further, mothers paid the same or 
more after remarriage. The researchers suggest that this positive picture 
was probably because the respondents came from higher income 
households.  
Differences in compliance by gender do not appear to have been explored 
in any published empirical work on compliance in the UK. Data from one 
unpublished study on factors predicting compliance (McKay & Atkinson 
2005) cited in Atkinson and McKay (2005: 38) showed that gender was 
associated with payment: fathers were more likely to pay than mothers. 
However, it is unclear whether McKay and Atkinson’s conclusion refers 
to compliance or payment as this was not disused further. Mothers are 
also less likely to pay in Norway (Lyngstad 2010), although again this 
may not mean mothers are less compliant. (This study is discussed 
further in Section 3.3.) 
One other study is worth mentioning under this research question. 
Smock and Manning (1997) used matched former couples (n=220 
couples, 19% with a nonresident mother) from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics to compare parents’ reports of child support paid. (Information 
was not available on whether there was an order in place.) Contrary to 
other research restricted to nonresident fathers and resident mothers (for 
example, Braver, Fitzpatrick & Bay 1991), there was no significant 
difference in reported payments between liable parents and their ex-
partners. Like the Benson and Paisley work, Smock and Manning note 
that parents’ better economic circumstances may explain higher 
agreement on amounts paid and received in this small study.  
  What are the apparent reasons for non-compliance by liable 
mothers? 
This section reviews the international literature relevant to the third 
research question: what are the apparent reasons for non-compliance by 
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liable mothers? Again, the research is sparse and generally focuses on 
non-payment rather than compliance. As detailed previously, non-
payment frequently relates to no order for child support in place either 
because it was not ordered or the father did not request an order. These 
reasons are not discussed further in this section.  
Greif and Pabst’s (1988:143) survey of 577 nonresident mothers 
undertaken in the 1980s—at a time when child support payment was not 
often ordered—found that mothers who paid did so because they were 
required by the court; it was the fair thing to do; and it entitled them to 
greater involvement in their children’s lives. Non-payers reported that 
they could not afford it; the judge or the father did not require it; or their 
husband did not pay when the children were with the mother.  
Three more recent studies provide some detail about why payment was 
not made; one qualitative study from the US (Bemiller 2005) and two 
based on survey data from other countries: Lau (2007) in Hong Kong and 
Lyngstad (2010) in Norway. Although these mainly related to non-
payment rather than non-compliance, they are reviewed here as context 
to the statistical testing of the approach adopted by the present study.  
In Bemiller’s (2005) qualitative study, ten out of 16 mothers interviewed 
had an order to pay child support but only three were currently paying. 
Two other mothers provided substantial in-kind support by agreement in 
lieu of a formal child support order. The judge did not order child 
support for four mothers (two where the father did not want payment). 
Mothers who paid none of their child support liability (n=7/10) reported 
that their financial circumstances meant they could not afford to pay. In 
contrast to the guilt expressed by the mothers about any inability to ‘live 
up to dominant expectations of mothering’ (Bemiller 2005: 157), non-
paying mothers did not express any guilt for non-payment of child 
support, suggesting that payment should not be expected because of 
their financial circumstances (Bemiller 2005: 100–102).  
Lau (2007) in her small study of 45 Chinese nonresident parents in Hong 
Kong (n=13 mothers) referred from welfare agencies, reported that 
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mothers were less likely to pay formal child support but found no 
significant difference in major or small informal support. Utilising a 
family systems theoretical framework, Lau (2007: 53) concluded that the 
provision of financial support by nonresident mothers and fathers 
reflected ‘flexibility in traditional cultural values,…gender role attitude 
and shared kinship’. 
Lyngstad (2010), using the same 2004 survey data as Kitterod (2006) 
discussed in Section 3.1.2, and administrative data from National 
Insurance in Norway, explored why few nonresident mothers paid child 
support.43 He found one-in-six nonresident parents were mothers. 
Mothers were less likely to pay than nonresident fathers (31% compared 
with 85%). Like Kitterod (2006), Lyngstad utilised the theoretical 
approach developed by Stewart (1999b). However, he only tested the 
gender role and the selection hypothesis. The ‘no difference’ hypothesis 
was not relevant as child support rates did differ. Some of the difference 
in payment between mothers and fathers was explained by mothers’ 
lower incomes and more overnights (24% of mothers reported 13 or more 
nights a month). Lyngstad concluded that even taking these differences 
into account, mothers still paid less often than fathers, suggesting that 
traditional gender roles could have some impact.  
Of note, some of the difference in payment found by Lyngstad, and the 
higher income nonresident mothers previously identified by Kitterod 
(2006), may be because of shared-time. As in Norway people can only be 
registered at one address, parents with shared-time children may register 
a child each or those with one child, register the child in alternate years 
(see Kitterod & Lyngstad 2011). Parents with a shared-time child 
registered as living with the other parent would therefore be classified as 
a ‘nonresident’ parent for the purposes of survey sampling. Further, 
higher income parents with equal-time can be liable under the Norwegian 
                                       
43 Nonresident and liable mothers were also a research subject in Sweden where 17% of 
children have majority-time with their father and 18% shared-time (Stjernstrom & 
Stromgren 2012). None of the Swedish child support studies are available in English. 
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child support rules. It is unclear what impact this may have had on 
compliance (Hakovirta & Rantalaiho 2011). 
One possible reason for non-compliance advanced by Stirling and Aldrich 
(2012) is worth mentioning. Their US study concluded that nonresident 
mothers were worse-off post-separation than nonresident fathers, and 
both resident fathers and resident mothers (see Section 3.1.1). They 
posited that a ‘substitution effect’ could apply whereby, because of low 
income, time spent with children may substitute for cash child support. 
Unfortunately, Stirling and Aldrich were unable to be tested their 
hypothesis with the data available.  
  The role of gender: studies with other respondents 
The present literature review concentrates on nonresident and liable 
mothers’ reports. This section discusses three studies that used large 
datasets and resident father/carer responses on receipt of child support 
to explore the role of gender in the payment of child support.44 The first 
work from the US (Stewart 2004, 2010) mainly focuses on payment, 
although some findings refer to parents with an order for payment. The 
second study from Jamaica (Wyss 2001) uses census data on child 
support receipts. The final study from the US (Kanazawa and Still 2000) 
relates to compliance, defined as annual liability paid in full. This work 
compliments the research on reasons for non-payment discussed above.  
Stewart (2004, 2010) used the National Survey of America’s Families 
(NSAF) to examine financial contributions towards children made by 
nonresident mothers and fathers and face-to-face contact in different 
living arrangements (that is, married or cohabiting stepfamily, relative 
care or foster care) highlighting the ‘complex family realities of children 
with nonresident parents’ (Stewart 2004: 10). Sampling for the NSAF 
targeted low-income households with methods that increased inclusion 
such as utilising mobile phones for those without a landline; a group 
                                       
44 The early US study by Meyer and Garasky (1993), while one of the first with a child 
support focus, is not discussed in this literature review as it reported on 
characteristics of custodial fathers rather than liable mothers and findings are from 
the 1980s. The studies in this section are limited to more recent work. 
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omitted when using random digit dialling. The respondent was the ‘most 
knowledgeable adult’ in the household, not always a parent of the 
identified children. Importantly, the NSAF asked about all child support 
payments not just those paid under an order and, unlike other surveys 
such as the Census, questions about child support were not restricted to 
parents. Information was based on 2,006 children with a nonresident 
mother and 11,079 with a nonresident father. 
Stewart (2004) tested whether an individualist perspective (differences in 
parenting styles related to gender) or a structuralist perspective 
(differences related to conditions encountered) explained the expected 
differences. This approach was previously adopted to examine differences 
in single-mother and single-father households (Downey 1994, 1995; 
Downey, Ainsworth-Darnell & Dufur 1998). Stewart (2010) found that 
21% of nonresident mothers and 42% of nonresident fathers paid child 
support in the last 12 months. Fathers were also significantly more likely 
to pay than mothers when restricted to parents with a child support 
order. This latter finding suggests that, based on resident parents’ and 
other carers’ reports, nonresident fathers were significantly more 
compliant than nonresident mothers. 
Stepmother families were more likely to receive child support, and higher 
amounts, than single fathers45 which Stewart (2010: 1088) suggested 
may be because repartnered fathers had a new partner who ‘pressures 
him to collect child support’. Overall, fathers were more likely to pay 
child support and mothers to see their children more than once a week. 
Stewart (2010: 1087) concluded that parental roles ‘still at least partially 
reflect traditional notions of motherhood…and fatherhood’, a similar 
conclusion to the one reached in the Norwegian research comparing 
nonresident mothers and fathers (see, for example, Kitterod 2006; 
Lyngstad 2010). The quantum of difference between parents may be 
overestimated as Stewart excluded in-kind contributions (such as 
                                       
45 Grandparents, other relatives and nonparent carers were more likely to receive 
payments than single fathers.  
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clothes, toys and toiletries) frequently paid by mothers underestimating 
mothers’ total financial contributions.  
In the second study also concerning payment of child support, Wyss 
(2001: 417) used household level data from a nationally representative 
survey, the 1989 Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions, to ‘highlight how 
gender shapes cash child support outcomes and implications’. Wyss 
adopted a feminist critique of the neo-classical economic theory of child 
support (Weiss & Willis 1985, 1989; Willis 2000), determining that rather 
than being gender-neutral, ‘gender-differentiated assets, rules, norms 
and preferences’ (Wyss 2001: 420) were relevant. Wyss notes the view of 
another feminist economist (Folbre 1994) that the high costs of raising 
children mean that both parents have an incentive to not contribute but 
women have less opportunity to default. 
Nonetheless, Wyss (2001: 423) hypothesised that fathers would pay more 
child support than nonresident mothers because ‘breadwinning 
continues to be more closely associated with fatherhood than 
motherhood’. Of the 5,917 children in the survey Wyss found that 24% 
lived apart from their mother. Nonresident mothers were significantly 
less likely to pay child support than nonresident fathers, although 
fathers also had a low rate (less than 30% paid). Wyss concluded that 
Jamaican norms of gender behaviour explained why both men and 
women paid little child support, noting less community pressure for 
mothers to pay. Further, Wyss suggested the reasons for being 
nonresident (such as young age, disability or leaving for employment) 
made mothers’ child support behaviour less predictable. As incomes were 
inferred from nonresident parents’ education qualification, Wyss 
conceded that mothers’ ability to pay could have an impact. Additionally, 
information about in-kind support was not collected and this could be 
contributed instead of cash child support.  
In the third study, Kanazawa and Still (2000) analysed 1992 US census 
data to test their evolutionary psychological model of parental 
involvement where parental investment decisions were interdependent. 
Although they predicted that mothers would be less motivated to leave 
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children and to under-invest in them after separation, they found that 
this was only true for mothers’ time post-separation. Mothers were 
significantly less likely to comply with their child support order (here 
measured as proportion of annual liability paid). Two reasons were 
advanced: men’s generally greater financial resources and therefore more 
discretionary income, and nonresident mothers were a highly select 
group who either did not want custody or were deemed unsuitable. They 
concluded that the same factors selecting mothers into the minority 
parent role made them less able to pay child support.  
  Findings and research gaps 
This section summarises the relevant key findings from the international 
literature and identifies theoretical and research gaps that the present 
study seeks to address. 
  Theoretical framework and methodology 
The international nonresident mother literature mainly utilises feminist, 
and/or symbolic interaction theoretical frameworks to explore and 
explain the mother role. (Role theory and psychosocial frameworks are 
also represented.) Most work is qualitative with self-selected samples of 
mothers. Child support, if mentioned, is given less importance than other 
aspects of mothering, although this has evolved over time particularly in 
the US and Norway.  
In contrast to the nonresident mother work, the research exploring 
differences between nonresident mothers and fathers often involves large, 
nationally representative surveys or administrative data. While providing 
socio-demographic data on nonresident mothers and fathers, this work 
mainly focuses on payment rather than compliance and tends to use 
reports on payment/compliance from other sources (resident parents or 
carers) on child support rather than nonresident parents’ reports. Some 
of this work lacks a theoretical framework. The exceptions are the 
qualitative work from Cozzolino (2014) who uses economic sociology to 
explore differing meanings of child support monies in the US, and 
Lyngstad (2010) who tests whether gender role or selection into the 
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minority-time parent role better explains gender differences in child 
support payment in Norway. The latter approach follows on from the 
work of Stewart (1999) in the US and Kitterod (2006) in Norway focusing 
on differences between nonresident parents on socio-demographic 
characteristics and parenting-time. A later study by Stewart (2004, 2010) 
tests whether an individualist or a structuralist perspective better 
explains gender differences in child support payment using resident 
parents’ and carers’ reports of payments. 
The use of a feminist theoretical framework and a quantitative 
methodology in the present study will build on this previous work on 
minority-time mothers and differences in child support orders and/or 
any child support paid (for example, Lyngstad 2010 and Stewart 1999; 
2010) to further explore liability and shared-time parenting, and reasons 
(if any) for liable mothers’ non-compliance.  
  Findings from the international literature  
A common finding across the literature is that nonresident mothers 
continue to define themselves as ‘mothers’ and that gendered 
expectations and behaviours of nonresident mothers and fathers differed. 
In the studies reviewed, nonresident mothers spent more time with their 
children and often had another child resident in their household. In 
addition, mothers, even those with minority-time, were less often liable to 
pay child support, and liabilities were generally lower. Mothers’ lower 
incomes were frequently given as the reason for changes in their child’s 
living arrangements. Notably, domestic violence, particularly coercive 
behaviour, was a feature of the US research and was reported by most 
nonresident mothers in the more recent qualitative studies (Bemiller 
2008, Herrerias 2008). 
The research on liable mothers’ compliance and reasons for non-
compliance is considerably smaller. A consistent finding across the 
literature was that nonresident mothers were less likely to pay child 
support than nonresident fathers. However, the limited literature does 
not show that liable mothers are less likely to comply when ordered to 
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pay based on their own reports. US studies with self-selected 
participants showing mothers with an order to pay child support report 
similar compliance to liable fathers (see, for example, Greif 1997; Pearson 
& Anhalt 1994). The one US study using administrative data (Meyers 
2004) shows liable mothers’ share of child support arears was less than 
their representation in the caseload.  
The qualitative studies in the US that detail reasons for non-payment, 
often report that payment was not ordered or needed, with no payment 
by agreement in some cases (see for example, Bemiller 2005). 
Affordability was also mentioned in several studies (Becerra & Ong 2001; 
Greif & Pabst 1988; Herrerias 2008) either as a reason for no payment 
required or not made as expected. Many mothers contributed something 
in-kind (see for example, Kielty 2006b). Gender and/or mothers’ higher 
parenting-time are posed as possible reasons for non-payment in the 
Norwegian (Lyngstad 2010), and US research (Stirling & Aldrich 2012), 
and in a small study in Hong Kong (Lau 2007), although not explored 
further. Studies with resident fathers and other respondents have also 
highlighted gender as influential.  
  Relevance and research gaps 
This literature review provides some broad brush-strokes for 
understanding the demography and dynamics around child support and 
gender. Of interest, the international work provides a more detailed 
analysis of nonresident mothers and the mother role, and comparisons 
with nonresident fathers than the Australian literature. In contrast, 
compliance rates were frequently mentioned in the recent Australian 
research but largely absent from the international work.  
But how applicable are the international findings for Australia? Child 
support is context specific. Differences in law and policies, different 
social and economic conditions, cultural expectations and gender specific 
norms of ‘good’ mothering and fathering in countries covered by the 
literature restrict transferability. Court-based systems allow more 
discretion than administrative systems. Mothers deemed to have lower 
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parental competency (for example, poor mental health) are unlikely to be 
awarded all or majority-time of their children and unlikely to be ordered 
to pay child support in judicial contexts (Teachman & Polonko 1990). 
Further, parental negotiations may operate differently in shared-time or 
where the father has majority-time, resulting in no or lower child support 
orders (Seltzer & Maralani 2001). Personal preference could be influential 
for employed majority-time fathers who have no requirement to pursue 
payment.  
In Australia, child support is calculated by an administrative formula 
that determines the liability based on income and parenting-time of the 
liable parent with no discretion to consider whether this is the mother or 
the father, or how the parenting arrangements were determined. This 
means that child support can be payable based on actual overnights with 
the child even where this may not correspond with previous court orders 
or agreements on parenting-time between parents.46 Changes in 
parenting-time or living arrangements can be notified over the phone and 
processed immediately—and any corresponding change in which parent 
is liable in the case.  
Further, the Australian child support system appears to have gradually 
drifted away from a state-enforced collection to one based largely on a 
philosophy of voluntary payment. Around half (53%) of cases are Private 
Collect, that is, parents transfer payments between themselves. In the 
other half of cases where Child Support Collect applies, only a third 
(36%) of liable parents have deductions from salary and wages, which is 
the dominant collection method used in the US.47 This suggests that 
motivation to pay plays a larger role in Australia. 
The US and Norwegian work point to gender affecting the payment of 
child support by mothers. This work involves two diametrically opposite 
                                       
46 See Child Support Guide <http//guide.dss.gov.au/child-support-guide/2/2/4> 
(viewed 24 August 2017) 
47 The share of private payments directly to the Child Support Program (via electronic 
bank transfer or payment at the Post Office) increased from 31% in 1998 to 50% in 
2009, while the share from deductions from wages and salaries decreased from 53% 
to 36% (Child Support Agency 2009a: 45). The latter are generally only used when 
voluntary payment has been unsuccessful.  
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profiles of mothers: young, low income, racially diverse mothers in the 
US, half with children in nonparental or foster care, and middle-class 
mothers in Norway whose children are in shared or majority-time with 
their father.  
The present study will explore the profile of liable mothers in Australia. It 
is probable that this profile will differ from that detailed in the 
international nonresident mother and child research. Nonparental carers 
are a negligible group in the Australian Scheme.48 On the other hand, 
parents in Norway generally have egalitarian attitudes to parenting with 
dual-earner couples where both parents are in full-time employment and 
fathers encouraged by the State to share day-to-day caregiving of young 
children. Shared-time can generate a liability under the formula in 
Australia highlighting that parents with equal-time or more time than the 
other parent can be included in liable mother and not solely minority-
time mothers.  
Most of the research indicating that nonresident mothers were less likely 
to pay did not refer to compliance and/or did not rely on nonresident 
mothers’ own reports. Further, no studies systematically explored liable 
mothers’ non-compliance. When compliance was referenced this was 
either in small, qualitative studies or the measure varied across studies 
making comparisons with the broader compliance work challenging. The 
present study will use a comprehensive measure of compliance (that is, 
the expected payment made in full and on time) complemented by other 
detailed measures of financial contributions.  
The present study will seek to (i) confirm whether the lack of difference in 
liable mothers’ self-reported compliance found in the US work applies in 
Australia or whether there is any difference in compliance by gender 
using data from a representative sample of liable parents; (ii) explore 
                                       
48 In Australia, nonparent carers can claim child support against one or both parents 
but are not required to meet the MAT. Child support legislation excludes most foster 
carers from claiming child support. There were 3,900 nonparent carers in the Scheme 
caseload in December 2010 out of 1,330,500 payers and payees (FaHCSIA cited in 
Australian Law Reform Commission 2012: 326).  
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whether reasons for any non-compliance by liable mothers are related to 
gender or whether other factors are relevant.  
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Chapter 4  Methodology 
This thesis uses data from the Australian National University Child 
Support Reform Study (CSRS).49 The CSRS is based on a national 
random sample of 5,046 parents registered with the Child Support 
Agency in 2008. The aim of the study was to explore the impact of child 
support reform on separated families. Information was collected about 
parents’ circumstances, experiences of, and attitudes to, the child 
support system prior to, and after, the new formula was introduced on 1 
July 2008. The study comprises three waves of data: pre-reform baseline 
Time 0, and two follow-up waves: Time 1, 20–24 months later and Time 
2, another 18–25 months later. Time 1 was around eighteen months 
post-reform and Time 2 around three years post-reform. The study also 
involved two supplementary waves of data collected from recently 
separated parents (those who separated in the second half of 2008 and 
the second half of 2009) who entered the Scheme after the reforms.50  
  How the baseline sample was selected 
The in-scope population for the study was English-speaking parents who 
had an active Child Support Agency case in 2008, were separated or 
divorced from their child’s other parent and had at least one biological or 
adopted child under 18 years living with either parent. The unit of 
selection was the case, not the individual. A national random sample of 
50,000 cases was drawn, stratified by: (i) time since separation 
(separated in the last 6 months of 2006; separated prior to 1 July 2006); 
(ii) level of ‘care’ (based on original Scheme categories: 75% ‘sole’; 25% 
                                       
49 The baseline data collection was funded by the Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), now the Department of Social 
Services: the government department responsible for child support policy. Significant 
in-kind support was provided by the Child Support Agency (CSA): access to the 
sample from the active caseload and technical support. The follow-up and 
supplementary surveys were funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage 
grant (Grant LP0989558) with support from FaHCSIA and CSA as Industry Partners. 
The Chief Investigators at ANU were Dr Bruce Smyth and Dr Bryan Rodgers (with Dr 
Jeromey Temple until 2010) with research assistance from Dr Vu Son and Dr Liz 
Allen. The Industry Partner Investigators were Dr Marian Esler and Maria Vnuk 
(FaHCSIA) and Allan Shephard (CSA). 
50 The supplementary samples each involved 1,000 recently separated parents. These 
data were not examined in the present study because of the smaller numbers of 
parents interviewed, and therefore few liable-mother cases.  
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‘shared-time’) 51; (iii) method of collection (50% Private Collect; 50% Child 
Support Collect); (iv) geographical location (state/territory; rural/urban); 
and (v) gender (50% female; 50% male). Shared-time arrangements and 
recent cases were oversampled to ensure that there were a sufficient 
number of cases to make analysis of these groups statistically robust.  
A Primary Approach Letter was mailed to 16,654 potential respondents 
selected from the original extract of 50,000 cases. Around 2,000 letters 
were returned (12%) because the respondent was not known at the 
address provided. A total of 79,797 calls were placed to the 14,785 
sample records to which calls were initiated. Telephone numbers that 
resulted in no answer, engaged or answering machine on first contact 
were recontacted (some up to 15 times) until an interview time or refusal 
was obtained.52 In total 5,046 interviews were successfully completed. 
The response rate was 67% based on interviews as a proportion of 
interviews and refusals of all types. Almost all (98%) respondents agreed 
to be recontacted at a later date for future research.53 
  Procedure and survey content 
Computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) of 25 minutes duration 
were conducted with 2,237 fathers and 2,809 mothers. Respondents 
were interviewed between 21 February and 26 April 2008 (the day before 
a large national advertising campaign about the revised Scheme began).  
The CATI interview schedule comprised eight key sections: (i) family type 
and relationship history; (ii) children’s living arrangements, and parent–
child ‘contact’; (iii) legal process; (iv) child support (regular and other 
financial support for children); (v) agreements, negotiations and strategic 
bargaining; (vi) family dynamics (including relationship quality, and 
                                       
51 This was based on definitions that applied under the Scheme when the survey was 
conducted: sole (70% or more nights) and shared (at least 30% of nights with each 
parent). This information was based on CSA records just prior to the start of the 
fieldwork and may not reflect respondents’ actual arrangements at interview. 
52 Re-calling each unanswered number several times over the fieldwork period assisted 
in maximising the number of ex-partners dyads where both parents were interviewed. 
53Follow-up interviews with 3,958 respondents from Time 0 were completed at Time 1 
20–24 months later and 2,927 respondents at Time 2 3-years later. 
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conflict in the past 12 months); (vii) parenting and family wellbeing; and 
(viii) demographic information.  
Detailed questions were asked about one child of the relationship 
(hereafter ‘focal child’) chosen randomly from all children in the case. The 
initial response on usual living arrangements of this child with the 
respondent determined whether further questions referred to time with 
them or the other parent, including number of overnights and days 
without staying overnight. Limited information was collected on other 
children.54  
To disentangle differences between non-payment because of no current 
liability and non-compliance—a frequent problem in this research as 
noted previously—the questionnaire included a detailed module on child 
support and other financial contributions made by the liable parent. A 
particular focus was to determine whether a payment was expected and, 
if so, what was actually paid. Respondents who confirmed that they 
currently paid or received child support were asked about timeliness and 
in-kind contributions made instead of, or in addition to, the expected 
payment. Detailed information was collected from parents who reported 
that another arrangement replaced cash child support.  
The questionnaire comprised closed, scale or Likert format questions, 
with a few open questions. Those relevant for child support were: What is 
the main reason that you do not currently pay/receive any child support?, 
What is the main reason that you transfer child support payments 
privately and not through the CSA?, and for parents with other 
arrangements, What is this arrangement?55  
  Weights 
Design and response weights for individuals, cases, and dyads were 
developed based on the Scheme caseload at the time of sample 
                                       
54 Information was collected on living arrangements with the same response choices plus 
‘lives independently, has left home’ as an option not read out, to be inclusive of young 
adult children. 
55 The other open questions were about the main reason for (i) rarely or never seeing the 
child and (ii) never staying overnight. 
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extraction. The weights took into account the oversamples of shared-time 
arrangements and recently separated cases. The results are generalisable 
to the active caseload for parents who previously lived together.56  
Statistical analyses are weighted; the number of respondents reported in 
the text and tables are unweighted.  
  Former couple sample  
A unique feature of the study’s design was the collection of data from 
both parents in 1,064 former couples, around 40% of the sample.57 
Data from both parents in the child support case are valuable to 
compare views of post-separation financial arrangements such as child 
support and in-kind payments. Information from the former couple 
sample is used to further explore compliance.  
  Determining final sample sizes for liable parents and payees 
Determining group membership for analyses was more complex than 
expected. Although the case was the unit of sample selection for the 
CSRS, parents with shared-time and split-residence often had mirror 
cases: each parent was a ‘payer’ and a ‘payee’.58  
Key questions were used to define membership of the four groups: liable 
mothers, liable fathers, payee mothers and payee fathers. Liable parent 
was defined by: (i) “yes, pay” to: Do you currently pay any child support to 
or receive any child support from (former partner)?; or (ii) “respondent pays 
more” to: So on balance who ends up paying more money? for parents 
who both pay and receive; or (iii) “yes, I should be paying/former partner 
should be receiving” to: Is child support meant to be paid?. Payees were 
similarly defined. Excluded were parents (mainly those with no current 
liability) who reported (i) “50/50 cancels out” (n=109); or (ii) “no”, “don’t 
know” or “refused” (n=318) for whether they should pay and 25 
                                       
56 Most parents who never lived together were excluded from the sample because they 
had missing data on a key selection criterion: date of separation.  
57 All respondents’ data remained anonymous. Only after the survey was completed 
could data be matched by a ‘case’ to see if former couple data existed. This means that 
respondents and interviewers did not know if both former partners participated.  
58 A parent can have more than one case where children are from different relationships.  
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respondents who did not know if they had another arrangement and 
were not asked if they should pay.  
Excluded parents may contribute money or in-kind support regardless of 
formal expectations but the direction cannot be definitively established 
from the data nor is it clear whether a parent with no current liability 
perceives themselves as a ‘payer’ regardless of the Child Support 
Agency’s broad definition.  
Two additional pieces of information were used where available: survey 
responses from the former couple sample and basic information on the 
direction of net liability for mirror cases. The latter were influential for 
determining liable mothers (55% had these data). Some respondents 
were excluded from the analytic sample based on information from these 
two sources. Specifically, to allow comparisons of responses of former 
couples, only liable parent/payee ex-couples were included. This resulted 
in the exclusion of 19 former couples where both (i) were payees; (ii) were 
liable; or (iii) had no current liability. One ex-couple where both were 
male was excluded.  
Similarly, using the mirror data, 70 parents were excluded because the 
direction of payment transfer for the child support period that applied at 
sample extraction was inconsistent with survey responses or the current 
liability (or net liability) was $0.  
Parents with both ex-couple and mirror data with one match59 were 
included as there was no reason to preference one information source 
over another. Twelve parents with inconsistent data from these sources 
were excluded.60 
                                       
59 Discrepant reports by former couples can partly be explained by time between data 
extraction and interview, with changes in parenting arrangements or income resulting 
in differences in which parent was liable at interview. A third of former partners 
(n=7/21) had interviews 2–6 weeks apart. For some parents with one match, their 
former partner was already excluded from the analysis as he/she reported the same 
response (that is, pay/pay or receive/receive) or was neither a liable parent nor a 
payee. 
60 For example, the mirror data indicate the father should pay, the father reported that 
he should receive and the mother reported 50/50 split cancelled out payment. 
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Some parents reported that cash child support had been replaced by 
“some other arrangement” (n=303) and were not asked whether they 
should be paying or receiving child support. The same methodology was 
used to determine whether to include these respondents as liable parents 
or payees. First, those without ex-couple or mirror data were allocated 
based on the sample frame.61 Second, respondents in the former couple 
sample and no mirror case were deemed to be the liable parent where 
their former partner was a payee, and vice versa. As the focus of the 
present study is payment of child support, 28 parents who both reported 
another arrangement and 26 whose ex-partner said payments cancel out 
or they were neither meant to pay or receive were excluded. Third, net 
liability was used for those with mirror data leading to the exclusion of 
32 parents with no current liability. An additional 12 parents were 
excluded as they had both sources of information and neither matched. 
(These were different from the other 12 parents excluded.)  
The final analytic sample comprised 4,381 liable parents and payees. Of 
this sample 185 were liable mothers. Table 4.1 shows the unweighted 
sample sizes for the four groups of interest for the analyses and the 
distribution of parents in the five groups in the total CSRS original 
sample of 5,046. Parents in the ‘neither’ group are not included in the 
analyses except for Section 5.1 on liability by gender where the total 
dataset is used. 
  
                                       
61 Where both former couple data and mirror data were available, respondents were 
included where net liability and one parent’s response matched and the other parent 
had another arrangement which reflected this. (Responses from the open question 
What is this arrangement? were used to confirm this decision.) 
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Table 4.1  Final analytic sample 
Group name and definition Numbers 
(unweighted) 
Liable mothers: pay or should pay child support to fathers 185 
Liable fathers: pay or should pay child support to mothers 1,692 
Payee mothers: receive or should receive child support 
from fathers 
2,296 
Payee fathers: receive or should receive child support from 
mothers  
208 
Subtotal  4,381 
Neither: mothers and fathers not meant to pay or receive 
child support 
665 
Total 5,046 
Notes: ‘Neither’ includes parents who were omitted because of contradictory information 
and one former couple where both were male.  
Table 4.2 defines the liable-mother and liable-father dyads that is, former 
couples where both parents were interviewed.  
Table 4.2  Former couple sample 
Dyad type 
Number of former 
couples 
Liable-mother dyad: liable mothers and payee fathers 
78 
Liable-father dyad: liable fathers and payee mothers 
827 
Notes: Liable parent and payee former couples only. Excludes one former couple where 
both were male. 
By including parents with other arrangements where the liable parent 
could be determined, a broad definition of liable parent and payee was 
adopted. This inclusion allows in-depth exploration of post-separation 
financial arrangements and highlights the complexity of on-the-ground 
child support arrangements outside bureaucratic definitions of liable 
parent or payee, particularly for shared-time and split-residence parents. 
On the other hand, by excluding parents who reported being neither 
liable nor a payee and those where ex-couple and/or mirror data did not 
match, a conservative definition was used, sacrificing some statistical 
power for conceptual clarity in the liable mother and payee father 
subgroups. 
  Statistical method 
Analyses in Chapters 5–9 used Stata 13.1 (Statacorp 2009) and the 
survey (svy) commands appropriate for weighted data. Analyses use Time 
0 data collected under the original Scheme rules (refer to Section 1.2.1) 
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in 2008. Time 0 data were used to maximise sample size for comparisons 
and modelling.62  
  Variables used in the analyses 
This section details variables used in the analyses. First socio-
demographic measures, family dynamics and wellbeing are outlined. This 
is followed by the child support, in-kind contributions and compliance 
measures. 
  Socio-demographic, family dynamics and wellbeing 
measures  
Household composition was derived from questions detailing 
relationships between adults and children in and outside the household. 
Four categories were determined based on whether the respondent lived 
with a current partner and had any 'resident’ children, that is, children 
in the household at least 50% of the time.  
Employment was measured by two variables: hours of work, and type of 
employment. The latter derived variable takes account of gendered 
differences in employment and uses categories developed by Baxter, 
Gray, Hand and Hayes (2012) that divide part-time employment into 
‘short’ (1–20 hours) and ‘long’ (21–34 hours). The present study used 
their definition of long part-time hours as a proxy for job quality (for 
example, permanent part-time public sector work with flexible start and 
finish times and benefits such as carer’s leave63), and short-part-time-
hours denoting casual or lower skilled employment which Baxter and her 
colleagues indicate are associated with disadvantage.  
The personal and household income variables were derived by ANU 
researchers from questions about personal income from all sources, and, 
                                       
62 Data from later waves of the CSRS contain fewer liable mothers because (i) a 
substantial number of cases with a liable mother at T0 had a focal child who was aged 
over 18 years by 2009–10 and thus higher rates of attrition and (ii) liability changed 
between parents, that is the liable mother at T0 had become the payee or was neither 
meant to pay or receive child support under the assessment that applied at T1 or 
later.  
63 The right to request flexible working conditions has been instrumental in mothers 
being able to stay in better paid employment rather than change jobs to have this 
flexibility once they have children (de Henau & Himmelweit 2013). 
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where more than one person contributed to the household income, 
income from all sources.64 The final income variables represent net 
annual income inclusive of non-taxable payments like Family Tax 
Benefit65, allowing comparisons across households. Both personal and 
household income were compared to determine socioeconomic status as 
repartnered parents with low personal incomes could have an employed 
partner. Of note, the personal income measure is not the same as 
‘adjusted taxable income’ used in the assessment, which broadly equates 
to individual gross income with some deductions (such as net rental 
losses) added back in and any reportable fringe benefits or exempt 
foreign income. Further, the income variables did not take into account 
any child support actually paid.  
To allow further comparisons on socioeconomic circumstances, and to 
account for household size and composition, the present study used an 
equivalised household income measure.66 The measure used ABS 2007–
08 median equivalised disposable income: $36,082 plus $18,000 for 
additional adults and $10,800 for each resident child. It is somewhat 
rough for parents with an adult resident child67 or a child spending some 
overnights in the household and ‘generous’ for parents with more than 
one equal-time child.68 As comparisons could be affected if liability 
differed by gender, the annual amount of child support expected to be 
                                       
64 Income variables used for the present study were developed for Son, Rodgers and 
Smyth (2014). Income could be given before or after tax and weekly, fortnightly, 
monthly or annually. If gross income amounts were provided, adjustments were made 
for relevant taxes, levies and government payments. Respondents were prompted to 
include any child support received. A minority of liable parents chose not to answer or 
did not know, typical of questions about income with missing on personal income 4–
6% and 9–10% for household income. Thus, these variables are rough measures of 
income. 
65 Family Tax Benefit was received by half of liable mothers and 15% of liable fathers, 
indicating resident children or more overnights for minority-time liable mothers and 
that mothers are usually the recipient in couple households. 
66 Based on a more comprehensive analysis of CSRS data by Son, Rodgers and Smyth 
(2014). 
67 Resident children 19–24 years were treated as adults. Former relationship children 
who were 25 years or older were excluded because there was no information on their 
living arrangements. Liable fathers who lived with other adults (not including adult 
children) were treated as single adult households. This decision may overestimate the 
equivalised annual household income for a small number of liable fathers where more 
than one adult contributed to the household income. (No liable mothers were in this 
situation.) 
68 Equal-time applied to 7% of liable mothers and 39% had three or more children. 
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paid was deducted from the net household income before comparisons 
were made.69 Parents whose equivalised household income was below 
60% of the median were identified.  
Three variables measured the current circumstances of the respondent’s 
former partner: (i) repartnered (if known) (ii) repartnered with a 
new/stepchild and (iii) hours and type of employment. The first measure 
of repartnering had two categories (yes/no) and treated ‘don’t know’ 
responses as missing. As new family formation and paid employment 
could be related to perceptions of the ‘need’ for child support and 
willingness to pay, a ‘don’t know’ category was retained for the other two 
variables. (13–16% of liable mothers and 17–20% of liable fathers were 
unable to answer these questions.)  
Detailed information was collected about the respondent’s time with the 
focal child when the child lived with them less than 50% of the time and 
about the other parent’s time when the child lived with the respondent 
roughly 50/50 or more time. Frequency of face-to-face contact (range: 
1=daily, 11=never seen parent) was not used in the analyses as only 
minority-time parents (n=93/185 liable mothers) reported on their own 
time. It was not possible to calculate a valid estimate of parenting time 
for respondents whose answer related to the other parent’s time. Instead, 
responses from this variable, and those for daytime and overnights, were 
combined to develop a three-level variable that identified whether the 
liable parent had no time, daytime-only or some overnights in the last 12 
months. A range of measures based on number of nights were also 
developed. 
Information on other former relationship children was restricted to living 
arrangements. As arrangements for siblings could differ from the focal 
child’s arrangements, an additional variable was derived to cover all 
former relationship children eligible for child support (here defined as 18 
                                       
69 This assumes that all liable parents paid in full. Around 10% of liable parents did not 
know the expected amount and were treated as missing. 
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years or younger).70 The living arrangements of all former relationship 
children (18 years or younger) variable (hereafter ‘children’s living 
arrangement variable’) has four categories: ‘all mainly with the other 
parent’; ‘all equal-time’; ‘all mainly with the respondent’; and ‘split 
residence’ (that is, siblings split between parents). The latter category 
included shared-time children with a sibling in majority-time with either 
parent.  
The children’s living arrangement variable is used as a proxy measure for 
testing the present study’s feminist theoretical framework of gendered 
parenting roles and the concept of ‘good’ (that is, intensive) mothering as 
being immersed in the ‘relational and logistic work of child rearing’ 
(Arendell 1999: 1). The intensity of mothering is measured by level of 
involvement and thus the potential responsibility to cater to the needs of 
their child. The variable categorises this intensity on a continuum from 
minority-time to majority-time with one or more children. This assumes a 
specific, socially constructed (and internalised) expectation of ‘good’ 
mothering. The choice to use a proxy measure of this concept takes into 
account that this conceptualisation of mothering gives less attention to 
diverse norms of mothering and to the intersection with race, ethnicity 
and sexual identity. Further, it assumes that the performance of 
mothering measured by actual time (that is, daily caregiving) reflects the 
mother’s view of her expected role. The CSRS did not specifically ask 
about what respondents believed a ‘good’ mother should do. No questions 
were asked about personal values and attitudes about parenting and role 
identity. Adherence to gendered expectations of mothering were inferred 
by answers to other questions. 
The living arrangement variable is important to the following research 
questions: Question 1 (“What are the characteristics of mothers with a 
                                       
70 This variable was based on the age of each former relationship child who lived with 
either parent. Not all parents were asked which former relationship children were 
covered by the child support liability. Consequently, this variable may include older 
children who were no longer in the child support system because they were 18 years 
old and not in secondary school; and children where parentage had not been 
established or who were excluded for other reasons. Adult children (over 18 years) 
whose parents may still be paying or receiving child support were excluded. 
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child support liability in Australia?”) specifically Chapter 6 where a 
typology of liable mothers is developed, and Question 3 (“What are the 
apparent reasons for non-compliance by liable mothers?”) in Chapter 9 
where the relationship between parenting-time and non-compliance is 
tested.71 While this is the primary measurement used for this concept, 
other measures such as number of nights with the focal child are also 
used in the logistic regression modelling where applicable. 
Family dynamics were measured by the relationship between the 
parents; how the parenting arrangements were decided; how well the 
arrangements are working; and the closeness of the relationship with the 
focal child. The quality of the relationship with their former partner was 
based on one question: Which of the words I am about to read out best 
describe the relationship with (former partner) over the past 12 months: 
friendly, cooperative, distant, lots of conflict and fearful? (If parents gave 
more than one response the interviewer was directed to record the most 
extreme response at Time 0.) ‘Friendly’ and ‘cooperative’ were classified 
as positive; ‘distant’ as neutral; and ‘lots of conflict’ and ‘fearful’ as 
negative. Parents who said they had no contact in the last 12 months or 
no contact ever were categorised as ‘distant’. An additional dichotomous 
variable was created to indicate whether the relationship was fearful. 
This was done to test whether domestic violence could be a feature of the 
relationship, currently or in the past. The prevalence of domestic violence 
in the nonresident mother literature suggest this should be tested in the 
present study. 
Two variables covered the amount of general conflict between parents 
(range: great deal to none) and frequency of arguments over money 
(range: frequently to never). These were recoded into dichotomous 
variables representing high and low conflict.  
Two variables were chosen to measure respondent wellbeing: life 
satisfaction (range: 0=totally dissatisfied, 10=totally satisfied) and total 
                                       
71 The number of nights the liable parent spends with the focal child is another measure 
that is used as a proxy for intensity of mothering.  
   
92 
 
personal wellbeing (range: 3=low, 15=high). This wellbeing measure was 
a composite score based on three questions about how often in the last 
four weeks (range: 1=all the time, 5=none of the time) they (i) felt calm 
and peaceful, (ii) had lots of energy and (iii) felt down. (The first two were 
reverse-coded to create the total score.) Questions asked about child 
wellbeing were not used in the present study. 
The full list of socio-demographic, family dynamics and wellbeing 
variables used in the analyses are detailed in Table 4.3 below.  
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Table 4.3  Socio-demographic, family 
dynamics and wellbeing measures 
Socio-demographic measures 
Age continuous 
Household composition1 
1=lived alone or shared with other adults 
2=resident children and no partner 
3=partnered and no resident children 
4=partnered and resident children  
Has resident child1 1=yes, 2=no 
Biological children from more than one relationship2 
1=former relationship children only 
2=new or other previous relationship children resident in household or 
elsewhere  
Has degree or higher qualification 1=yes, 0=no 
Hours worked per week continuous 
Employment3 
1=not in paid employment 
2=short part-time (1–20 hours a week) 
3=long part-time (21–34 hours a week) 
4=standard full-time (35–44 hours a week) 
5=long full-time (45 hours or more) 
Main income source 
1=salary or wages 
2=self-employment or other 
3=government payment 
Net annual personal income continuous 
Net annual household income continuous 
Equivalised annual household income (with expected child support 
deducted) below 60% of the median 1=yes, 0=no 
Self-assessed poor financial circumstances 
1=poor or very poor 
2=just getting along or better 
Experienced hardship in last 12 months4 1=yes, 0=no 
Previously married 1=yes, 2=no  
Years together continuous 
Number of former relationship children continuous 
Years separated continuous 
Former partner repartnered 1=yes, 2=no 
Former partner repartnered with new/stepchild5 
1=not living with partner 
2=repartnered and no new/stepchild 
3=repartnered and a new/stepchild 
4=don’t know  
Type of employment of former partner 
1=employee 
2=self-employed 
3=not in paid employment 
4=don’t know 
Age of child continuous 
Age group 
1=0–5 years 
2=6–10 years 
3=11–15 years 
4=16 years or older 
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Living arrangement of child 
1=always or more than 50% of time with liable parent 
2=roughly 50/50 split 
3=less than 50% of time or never with liable parent 
Living arrangement of all former relationship children (18 years or 
younger) 
1=all children mainly with liable parent 
2=all equal-time 
3=all children mainly with other parent 
4=split-residence  
Split-residence 1=yes, 2=no 
Youngest child age continuous 
Sex of former relationship children (18 years or younger) 
1=all boys 
2=all girls 
3=both sexes 
Liable parent’s time with child in last 12 months  
1=no time 
2=daytime-only 
3=some overnights 
Liable parent’s overnights in last 12 months continuous 
Original Scheme time categories  
1=minor (0–109 nights) 
2=substantial (110–145 nights) 
3=shared (146–219 nights) 
4=major (220–255 nights) 
5=sole (256–365 nights) 
Liable parent has equal-time 
1=less than 48% nights 
2=equal-time (48/52% nights) 
3=more than 52% nights 
Family dynamics measures 
Parental relationship quality in the past 12 months6 
1=friendly 
2=cooperative 
3=distant 
4=lots of conflict 
5=fearful 
Fearful parental relationship 1=yes, 2=no 
General conflict in the last 12 months7 
1=a great deal or some 
2= very little or none  
Conflict over money in last 12 months8 
1=frequently or sometimes argued 
2=rarely or never argued or did not talk about money 
Distance between parents’ houses continuous 
Emotionally very close to child9 1=yes, 2=no 
Used lawyer or mediation service 1=yes, 2=no 
Parenting arrangement decision 
1=mother decided 
2=parents agreed or parents and child agreed 
3=child decided 
4=father decided 
5=judge decided 
6=other or just happened 
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How well arrangements are working for liable parent10 
How well arrangements are working for the child 
1=really or fairly well 
2=not so well or not at all well 
Wellbeing measures 
Life satisfaction  
Range: 0=totally dissatisfied, 10=totally satisfied 
Personal wellbeing11 
Range: 3=low, 15=high 
Notes: Variables referring to ‘child’ are based on information for the focal child. 
1. ‘Resident child’ means in the household at least 50% of the time and includes 
dependent adult children. 2. ‘Biological children’ include adopted children but not 
stepchildren. 3. Employment categories based on definitions developed by Baxter, Gray, 
Hand & Hayes (2012). 4. ‘Hardship’ was measured by whether because of the shortage 
of money they (i) pawned or sold something, (ii) went without meals, or (iii) asked for 
help from welfare/community organisation. 5. This excludes (i) former partners who 
have repartnered but do not live with their current partner and (ii) unpartnered parents 
with other relationship children. 6. ‘Distant’ includes ‘no contact with former partner in 
last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 7. ‘A great deal or some’ includes ‘varies’. ‘Very 
little or none’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 8. ‘Did not 
talk about money’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 9. 
Emotional closeness was not asked if either parent never saw the child. 10. How well the 
parenting arrangement was working for their former partner was also asked. This was 
not used in the analyses as 19% of liable mothers and 27% of liable fathers did not to 
respond about their former partner. 11. Score based on three questions about how often 
in the last four weeks they (i) felt calm and peaceful, (ii) had lots of energy and (iii) felt 
down (1=all the time, 5=none of the time, the former two reverse coded). 
 
  Child support and compliance measures 
As discussed in Chapter 1, most previous Australian research (pre-2008) 
did not clearly differentiate between non-payment where something was 
expected and non-payment when nothing was expected. Only the former 
is non-compliance. To disentangle these differences, questions in the 
CSRS survey first determined whether a payment was expected72, that is, 
a current liability of more than $0. (Compliance data used in the present 
study omits respondents with an expected amount of $0, unless 
specified.) A substantial minority of liable parents (12% mothers and 9% 
fathers) did not know the expected amount or stated that it varies. This 
level of unknown is consistent with other Australian research (Qu & 
Weston 2010) and reinforces evidence that some parents throw Child 
                                       
72 See Section 1.2.4 for an explanation of why CSA classify parents with no current 
liability as a ‘payer’ and/or a ‘payee’ and Section 1.4.2 for a discussion of issues with 
some Australian research that does not clarify whether an amount of child support is 
expected. 
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Support Program letters in the recycling bin without reading them 
(Fehlberg & Millward 2013).73 
Parents who reported they currently paid or received child support were 
asked whether the payment was received on time (range: 1=always, 
5=never) and what was the actual amount paid.  
Those parents who stated that they did not currently pay or receive 
child support were asked if child support should be paid. It was 
assumed none of the liability was paid if the parent said they should 
pay or receive. If the response to this question was “no” it was assumed 
that nothing was expected to be paid. These parents were treated as 
neither a liable parent nor a payee. The distinction between parents 
who were meant to pay or receive child support and those who were not 
is important. The former are included in the measure of compliance and 
are treated as non-compliant. The latter are excluded from the 
analytical sample.74  
Compliance was measured as payment made in full and always on time. 
While a strict definition of compliance, this measure is used because 
both fullness and timeliness are important. This definition is consistent 
with other contemporary Australian research on compliance75 (see 
Smyth, Vnuk, Rodgers and Son 2014 and research conducted by AIFS 
such as Kaspiew et al. 2009; Qu & Weston 2010; Qu et al. 2014; De Maio 
et al. 2013). This definition is also consistent with expectations of 
compliance under the Child Support Scheme. Under Private Collect, 
100% is assumed paid.76 Payees can request Child Support Collect if 
payments are not in full and regular. For Child Support Collect cases, 
                                       
73 Anecdotal evidence from the 2008 child support reform communication campaign 
indicated that letters were often ignored. 
74 This is explained in more detail in Section 4.2. 
75 While some compliance research in the US and other countries use a more ‘generous’ 
measure of compliance which does not include regularity and treats as compliant 
payment of amounts above a threshold (e.g., 90% of the expected annual amount 
paid), this is often because of the level of precision in the available administrative or 
survey data.  
76 Parents can come to an agreement about how this 100% of the liability is paid (e.g., 
weekly, fortnightly, monthly or customised such as on the liable parent’s payday or 
when the child is picked up) and payment can be in kind (e.g., school fees, bills paid, 
mowing the lawns at the payee’s home) (Child Support Agency 2006). 
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the monthly liability is meant to be paid by the 7th of each month.77 DHS 
expect the amount due to be paid on time. A range of compliance and 
enforcement actions can be taken where this is not happening. Late 
payments are automatically flagged from the first default (Child Support 
Agency 2008). 
Determination of compliance required up to three pieces of information 
(expected amount, actual amount and regularity). Parents were excluded 
if they had missing data on: (i) all relevant variables; (ii) regularity but 
payment was in full; or (iii) expected and/or actual payment but payment 
was always on time. In addition, parents with another arrangement in 
lieu of cash child support were treated as missing. 
Non-compliance was defined as not in full and/or not on time. Parents 
were ‘non-compliant’ if they (i) paid less than the liability and/or paid 
mostly to never on time or (ii) said they should pay including those who 
did not know the assessed amount or it varies; (iii) had missing data on 
expected and/or actual and paid mostly to never on time. 
To further understand the extent of financial support provided, parents 
who reported that they currently paid or received child support were 
asked additional questions about (i) specified in-kind contributions 
prescribed under the regulations and (ii) anything else such as clothing, 
computer, mobile phone costs, hobbies or sports equipment.78 For 
parents with Child Support Collect in-kind contributions are credited in 
full where the payee agrees and for prescribed payments for up to 30% of 
the liability without agreement when the remaining 70% is paid. Parents 
were asked if any prescribed items were partly or fully in lieu of child 
support; and whether agreed. 
                                       
77 A different monthly pay-date can be negotiated to align with wages/salary payments 
(Child Support Agency 2006). 
78 Questions about in-kind contributions were restricted to respondents who answered 
“yes” to the first child support screening question: Do you currently pay any child 
support to, or receive any child support from (partner)? This excluded 18% of liable 
mothers (n=34/185), 6% of liable fathers (n=96/1,692), 13% of payee mothers 
(n=299/2,296) and 24% of payee fathers (n=50/208). Responses from other survey 
questions suggest in-kind contributions were also common among liable mothers and 
payee fathers who were not asked these questions. 
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The child support, in-kind, and compliance variables used in the 
analyses are listed in Table 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.4  Child support measures  
Concept 
Measure  
Child support  
How liability determined 
1=administrative assessment 
2=private agreement 
3=registered agreement 
4=other 
Administrative assessment 1=yes, 
2=no 
Collection method 
1=Child Support Collect 
2=Private Collect 
Previously Child Support Collect (if 
Private Collect) 1=yes, 2=no 
Previously Private Collect (if Child 
Support Collect) 1=yes, 2=no 
Expected annual amount of child 
support continuous  
Expected annual amount of child 
support 
1=$0 
2=$1–339 (minimum liability) 
3=$340–999 
4=$1,000–1,999 
5=$2,000–2,999 
6=$3,000–3,999 
7=$4,000–4,999 
8=$5,000–5,999 
9=$6,000–6,999 
10=$7,000–7,999 
11=$8,000–8,999 
12=$9,000–9,999 
13=$10,000–10,999 
14=$11,000–11,999 
15=$12,000 or more 
Paid none of the liability 1=yes, 2=no 
Actual amount paid 
continuous 
Percentage paid 
1=less than 100% 
2=exactly 100% 
3=more than 100% 
Paid in full 1=yes, 2=no 
Paid on time 
1=always 
2=mostly 
3=sometimes 
4=rarely 
5=never 
Always paid on time 1=yes, 2=no 
Ever paid regularly 1=yes, 2=no 
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Compliance 
Compliance 
1=compliant 
2=non-compliant  
Compliance types 
1=in full and on time 
2=in full and not on time  
3=on time and not in full  
4=neither in full nor on time  
Neither in full nor on time 1=yes, 2=no 
In-kind contributions 
Liable parent made an in-kind 
payment for a prescribed item 1=yes, 
2=no 
Amount paid continuous 
Partly or fully in lieu of child support 
1=yes, 2=no 
Other parent agreed to payment 
1=yes, 2=no 
Paid for childcare 1=yes, 2=no 
Paid for preschool or school fees 
1=yes, 2=no 
Paid for school uniform or books 
1=yes, 2=no 
Paid for essential medical or dental 
1=yes, 2=no 
Paid for payee’s share of mortgage, 
rent or utilities 1=yes, 2=no 
Paid for payee’s motor vehicle 
expenses 1=yes, 2=no 
Anything else paid in-kind by liable 
parent1 1=yes, 2=no 
Amount paid continuous 
Other parent agreed to payment 
1=yes, 2=no 
Liable parent made any in-kind 
contribution 
1=something in-kind 
2=nothing in-kind 
Satisfaction and fairness of child 
support amount 
Satisfied with the amount payable 
Range: 0=totally dissatisfied, 10=totally 
satisfied 
Fairness of child support for: 
child 
liable parent 
payee 
current partner 
Range: 0=totally unfair, 10=totally fair 
Overall fairness2 
Range 0=totally unfair for all, 30=totally 
fair for all  
Notes: Parents who said they should pay or should receive or had another arrangement 
were not asked about actual amount, regularity and in-kind contributions. 1. ‘Anything 
else’ means items not on the prescribed payment list, for example, mobile phones, 
clothes or computer. 2. Total of fair for child, respondent and former partner where valid 
information for all three questions.  
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  Preliminary technical notes 
  Using quantitative research to explore gender 
The present study involves secondary analysis of survey data using a 
feminist theoretical framework as detailed in Section 1.5. Although a 
feminist theoretical framework (or ‘gender lens’) is predominantly 
associated with qualitative work, quantitative research has equal validity 
for exploring gender (Allen & Baber 1992; Chafetz 2004; Gringeri, Wahab 
& Anderson-Nathe 2010; Thompson, L 1992). As Risman (1993: 20) 
points out, any methodological technique can incorporate a feminist 
perspective: 
The important feminist issues that guide our research involve the context 
of discovery….Can it be used to further gender equity?...If…we ask 
questions that matter to women's lives, we are…framing research within a 
feminist vision.  
As other feminist researchers have stated, ‘concern with systematic 
disadvantages lends itself to quantitative research, which relies on 
statistical methods to create abstract, simplified representations of 
…systems and institutions in order to allow for clearer inferences’ 
(Stauffer & O'Brien 2017). Quantitative methodology can ‘carefully 
conceptualise these experiences within wider social structures’ (Metso & 
Le Feuvre 2007: 14).  
One of the strengths of quantitative research for policy analysis is that ‘it 
allows the understanding of patterns’ (Burkinshaw 2013: 237) and 
sometimes this provide a more compelling driver for social change than 
personal stories (Sprague & Zimmerman 1993). Feminist-informed 
quantitative research is important when the focus of the research 
question relates to prevalence such as domestic violence, or to structural 
differences by gender for example time use by mothers and fathers or the 
comparative worth of work (Metso & Le Feuvre 2007). 
There is a strong tradition in Australia of using survey data to investigate 
gender and post-separation finances, leading to policy and law reform. 
Research on the economic circumstances of women and children after 
separation (McDonald 1986) provided evidence to support the 
introduction of the Scheme and to monitor its coverage and impact (see 
   
102 
 
also, Funder, Harrison & Weston 1993; Harrison, Snider & Merlo 1990; 
Harrison et al. 1991). Later research on spousal violence and property 
division (Sheehan & Smyth 2000), and superannuation and property 
(Dewar, Sheehan & Hughes 1999), informed family law reform.  
  ‘Minority-time’ or ‘liable’ mothers 
The Scheme caseload currently provides the best and most 
comprehensive sampling frame of separated mothers with a child 
support liability. An estimated 6–15% of separated parents have no 
involvement with the Child Support Program (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs 2003; Ministerial 
Taskforce on Child Support 2005). This group comprises (i) parents who 
have no arrangements for reasons such as not wanting any child support 
or to avoid conflict or violence79 and (ii) parents who have incomes above 
the threshold for FTB, get along and have a private arrangement for child 
support (hereafter ‘self-administer’). Parents with no arrangement are not 
relevant to the current study.  
The small group who self-administer is hard to quantify80 or identify to 
include in research. Thus, while some minority-time mothers might 
privately pay child support to fathers, legal restrictions on formal 
arrangements outside the Scheme mean informal transfers are not 
necessary to understand compliance. Any parent with at least 30% of 
nights (35% from July 2008) can apply for an administrative assessment. 
This means the caseload is inclusive of fathers who want to receive child 
support. Because the focus of the present study is on compliance with a 
child support liability, and registration with the CSA is required for an 
                                       
79 Some low-income parents forgo the additional FTB payable and may be unaware that 
they can apply for an exemption because of domestic violence, or do not to pursue this 
for a range of reasons. 
80 No reliable research is available to determine what proportion of the estimated 6–15% 
have a private working arrangement for child support and how many of these are 
mothers paying fathers. Some research (Qu & Weston 2013) based on two cohorts of 
children aged 6–7 years and 10–11 years (almost all with a majority-time mother) 
showed that the self-administered group comprised mainly fathers paying mothers 
and was much smaller than the group with no arrangements. Unpublished ABS data 
(Qu & Weston 2007) collected in 2003 estimated this group to be 10,200 out of 
669,600 separated families with children 18 years or younger. 
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administrative assessment to be made (or an agreement registered), a 
sample that represents the CSA caseload is appropriate. 
The focus of the present study is on financial responsibility not parenting 
time. It is not intended to represent all minority-time mothers and 
intentionally excludes mothers not in the caseload and those with no 
current liability. Rather, it reflects the range of parenting arrangements 
where money should be transferred between parents, that is split-
residence, shared-time, and majority-time where the mother has the net 
liability81 and minority-time arrangements. (It represents payee parents 
in the caseload as nonparent carer payees were excluded from the 
CSRS.) 
  Limitations 
Two methodological limitations of secondary data analysis warrant 
mention. The first relates to the theoretical approach; the other, to the 
size of the groups of interest. 
  Intersectionality 
Gender ‘must be understood within the context of intersecting domains 
of inequality’ (Risman 2004: 442): race, ethnicity, class and sexual 
identity. It should not be assumed that meanings ascribed to financial 
support for children in separated families is the same across cultures or 
classes. There are some restrictions on taking an intersectional approach 
using CSRS data.  
First, data were not collected on Indigenous identification or cultural 
connections.82 The exclusion of identifying questions was made on solid 
methodological grounds as small numbers would preclude meaningful 
analysis. Larger studies have identified high representation of Indigenous 
mothers and mothers born overseas with a child living elsewhere 
(Kaspiew et al. 2009), the former confirmed by Indigenous-specific 
                                       
81 This includes four liable mothers with another arrangement who reported no 
payment was expected. These arrangements involved payment of school fees or 
specific bills, or each parent covered expenses when the child was with them. 
82 If a respondent was not comfortable with English the interview was terminated. 
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datasets (Walter & Hewitt 2012). Indigenous families remain under-
represented in the Scheme caseload (Esler, Robertson & Shipley 2010). 
Norms of financial obligations and parenting in Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait communities such as concepts of kinship rather than solely 
biological parental responsibility (Moore & Riley 2010) diverge from the 
dominant culture in Australia reflected in this thesis.  
Second, socioeconomic status is measured by education, hours of 
employment and net annual household income. 
Third, the Scheme was not extended to same-sex families until 1 July 
2009. Separated parents with children from former opposite-sex 
relationships in later same-sex relationships were not identified.83  
  Small sample sizes 
CSRS is large dataset weighted to be generalisable to the active CSA 
caseload for parents who previously lived together. However, liable 
mothers are a small subgroup of liable parents compared with liable 
fathers (n=185 and n=1,692). 
Using large surveys for secondary analysis of subgroups has limitations. 
One identified by Ahrons (2011: 231) is ‘the slippery slope of shrinking 
ns’. As observed in the preceding literature review chapters, analyses of 
survey data with parents in atypical roles often involve fewer than 150 
respondents (for example, Gunnoe 1993; Kitterod & Lyngstad 2011; 
Maccoby et al. 1992; Manning & Smock 2000).  
Cheng and Powell (2005) highlight that a potential problem with 
subgroup studies is underestimation of real effects due to a lack of 
statistical power where potentially significant findings are missed 
because of small sample size (technically termed, Type II error). One 
option to deal with lack of statistical power suggested by Cheng and 
Powell is to use a larger p-value to test the null hypothesis, which 
increases Type I error. While the present study reports findings at the 
                                       
83 Again, this subgroup would have been too small for analysis. 
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standard significance level of p<.05, findings approaching significance 
(between p=.05 and p<.10) are noted. This approach is particularly 
relevant to the two chapters that focus solely on liable mothers: Chapter 
6 where a liable mother typology is discussed and Chapter 9 where the 
analyses relate to the smaller number of liable mothers with compliance 
information (n=146) and odds of non-compliance across a range of 
variables. These two chapters have some small subgroups of liable 
mothers.  
Nonetheless, relationships could still be missed because of unequal 
sample sizes. Other options to increase the sample size are not possible. 
Because of small numbers in some subgroups, differences that appear 
meaningful but are not statistically significant (such as relationships in 
the opposite direction to that found in research with liable fathers) are 
noted. This is primarily relevant to Chapter 9 and the logistic regression 
modelling of reasons for non-compliance for liable mothers.  
The next five chapters—the results chapters—address the present 
study’s three research questions in detail. 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on Question 1: “What are the characteristics of 
mothers with a child support liability in Australia and what are the key 
differences between liable mothers and liable fathers?” Chapter 5 first 
explores the liability rates of mothers and fathers at different parenting-
time arrangements with the focal child. Second, liable mothers and liable 
fathers are compared on socio-demographic, family dynamics and 
wellbeing measures. The remainder of the chapter identifies the key 
differences between liable parents and discusses these differences using 
a gender lens. Chapter 6 describes a typology of liable mothers developed 
for the present study. This typology is based on a feminist theoretical 
framework of gendered parenting roles and the concept of ‘good’ (that is, 
intensive) mothering, categorised liable mothers into four groups based 
on the living arrangements of all former relationship children (18 years or 
under).  
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Chapters 7 and 8 focus on Question 2: “Are liable mothers less compliant 
than liable fathers?” Chapter 7 establishes what payments are expected 
to be made by liable mothers and liable fathers and addresses whether 
liable mothers pay when they should in full and on time. Chapter 8 
focuses on whether liable parents provide anything in-kind as an 
addition to, or as a substitute for, child. These two chapters answers this 
question using (i) reports from liable parents; and (ii) matched reports 
from a subgroup of ex-partner dyads from the same child support case.  
Chapter 9 focuses on Question 3: “What are the apparent reasons for 
non-compliance by liable mothers?” This chapter provides a brief overview 
of the compliance literature—mainly involving liable fathers and/or payee 
mothers—and then details the odds of non-compliance for liable mothers 
testing a range of factors that the literature suggests might be relevant. 
The chapter concludes with a model identifying the key factors 
associated with non-compliance for liable mothers. In particular, this 
chapter examined whether mothers have a distinct pattern of non-
compliance associated with factors relevant to their mothering role as 
hypothesised in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 5  What are the characteristics of mothers with a 
child support liability in Australia? 
This chapter addresses the first research question: “What are the 
characteristics of mothers with a child support liability in Australia 
and what are the key differences between liable mothers and liable 
fathers?” It does so by examining the key differences between liable 
parents. The chapter is structured as follows. First, liability status of 
all mothers and fathers is detailed. This section (Section 5.1) details 
the liability status of all mothers and fathers by nights with the focal 
child based on the original Scheme time categories using the whole 
CSRS sample of 5,046 parents. Second, liable mothers and liable 
fathers are compared on a range of socio-demographic, family 
dynamics and wellbeing measures. This section (Section 5.2) focuses 
on the analytic sample of liable parents. Differences between each 
group are summarised in tabular form. Third, the key differences 
between liable mothers and liable fathers are identified using logistic 
regression modelling (Section 5.3). Fourth, these key differences are 
discussed in the context of previous research findings (Section 5.4). 
  Child support liability 
This section details the liability status for mothers and fathers based on 
overnights with one randomly chosen former relationship child. The 
parenting-time categories used for the focal child are those that applied 
under the original Child Support Scheme (see Table 1.2). To recap, these 
are sole (256–365 nights); major (220–255 nights); shared (146–219 
nights); substantial (110–145 nights); and minor84 (0–109 nights). Table 
5.1 details the lability status by amount of parenting-time. Each row 
represents a parenting-time category based on the respondent’s reports 
of their time with the focal child and indicates the percentage frequency 
of respondents by liability status, i.e., liable parent, payee or neither. The 
top panels of the table show mothers’ reports. The bottom panels of the 
table show fathers’ reports. This section is descriptive: no statistical tests 
                                       
84 ‘Minor’ is not defined in the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989. It was a commonly 
used term for parenting-time where the payee/other parent had ‘sole’ time. 
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were applied to this data. This is the only section that uses the whole 
CSRS sample (n=4,883/5046 with valid information). 
Table 5.1  Mothers’ and fathers’ reports 
of overnights with the focal child and 
whether they are the liable parent, the 
payee or neither 
Mothers’ 
reports 
n=2,708 
     
Mothers’ time 
with focal 
child 
Mother 
liable  
(%) 
Mother 
payee  
(%) 
Mother 
neither  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
Total 
(n) 
Mother minor & 
father sole 
36.0 31.9 29.1 100.0 n=121 
Mother 
substantial & 
father major 
43.7 50.5 5.8 100.0 n=26 
Shared 16.7 60.6 22.7 100.0 n=469 
Mother major & 
father 
substantial 
3.2 85.6 11.2 100.0 n=198 
Mother sole & 
father minor 
1.9 93.2 4.9 100.0 n=1,894 
Fathers’ 
reports 
n=2,175 
     
 Father 
liable  
(%) 
Father 
payee  
(%) 
Father 
neither  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
Total 
(n) 
Father minor & 
mother sole 
96.6 0.5 2.9 100.00 n=1,086 
Father 
substantial & 
mother major 
89.5 1.4 9.2 100.0 n=216 
Shared 64.3 7.6 28.2 100.0 n=627 
Father major & 
mother 
substantial 
56.1 29.6 14.3 100.0 n=19 
Father sole & 
mother minor 
21.6 49.3 29.1 100.0 n=227 
Notes: Data are weighted. Overnights with the focal child may not reflect 
arrangements for all former relationship children (aged 18 years or younger) where 
split-residence applied. Responses from 2,620 mothers. Excludes 61 mothers with 
inconsistent information, 33 who did not know if they should pay or receive and 96 
who had missing information on overnights. Responses from 2,088 fathers. Excludes 
94 fathers with inconsistent information, 40 who did not know if they should pay or 
receive, 54 who had missing information on overnights and two fathers who were a 
former couple.  
Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of mothers and fathers with a specified 
amount of time (i.e., minor, substantial, major and sole) who are the 
liable parent in their child support case, as detailed in Table 5.1 column 
2. In other words, Figure 5.1 displays the comparison of the liability rates 
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of mothers and fathers at each level of parenting-time (based on the 
original Scheme categories) in graphic form.  
Note: Data are weighted. Data are based on 179 liable mothers and 1,656 liable fathers 
who had valid information on the number of overnights with the focal child.  
Figure 5-1 Mothers’ and fathers’ reports 
of their overnights with the focal child: 
percentage liable  
  Mothers’ and fathers’ reports of their overnights with the 
focal child and liability 
Whether a parent was liable, a payee, or neither differed by gender and 
number of nights with the focal child. Figure 5.1 shows that 97% of 
fathers were liable when they had minor time and 90% when they had 
substantial time. In contrast, 36% of mothers were liable when they had 
minor time and 44% when they had substantial time. It would be 
expected that the majority of mothers with minor time would be liable as 
was the case with fathers with minor time. While mothers with minor 
time were more often a payee or neither than the liable parent seems 
counter-intuitive, this lower rate could denote split-residence.85  
Further, as Table 5.1 indicates, when fathers had sole time, 49% were 
payees; higher than reported by liable mothers with minor time. Two 
reasons might explain this discrepancy: (i) parents with this arrangement 
                                       
85 Parents who reported being neither a liable parent nor a payee could have a current 
liability that was offset by arrears due by the other parent. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Minor Substantial Shared Major Sole
%
Liability by original Scheme parenting-time with the focal 
child: mothers' and fathers' reports 
Mothers Fathers
   
110 
 
were independent samples of mothers and fathers (that is, not ex-
couples) and each sample reflected different populations of parents 
and/or (ii) respondents reported more nights than their former partner 
thereby placing them in different time categories. Again, split-residence 
could explain why 22% of fathers were liable when they had sole-time 
with this child. 
Differing rates of liability for mothers and fathers with similar amounts of 
time found here are consistent with recent research (Kaspiew et al. 
2009), and as other research suggests (see, for example, Qu & Weston 
2008), mothers’ lower rates could indicate a resident child.  
  Comparative analysis: liable mothers and liable fathers  
In this section liable parents are compared on a range of socio-
demographic, family dynamics and wellbeing measures. As there is 
little previous research in this area, variables chosen for the comparisons 
were those that intuitively could be important and relate to the 
theoretical framework, that is, gender, and the first research question 
seeking to identify the characteristics of liable mothers and the key 
differences between liable mothers and liable fathers. Differences are 
expected to be associated with differences in gender norms of parenting 
for mothers and fathers. The results are generalisable to the active 
caseload for parents who previously lived together. 
 Analytic sample and related notes 
Between-group differences are based on an analytic sample of 185 liable 
mothers and 1,692 liable fathers. This section reports on independent 
samples of mothers and fathers not former couples. The selection criteria 
into groups (see Section 4.2) meant that ex-couples where both parents 
reported being liable (or both payees) were omitted from the analytic 
sample.  
The bivariate analyses in this section use cross-tabulation for categorical 
variables and comparison of means for continuous variables to identify 
similarities and differences between liable mothers and liable fathers. 
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These simple bivariate techniques were chosen because they provide 
information on the relationship between variables.  
As the data are weighted to take into account the complex survey design, 
the relationship between variables cannot be tested by the Pearson chi-
squared test (categorical variables) nor the t-test (continuous variables) 
as ‘estimates may be biased for the true proportion of the survey 
population’ (Heeringa, West & Berglund 2010:151). Instead, tabulations 
are performed using the svy: tab command, and means86 are determined 
using the svy: mean command. Comparisons are restricted to the 
subpopulation of liable parents using the subpop option in Stata.87 The 
former process produces an F-transformed Rao-Scott chi-squared test 
statistic as a default (Heeringa, West & Berglund 2010: 167)88 to take 
account of the complex survey data. The latter process produces 
linearised standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of the mean. The 
test command run post-estimation produces an adjusted Wald Test and 
an F-Ratio to show whether the means are statistically equivalent or not 
(UCLA Statistical Consulting Group n.d.). Exact p-values are reported in 
the text and tables.89 Significant differences at p<.05 are noted. All data 
are weighted using the design and response weights developed to be 
representative of the Scheme active caseload. Numbers reported in the 
text and tables are unweighted.  
Variables that differ significantly between liable parents in the bivariate 
analyses are further investigated via multivariate techniques (specifically 
binary logistic regression) later in this chapter to determine the key 
differences between liable mothers and liable fathers. In addition, group 
                                       
86 While medians are mentioned where appropriate, the complex survey design limits the 
validity of statistical testing of differences in medians between liable mothers and 
liable fathers. 
87 This required the creation of a variable to represent the subpopulation of interest, 
here liable parents. Liable parents were coded 1 and all respondents outside this 
group were coded 0. A similar process was used for specific subpopulation analyses in 
the other results chapters: the subpopulation of payees; liable mothers; and all liable 
parents and payees. 
88 This is a design-adjusted form of the Pearson Chi-Squared Test with a second-order 
design correction incorporated.  
89 P-values below .001 are reported as p<.001. 
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level comparisons may mask differences within the liable mother group. 
Intragroup differences are explored in Chapter 6. 
  Household composition  
The socio-demography of liable parents covers their current household 
and socioeconomic circumstances; two areas where previous research 
would suggest that differences exist.  
Household composition differed significantly by gender: 51% of liable 
fathers lived alone or shared with other adults compared with 20% of 
liable mothers. In contrast, a third of liable mothers had resident 
children but no partner in their household. Regardless of whether 
repartnered, mothers were significantly more likely to have resident 
children (57% compared with 32% of fathers, p<.001).  
Table 5.2  Liable parents: current 
circumstances  
 
Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,695 
Household 
composition (%)  
  
Lived alone or shared 
with other adults 
20.2 50.6 
Lived with resident 
children and no partner  
33.3 13.0 
Lived with a partner 
and no resident 
children  
22.3 17.6 
Lived with a partner 
and resident children 
24.1 18.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Has a resident child 
(%) 
57.4 31.8 
p<.001   
Biological children 
from more than one 
relationship (%) 
20.1 19.2  
p=.859   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. ‘Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. ‘Resident children’ means in the 
household at least 50% of the time and includes dependent adult children. Parents 
categorised as having no resident children could have 1–49% nights with one or more 
children. ‘Biological children’ includes legally adopted children but not stepchildren. 
Differences shown in Table 5.2 reflect arrangements for former 
relationship children (that is, shared-time or split-residence) rather than 
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other relationship children. A comparison of minority-time liable parents 
indicates little difference in households with resident children. 
Nevertheless, a minority of parents had a child from another relationship 
in their household or living elsewhere. Liable parents had similar rates of 
other relationship children (19–20%). Some repartnered parents had 
stepchildren in their household or living elsewhere who stayed overnight 
(12–17%), illustrating the complexity of relationship ties within and 
between households.90  
These results are consistent with previous Australian research (Kaspiew 
et al. 2009; Weston 2008; Wolffs & Shallcross 2000) finding high 
repartnering and resident children among liable mothers.  
  Socioeconomic status  
Socioeconomic status was measured by education, employment and 
income. Highest education level did not differ significantly: 13–17% of 
liable parents had a degree or higher qualification. A substantial minority 
of liable parents (29% mothers and 20% fathers) were not in paid 
employment. Liable mothers worked fewer hours per week (mean=26.4 
hours compared with 37.1 hours for fathers, p<.001).  
To further explore gendered differences in employment a five-category 
variable is used (see Section 4.4.1). As indicated in Table 5.3, liable 
mothers were significantly more likely to work short and long part-time 
hours and liable fathers to work long full-time hours with employment 
patterns signalling responsibility for children. Mothers who worked part-
time were twice as often in long rather than short part-time hours.  
  
                                       
90 Biological and legally adopted children are considered in the assessment while 
stepchildren are generally excluded. Liable fathers more often had resident 
stepchildren than liable mothers (12% compared with 2%).  
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Table 5.3  Liable parents: 
socioeconomic circumstances  
 Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,692 
Has degree or higher 
qualification (%) 
16.7 13.1 
p=.326   
Hours of work per 
week (mean) 
26.37 37.06 
SE, CI 2.45, CI 21.56–31.17 1.21, CI 34.69–39.44 
p<.001   
Employment (%)   
Not in paid employment  28.6 19.7 
Short part-time (1–20 
hours) 
5.1 1.9 
Long part-time (21–34 
hours) 
11.8 6.2 
Standard full-time-(35–
44 hours) 
44.4 33.4 
Long full-time (45 hours 
or more) 
10.1 38.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Main income source 
(%) 
  
Salary or wages 68.2 67.0 
Self-employment or 
other 
9.0 18.7 
Government payment 22.8 14.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.063   
Net annual personal 
income (mean) 
$37,688.17 $39,900.50 
SE, CI $2,609.03, CI $32,573.33–
$42,803.00 
$989.33, CI $37,960.98–
$41,840.02 
p=.428   
Net annual household 
income (mean) 
$52,735.91 $50,635.91 
SE, CI $3,793.34, CI $45,298.62–
$60,171.82 
$1,076.34, CI $48,525.81–
$52,746.01 
p=.595   
Equivalised household 
income (with expected 
child support 
deducted) below 60% 
of the median (%) 
20.2 22.7 
p=.620   
Self-assessed poor 
financial 
circumstances (%) 
11.2 21.5 
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 Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,692 
p=.009   
Experienced hardship 
in last 12 months (%) 
33.8 34.1 
p=.966   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. Employment categories based on 
definitions developed by Baxter, Gray, Hand & Hayes (2012). Net annual income 
variables developed for Son et al. (2014). 
Main income source reflected gendered employment patterns. While 
salary and wages predominated, liable fathers were twice as likely as 
mothers to identify self-employment. By contrast, mothers had higher 
rates of government payments than fathers (self-employment: 19% 
fathers compared with 9% mothers and government payment: 23% 
mothers compared with 14% fathers, p=.063). Gender and household 
composition influenced the type of government payment received by 
liable parents (n=21 mothers and n=116 fathers). While both had high 
rates of Disability Support Pension (49% and 35%), Parenting Payment 
was more common for mothers (27% compared with 7% fathers, data not 
shown).  
Liable parents had similar mean net personal incomes ($37,688 mothers 
and $39,901 fathers, p=.428) and mean net household incomes ($52,736 
mothers and $50,636 fathers, p=.595). Medians were slightly lower: 
personal income mothers and fathers $36,444 and household income 
$46, 649 mothers and $43,900 fathers. As household size may differ, 
liable parents were also compared using equivalised household income 
(see Section 4.4.1). This measure considered child support liability by 
deducting this from income. Liable parents had similar low financial 
resources: 28–30% had incomes below 60% of the median for their 
household size.91  
In contrast, liable parents did differ on self-assessed financial 
circumstances. While the majority reported they were ‘just getting along’ 
or better, mothers were half as likely to say they were ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ 
(11% compared with 22% fathers, p=.009). This significant difference in 
                                       
91 See Section 4.4.1 for how this measure was calculated. 
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subjective financial wellbeing was not found for actual disadvantage with 
34% of liable parents reporting at least one measure of hardship in the 
previous 12 months (p=.966).92  
  Former relationship  
As Table 5.4 reveals, liable parents had similar rates of being previously 
married to their former partner (67% mothers and 71% fathers), years 
together (mean=11 years mothers and 9.8 years fathers), and number of 
children (mean=2.3 mothers and 2.0 fathers). Mothers had been 
separated significantly longer (mean=7.8 years compared with 6.0 years 
fathers, p=.001) with 40% of mothers separated more than 10 years 
compared with 19% of fathers (data not shown).  
Whether their former partner was living with a partner and, for those 
repartnered, had a new or stepchild did not differ significantly. In 
contrast, gender differences were again noted for employment type: 26% 
of mothers reported a self-employed former partner (compared with 5% 
fathers, p<.001).  
  
                                       
92 ‘Hardship’ was measured by whether because of the shortage of money in the last 12 
months they (i) pawned or sold something, (ii) went without meals, or (iii) asked for 
help from welfare/community organisation.  
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Table 5.4  Liable parents: former 
relationship 
 Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,692 
Previously married (%) 67.3 71.0 
p=.519   
Years together (mean) 10.98 9.84 
SE, CI 0.71, CI 9.59–12.37 0.27, CI 9.32–10.36 
p=.133   
Number of former 
relationship children 
(mean) 
2.26 2.00 
SE, CI 0.21, CI 1.85–2.68 0.05, CI 1.91–2.10 
p=.236   
Years separated (mean) 7.84 5.98 
SE, CI 0.53, CI 6.80–8.87 0.20, CI 5.58–6.38 
p<.001   
Former partner 
repartnered (%) 
44.0 48.9 
p=.510   
Former partner 
repartnered with a 
new/stepchild (%) 
  
Not living with partner 46.9 40.5 
Repartnered and no 
new/stepchild 
12.5 16.2 
Repartnered and a 
new/stepchild 
23.8 19.9 
Don’t know 16.8 23.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.582   
Type of employment of 
former partner (%)  
84.1 72.8 
Employee 45.6 52.8 
Self-employed 26.3 4.6 
Not in workforce 13.9 22.6 
Don’t know 14.2 20.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. The question about a new/stepchild 
was only asked if their former partner had repartnered. This could undercount parents 
with a resident child from another relationship and not repartnered. 
  Former relationship children 
Details of the age and living arrangements of the focal child are shown at 
Table 5.5. Mothers were predominantly liable for older children 
(mean=12.7 years compared with 10.3 years for fathers, p<.001): 74% of 
focal children were 11 years or older compared with 50% for fathers. The 
youngest former relationship child was also older (mean=11.9 years 
compared with 9.2 years for fathers, p<.001, see Table 5.6).  
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Table 5.5  Liable parents: focal child 
age and living arrangements  
 
Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,692 
Age of child (%)   
0–5 years  9.2 15.6 
6–10 years 17.1 34.8 
11–15 years 44.1 38.4 
16 years or older 29.6 11.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<=.001   
Age of child (years) 
(mean) 
12.72 10.26 
SE, CI 0.55, CI 11.64–13.80 0.19, CI 9.89–10.62 
p<.001   
Child lives with liable 
parent (%) 
   
All the time or more than 
50% of the time 
22.2 3.4 
Roughly 50/50 split 12.9 7.2 
Less than 50% of the time 
or never 
64.9 89.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. 
Data from CSA Facts and Figures (Section 1.2.5) indicate that in 89% of 
cases the liable parent had minor time. While accurate for liable fathers, 
as detailed in the table above, liable mothers demonstrated a different 
pattern: 22% lived with the focal child more than 50% of the time 
(compared with 3% of fathers, p<.001). Another 13% lived roughly half 
the time with the focal child, almost twice the rate for fathers, and 10% 
never lived with this child compared with 17% of fathers.  
The parenting arrangements for the focal child should generally 
represent all former relationship children because focal children were 
chosen randomly. However, as detailed in Table 5.6, siblings could have 
different arrangements, for example, one child lives mainly with their 
mother and a sibling lives mainly with their father. 
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Table 5.6  Liable parents: parenting 
arrangements of all former relationship 
children (18 years or younger)  
 Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,692 
All former relationship 
children (%) 
  
Mainly with other parent  54.2 83.9 
Equal-time 10.9 6.0 
Mainly with liable parent 10.6 1.0 
Split-residence 24.3 9.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Sex of former relationship 
children (%) 
  
All boys 32.4 27.9 
All girls 26.7 30.2 
Both sexes 40.9 41.9 
Total  100.0 100.0 
p=.747   
Age of youngest child 
(mean) 
11.91 9.19 
SE, CI 0.58, CI 10.78–13.04 0.18, CI 8.84–9.54 
p<.001   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. Excludes children under 18 years who 
did not live with either parent.  
Based on information for all former relationship children (18 years or 
younger)93, 84% of liable fathers had less than 50% of the time (or never 
spent time) with all their children, 6% had equal-time, and 9% split-
residence. In contrast, 24% of liable mothers had split-residence and 
11% equal-time. Reflecting that under the original Scheme parents with 
more time (up to 69.9% of nights) can be liable in Australia—a 
circumstance not common elsewhere—11% of liable mothers had 50% or 
more time or always lived with all their children (compared with 1% of 
fathers). Again, these differences were statistically significant (p<.001). 
Liable mothers had a significantly higher rate of split-residence: 24% of 
liable mother cases had differing living arrangements for siblings 
                                       
93 Parenting arrangements shown at Table 5.6 represent liable parents. Some shared-
time or split-residence cases had no current liability: 6% of all parents in the CSRS 
reported they were neither meant to pay or receive child support. 
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(compared with 9% of fathers, p=.002)94 reflecting the generally older age 
of the children in liable mother cases. When all the children in the case 
were considered, it became apparent that 46% of liable mothers had at 
least one child in majority or shared-time, compared with 16% of liable 
fathers. 
  Overnights with the focal child 
Liable parents differed on all measures of parenting time. Sixteen per 
cent of fathers had not seen the focal child in the last 12 months, and 
7% had daytime-only contact (compared with 3% and 15% of mothers, 
p=.014). This difference is consistent with the literature reported in 
Chapters 2 and 3 showing minority-time mothers were less likely to have 
no overnights (or daytime-only) than minority-time fathers. 
Consequently, liable mothers had double the overnights of liable fathers 
(mean=135 nights compared with 64 nights, p=.002). Median nights were 
81 for mothers and 52 for fathers. Table 5.7 shows overnights with the 
focal child using the original Scheme categories. More mothers had 
shared, major and sole time than fathers. Table 5.7 also details another 
parenting-time measure (equal-time). This shows that 27% of liable 
mothers had the majority of nights and 10% equal-time (48–52% nights). 
In contrast, 9% of liable fathers had equal or more nights (p<.001).  
  
                                       
94 Some liable parents had young adult children living with them, generally those who 
had ‘aged out’ of the assessment. This could signal a (now) minority-time liable mother 
who was previously a payee.  
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Table 5.7  Liable parents: time with 
focal child  
 
Liable mothers 
n=179 
Liable fathers 
n=1,656 
Time with liable parent 
in last 12 months (%) 
  
Did not see child 2.8 16.4 
Daytime-only 14.5 6.8 
Some overnights 82.7 76.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.014   
Overnights in last 12 
months (mean) 
134.74 63.73 
SE, CI 23.16, CI 89.35–180.14 2.76, CI 58.32–69.13 
p=.002   
Original Scheme time 
categories (%) 
  
Minor (0–109 nights) 57.1 82.0 
Substantial (110–145 
nights) 
3.8 5.6 
Shared (146–219 nights) 15.6 9.8 
Major (220–255 nights) 1.4 0.2 
Sole (256–365 nights) 22.1 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Liable parent has equal-
time (%) 
  
Less than 48% nights 63.1 91.4 
Equal-time (48–52% 
nights) 
9.8 5.3 
More than 52% nights 27.1 3.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Details of 
nights for the focal child were missing for 6 liable mothers and 36 liable fathers.  
 Family dynamics 
This section looks at family dynamics and covers the parental 
relationship, conflict, emotional closeness to the focal child and 
workability of the parenting arrangements.  
  Parental relationship quality 
As indicated in Table 5.8, parental relationship quality in the last 12 
months differed significantly. Fathers were more likely to report a positive 
relationship than liable mothers (47% friendly or cooperative compared 
with 36% of mothers) while more liable mothers had a negative 
relationship (38% compared with 24%, p=.046). Further, liable mothers 
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were significantly more likely to report a fearful relationship than liable 
fathers (18% compared with 6%, p=.002). 
Table 5.8  Liable parents: family 
dynamics  
 
Liable mothers 
n=184 
Liable fathers 
n=1,681 
Parental relationship 
quality in the last 12 
months (%) 
  
Friendly 15.4 18.8 
Cooperative 21.1 28.2 
Distant  25.5 29.2 
Lots of conflict 20.2 17.4 
Fearful 17.7 6.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.046   
Relationship is fearful (%)   
Yes 17.7 6.4 
No 82.3 93.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.002   
General conflict in the 
last 12 months (%) 
  
Great deal or some 43.8 44.6 
Very little or none 56.2 55.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.901   
Conflict over money in 
last 12 months (%) 
  
Frequently or sometimes 28.2 31.1 
Rarely or never or did not 
talk about money 
71.8 68.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.637   
Distance between 
parents’ houses (mean) 
374.52 km 377.67 km 
SE, CI 122.83, CI 133.73–
615.32 
57.27, CI 265.40–489.95 
p=.981   
Liable parent emotionally 
very close to child (%) 
63.4 55.6 
p=.281   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. ‘Distant’ includes ‘no contact in the last 
12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. A great deal or some’ includes ‘varies’. ‘Very little or 
none’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. ‘Did not talk about 
money’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. Emotional 
closeness was not asked if either parent never saw the focal child. 
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Liable mothers’ less positive relationships were not reflected in other 
measures of conflict nor for closeness to their child, either physically or 
emotionally. Liable parents almost as often reported high as low general 
conflict (44–45% high and 55–56% low). Conflict over money was low: 
28–31% frequently or sometimes argued about money in the previous 12 
months. Mean distance from their former partner’s house was almost 
identical: 375 km and 377 km.95 Use of the median value showed a 
different pattern: with the median distance for liable mothers of 42 km 
and 25 km for liable fathers. Liable parents did not differ significantly in 
reports of being emotionally very close to the focal child: 63% mothers 
and 56% fathers (p=.281) reported being very close. 
  Parenting arrangement decision 
Liable mothers and liable fathers reported some significant differences in 
how the parenting arrangements were decided for the focal child 
(p<.001). As Table 5.9 shows, liable mothers were less involved in the 
parenting arrangement decision. Although few liable parents (3–4%) 
reported that they decided, 27% of fathers reported that the mother 
decided; nine times higher than mothers stated they decided. This 
reflects circumstances that varied from the traditional majority-time 
mother arrangement.  
Parenting arrangements were frequently agreed (37% mothers and 43% 
fathers), but mothers more often reported a judicial decision (36% 
compared with 20% fathers). Reflecting predominately older children in 
liable-mother cases, 7% were decided by the child alone (compared with 
3% fathers).96  
  
                                       
95This may not represent how close they lived from the focal child as some liable 
parents, particularly mothers, did not live apart from all or any of their children. 
96 In 93% of liable-mother cases where the child only decided the liable mother had 
minority-time or split-residence. 
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Table 5.9  Liable parents: parenting 
arrangement decision for the focal child  
 Liable mothers 
n=185 
Liable fathers 
n=1,692 
Parenting arrangement 
decision (%) 
  
Parents agreed or parents 
and child agreed 
37.4 43.3 
Judge decided 35.8 19.5 
Mother decided 2.9 27.0 
Father decided 14.8 3.7 
Child decided 6.9 3.1 
Other or just happened 2.2 3.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Used lawyer or mediation 
services (%)  
72.3 57.9 
p=.046   
Arrangements working 
well for child (%) 
74.8 66.2 
p=.177   
Arrangements working 
well for liable parent (%) 
45.4 53.2 
p=.258   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. 
Liable mothers used more formal assistance from lawyers and mediation 
services (73% compared with 58% fathers, p=.046). This is partly 
explained by longer time since separation and the prevalence of 
legal/judicial pathways for dispute resolution prior to the 2006 family 
law reforms (99% of these mothers separated before July 2006). These 
results are consistent with other research indicating high use of 
mediation, lawyers or courts where fathers had majority-time (Cashmore 
et al. 2010; Kaspiew et al. 2009).  
  Personal wellbeing 
This section looks at personal wellbeing. As illustrated in Table 5.10. 
Liable mothers had significantly higher life satisfaction and marginally 
better psychological wellbeing than fathers.  
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Table 5.10  Liable parents: personal 
wellbeing 
 
Liable mothers 
n=184 
Liable fathers 
n=1,688 
Satisfaction with life 
as a whole (0=totally 
dissatisfied, 10=totally 
satisfied) (mean) 
7.24 6.28 
SE, CI 0.30, CI 6.65–7.84 0.13, CI 6.04–6.53 
p=.003   
Personal wellbeing 
(3=low, 15=high) 
(mean) 
10.77 10.20 
SE, CI 0.31, CI 10.17–11.37 0.12, CI 9.98–10.43 
p=.085   
Notes: Data are weighted. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 
Personal wellbeing based on a composite score from three questions about how often in 
the last four weeks the respondent (i) felt calm and peaceful, (ii) had lots of energy and 
(iii) felt down (1=all the time, 5=none of the time); the former two reverse coded. 
The data from the Family Court in Section 1.3.2 and the literature 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that some minority-time 
arrangements occur because the mother had mental health issues. 
Liable mothers with low wellbeing and/or lower life satisfaction, such as 
those with mental health problems serious enough to affect parenting 
arrangements, may have self-selected out of the CSRS itself. This could 
positively skew reports of wellbeing. Alternatively, parenting time could 
be relevant for liable mothers’ sense of wellbeing, with parents who had 
more time with their children reporting higher levels of satisfaction and 
wellbeing than those with less time—thereby increasing the mean for the 
liable mother group as a whole. (Intragroup comparisons in the liable 
mother group for wellbeing and satisfaction are explored in Chapter 6.) 
  Key differences between liable parents  
Table 5.11 details similarities and differences between liable mothers and 
liable fathers from the bivariate analyses above. Some relationships are 
likely to be nonsignificant in multivariate analyses once associations 
between variables are considered. Significant and marginally 
significant)97 differences are noted. The latter variables are included as it 
is suggested that marginally significant variables should be considered 
                                       
97 Main income source and total personal wellbeing were marginally significant. 
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when determining factors to include in the multivariate analyses, 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000) here logistic regression modelling.  
Table 5.11  Liable mothers and liable 
fathers: similarities and differences  
Similarities  Differences  
Socio-demographic characteristics  
Age 
Lived with a partner 
Biological children from more than 
one relationship 
Previously married  
Years together 
Number of former relationship 
children 
Sex of former relationship children 
Has degree or higher qualification 
Net annual personal income 
Net annual household income 
Household income (with expected 
child support deducted) below 60% of 
the median  
Experienced hardship in last 12 
months 
Former partner repartnered 
Former partner repartnered with a 
new/stepchild 
Household composition 
Has a resident child 
Year separated  
Age of child 
Child’s living arrangements 
Overnights with child 
Parenting arrangements of former 
relationship children (18 years or 
younger) 
Split-residence 
Age of youngest child 
Main income source 
Self-assessed poor financial 
circumstances 
Hours worked per week 
Employment type of employment of 
former partner 
Family dynamics:  
How well parenting arrangements 
working for liable parent 
How well parenting arrangements 
working for child 
Distance between parents’ houses  
Emotionally very close to child 
Great deal or some conflict between 
parents in the last 12 months  
Frequently or sometimes argued 
about money in the last 12 months  
How parenting arrangements 
determined 
Used lawyer or mediation service 
Parental relationship quality in the 
last 12 months 
Fearful relationship 
Wellbeing  
 Life satisfaction 
Personal wellbeing  
Notes: ‘Child’ means focal child.  
In summary: 
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• Household composition: liable mothers were more likely to have 
resident children whether they lived with a partner or not than liable 
fathers. 
• Financial resources: liable fathers worked longer hours, reflecting 
mothers’ higher part-time employment. Fathers were marginally 
more likely to have their main income source from self-employment 
than liable mothers. Nevertheless, more liable fathers reported poor 
financial circumstances than liable mothers.  
• Former relationship: liable mothers had been separated longer than 
liable fathers.  
• Circumstances of former partner: liable mothers were more likely to 
have a self-employed former partner than liable fathers. 
• Children: mothers were more likely to be liable for older children 
than fathers. Liable mothers were less likely to have no time with the 
focal child in the last 12 months and had more overnights than 
liable fathers: 43% of liable mothers had shared-time or more. When 
all former relationship children were considered, more liable mothers 
had split-residence, equal-time or all children mainly with them than 
liable fathers.  
• Parenting arrangements: liable mothers were more likely to have 
arrangements determined by a judge and to have used formal 
assistance than liable fathers. Few liable mothers reported they 
solely decided the parenting arrangements.  
• Parental relationship: more liable mothers described their 
relationship in negative terms, especially fearful, than liable fathers. 
• Personal wellbeing: liable mothers were more satisfied with their life 
overall and had marginally higher personal wellbeing than liable 
fathers. 
  Modelling of key differences between liable mothers and 
liable fathers  
In this section binary logistic regression modelling is used to identify the 
key differences between liable mothers and liable fathers. This method 
was chosen over other methods that classify or predict group 
membership such as discriminant analysis for two reasons. First, logistic 
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is preferable when continuous data are not normal in distribution (such 
as number of overnights) or group sizes are very unequal and where 
some factors are categorical (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). Second, it can 
be utilised with complex weighted data using the survey (svy) command 
in Stata. Use of the svy command produces results that report a model F 
test and t statistics that take into account the survey design degrees of 
freedom to compute p-values (Statacorp 2015). 
To begin with, variables to be specified in the model were identified: those 
significant (or marginally significant) in the bivariate analyses. Variables 
to be considered were those listed in column 2 Table 5.11. To avoid 
collinearity and/or substantial reduction in the number of parents in the 
models some variables were omitted if the concept was better measured 
by another variable. The final variables to be tested in the model are 
detailed in Table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12  Variables used in logistic 
regression models of the key differences 
between liable mothers and liable 
fathers  
Concept 
Measure  
Household composition 
Household composition1 (nominal) 
1=lived alone or shared with other 
adults (reference category) 2=resident 
children and no partner, 3=partnered 
and no resident children, 4=partnered 
and resident children  
Financial resources  
Hours worked per week2 
(continuous)  
Main income source (nominal) 
1=salary or wages (reference 
category), 2=self-employment, 
3=government payment 
Self-assessed poor finances 
(dichotomous) 
1=poor or very poor, 2=just getting 
along or better (reference category) 
Former partner employment 
Type of employment of former 
partner (nominal) 
1=employee (reference category), 
2=self-employed, 3=not in paid 
employment, 4=don’t know  
Age of children 
Age of youngest child3 (continuous)  
Time with focal child 
Overnights in last 12 months4 
(continuous) 
Parenting arrangements: all 
children 
Arrangements of former 
relationship children5 (nominal) 
1=all children mainly with liable 
parent, 2=all equal-time, 3=all 
children mainly with other parent 
(reference category), 4=split-residence 
Parental relationship 
Parental relationship quality in the 
last 12 months6 (nominal) 
1=friendly, 2=cooperative (reference 
category), 3=distant, 4=lots of conflict, 
5=fearful  
Parenting arrangement decision 
Parenting arrangement decision7 
(nominal) 
1=mother decided, 2=parents agreed 
or parents and child agreed (reference 
category), 3=child decided, 4=father 
decided, 5=judge decided, 6=other or 
just happened 
Wellbeing 
Life satisfaction8 (continuous) 
Notes: ‘Former relationship children’ mean those 18 years or younger. 1. Also measures 
‘has resident child’. 2. Also measures ‘employment type’. 3. Also measures ‘age of focal 
child’ and ‘years separated’. 4. Measures all parenting time variables. 5. Also measures 
‘split-residence’. 6. Also measures ‘fearful relationship’. 7. Also measures ‘used lawyer or 
mediation’. 8. Also measures ‘personal wellbeing’.  
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  Results from models 
Four models were specified. The dependent variable was 1=mother, 
0=father. The models identify the key differences between liable parents. 
Model 1 included only socio-demographic variables for liable parents 
(household composition; hours worked; self-assessed poor financial 
circumstances; main income source) and type of employment of their 
former partner. Model 2 added child-related variables (age of youngest 
child; overnights with focal child; parenting arrangements of all former 
relationship children). Model 3 added family dynamics (relationship 
quality and parenting arrangement decision). Model 4 added life 
satisfaction. Numbers differed as Stata deletes listwise for missing 
responses on any variable in the model. (Model 1 n=1,856/1,865 and 
Model 4 n=1,761.) All models were statistically significant (p<.001), 
confirming the working hypothesis that liable parents do differ by gender.  
Model 1 only included socio-demographic variables for liable parents and 
their former partner. Four variables were significant; one in part. 
Mothers were more likely to live with a partner (with or without resident 
children) or with children but no partner than live alone or share with 
other adults. Mothers worked fewer hours than fathers and were less 
likely to have poor financial circumstances. Mothers were more likely to 
have a former partner who was self-employed than an employee. Not in 
paid employment or unknown was nonsignificant. Mothers were 
marginally less likely to have a main income source from self-
employment than wages or salary. Government payment was 
nonsignificant.  
Model 2 added child related variables. Once time with the focal child and 
all former relationship children were included, differences in household 
composition disappeared for those with resident children whether 
partnered or not. Hours of work, self-assessed financial circumstances 
and former partner self-employed remained significant. There were no 
changes from Model 1 for nonsignificant variables or part of variables. 
Mothers were significantly more likely to have (i) older children and more 
overnights with the focal child and (ii) all children with them than all 
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children mainly with the other parent. Differences were nonsignificant for 
equal-time and split-residence.  
Model 3 added family dynamics variables. All significant variables from 
Model 2 were unchanged. Mothers were more likely to describe their 
relationship as fearful (and marginally as lots of conflict) than 
cooperative. Friendly or distant were nonsignificant. Mothers were less 
likely to have solely decided the parenting arrangements than agreed.98 
Other categories of parenting arrangement decision-making were 
nonsignificant.  
Model 4 added life satisfaction. This reduced the number of parents in 
the model to 1,761 because of missing responses to this question. Life 
satisfaction was nonsignificant (odds 1.03, p=.667). Its addition produced 
two changes: (i) self-assessed financial circumstances became marginally 
significant and (ii) lots of conflict became significant. This suggests that 
parenting time and/or parental relationship quality might be relevant to 
the nonsignificant result for life satisfaction in Model 4.  
Three variables had one significant category with wide confidence 
intervals as this represented small subgroups of parents: (i) all children 
mainly with respondent; (ii) fearful relationship and; (iii) self-employed 
former partner. Using variables with fewer levels would create smaller 
confidence intervals for two variables, while a dichotomous measure of 
former partner self-employment produced the same confidence intervals, 
but with the loss of precision for which category was important. Results 
from these variables in the modelling should be interpreted cautiously. 
Results of the models are presented at Table 5.13 below. 
  
                                       
98 Once time and parental relationship quality in the last 12 months were considered, 
whether a judge made the decision became nonsignificant. 
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Table 5.13  Logistic regression models 
of the key differences between liable 
mothers and liable fathers 
Factor Model 1: 
odds 
ratios 
Model 2: 
odds 
ratios 
Model 3: 
odds 
ratios 
Model 4: 
odds 
ratios 
Household composition 
(ref: lived alone or shared with 
other adults) 
resident children and no 
partner  
8.11 
(p<.001) 
1.83 
(p=.442) 
0.86 
(p=.850) 
0.62 
(p=.567) 
partnered and no resident 
children 
4.10 
(p=.001) 
4.39 
(p=.002) 
4.44 
(p=.003) 
4.38 
(p=.004) 
partnered and resident 
children 
4.00 
(p=.002) 
1.26 
(p=.663) 
0.92 
(p=.878) 
0.81 
(p=.716) 
Hours worked per week 0.96 
(p<.001) 
0.96 
(p<.001) 
0.96 
(p<.001) 
0.96 
(p<.001) 
Self-assessed poor financial 
circumstances 
(ref: just getting along or 
better) 
poor or very poor 
0.37 
(p=.005) 
0.44 
(p=.032) 
0.39 
(p=.028) 
0.43 
(p=.055) 
Main income source 
(ref: salary or wages) 
self-employment or other 
0.43 
(p=.052) 
0.50 
(p=.138) 
0.58 
(p=.234) 
0.58 
(p=.235) 
government payment 
0.90 
(p=.831) 
1.46 
(p=.467) 
1.84 
(p=.309) 
1.65 
(p=.435) 
Type of employment of 
former partner  
(ref: employee) 
self-employed 
8.87 
(p<.001) 
7.77 
(p<.001) 
8.76 
(p<.001) 
8.97 
(p<.001) 
not in paid employment 0.94 
(p=.627) 
0.79 
(p=.557) 
0.87 
(p=.739) 
0.88 
(p=.764) 
don’t know 0.59 
(p=.326) 
0.53 
(p=.131) 
0.79 
(p=.583) 
0.68 
(p=.382) 
Age of youngest child 
 1.17 
(p<.001) 
1.21 
(p<.001) 
1.19 
(p<.001) 
Parenting arrangements of 
all former relationship 
children (18 years or 
younger)  
(ref: mainly with other parent) 
mainly with liable parent 
 8.47 
(p=.007) 
7.56 
(p=.012) 
8.46 
(p=.012) 
equal-time 
 2.02 
(p=.350) 
2.63 
(p=.176) 
3.04 
(p=.144) 
split-residence 
 2.53 
(p=.163) 
2.21 
(p=.273) 
2.65 
(p=.208) 
Overnights with focal child 
in last 12 months  
 1.01 
(p=.001) 
 
1.01 
(p<.001) 
1.01 
(p<.001) 
Parental relationship in the 
last 12 months  
(ref: cooperative) 
friendly 
  1.10 
(p=.842) 
1.30 
(p=.586) 
 
distant   0.98 1.13 
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Factor Model 1: 
odds 
ratios 
Model 2: 
odds 
ratios 
Model 3: 
odds 
ratios 
Model 4: 
odds 
ratios 
(p=.959) (p=.793) 
lots of conflict   2.44 
(p=.069) 
2.75 
(p=.039) 
fearful   4.60 
(p=.010) 
4.88 
(p=.011) 
Parenting arrangement 
decision  
(ref: parents agreed or parents 
and child agreed) 
mother decided 
  0.12 
(p=.001) 
0.13 
(p=.002) 
child decided   0.84 
(p=.773) 
0.84 
(p=.779) 
father decided   1.72 
(p=.415) 
1.80 
(p=.414) 
judge decided   1.58 
(p=.186) 
1.54 
(p=.218) 
other or just happened   0.32 
(p=.106) 
0.36 
(p=.185) 
Life satisfaction    1.03 
(p=.667) 
Number of liable parents 1,856 1,811 1,792 1,761 
F  10.82 
F(10, 
5,015) 
8.21 
F(15, 
4,965) 
5.63 
F(24, 
4,937) 
5.52 
F(25, 
4,905) 
Prob> F <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Notes: Data are weighted.  
To sum up, controlling for all other factors, liable parents differed 
significantly on household composition; hours of work; self-employment 
of their former partner; parental relationship quality; age of youngest 
child; overnights with focal child; arrangements of all former relationship 
children; and how arrangements determined. Self-assessed financial 
circumstances differed marginally.  
  Discussion 
The key differences between liable mothers and liable fathers were 
predominantly gender-specific and related to the mother role.  
  Household composition 
Liable mothers were more likely to have a resident child (usually a former 
relationship child), and to live with resident children and no partner, but 
these differences disappeared once all former relationship children were 
considered. Mothers without resident children were 4.4 times more likely 
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than fathers to be partnered rather than live alone or share with other 
adults.  
  Employment 
Differences in hours of employment reflect the typically gendered 
employment pattern in Australian families: father full-time and mother 
part-time (Smyth et al. 2013) and high part-time rates for mothers with 
resident children and no partner (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011). 
While separation provides an opportunity to reassess parental roles, 
patterns of gendered parenting remain relevant99 with mothers in part-
time employment (especially long part-time hours providing higher 
income and the flexibility needed to co-parent) and fathers in long full-
time employment. 
Of note, more fathers had self-employment as their main income than 
mothers although this marginal difference disappeared once parenting 
time was added to the model. This higher rate represents male 
occupations and that men devote more time to their businesses than 
women generating more income (Adema 2013). For some liable mothers, 
self-employment could be a secondary income source. 
The findings on employment partially matched previous research. While 
mothers were more often out of the workforce than fathers, as was 
highlighted in the sole study of payers in the Scheme caseload (Silvey & 
Birrell 2004), the difference here was smaller and nonsignificant. This is 
because Silvey and Birrell’s analysis included all payers whereas the 
present study’s analytic sample excluded parents with no current 
liability—a sizeable group among female ‘payers’. Previous research 
profiling a subgroup of minority-time mothers (those with 1–34% of 
nights: liability status not defined) found full-time employment common 
to this group and for the small number of mothers with equal-time 
(Kaspiew et al. 2009). Although liable mothers in the CSRS as a group 
                                       
99 Parents were not asked about pre-separation employment, nor views on gender roles 
relating to caregiving and employment. Whether post-separation issues had an impact 
on employment choices cannot be tested. 
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were more likely to be employed full-time, shared-time mothers had the 
highest full-time employment regardless of whether they were liable.  
  Time with children 
The stereotypical liable parent in the Scheme caseload lives apart from 
their child (or all their children), spending some weekend and holiday 
time with them (Department of Family and Community Services 2003). 
While 84% of liable fathers had minority-time with all their children, this 
applied to 54% of liable mothers. Liable mothers were 8.5 times more 
likely to have all the children mainly with them than with their former 
partner. Mothers had more overnights with the focal child even after 
controlling for arrangements of all children. This suggests mothers with 
minority-time tend to remain connected to children. Further, 27% of 
liable mothers had more nights than their former partner. 
Liable mothers had less straightforward parenting arrangements (that is, 
not all children lived mainly with the other parent). Although split-
residence became nonsignificant once overnights with the focal child and 
age of youngest child were considered, 24% of liable mothers had 
children with divergent arrangements. In the present study the rate for 
liable fathers matched the rate among separated families found 
previously (Smyth, Sheehan & Fehlberg 2001a; Smyth et al. 2008). The 
high rate for liable mothers is a new finding. While earlier research noted 
mothers with a child living elsewhere often had another child mainly with 
them (Weston et al. 2011) this was usually given as a reason for no 
liability. 
  Child age 
Liable mothers generally had older children than liable fathers reflecting 
that minority-time and split-residence increase for mothers with older 
children. Gender-defined roles and employment patterns for mothers 
with young children such as time out of the workforce and part-time 
work become less necessary for older children. Older mothers generally 
have higher human capital than younger mothers and therefore their 
incomes are more critical for assessment of liability in these cases. 
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Further, older children have more choice to move out of arrangements 
where all children were mainly with their mother. 
The present study’s findings on older age of children in liable-mother 
cases are consistent with previous Australian (Kaspiew et al. 2009; Qu 
2004; Renda 2012), and international research (see, for example, 
Administrative Office of the Courts California 2000; Bakker & Mulder 
2009; Sodermans, Matthijs & Swicegood 2013). The findings on older 
children and split-residence build on the limited Australian research 
(Hawthorne 2000).  
  Parental relationship quality 
Liable mothers more often described their relationship with their former 
partner in the last 12 months in negative terms. They were 2.8 times 
more likely to describe the relationship as ‘lots of conflict’ and 4.9 times 
‘fearful’ than ‘cooperative’.  
Notably at 18%, liable mothers were the most fearful group in the CSRS 
and significantly more fearful than other mothers. While it was not 
unexpected that more women reported fearful relationships than men—
10% of all mothers in the CSRS as a whole were fearful (compared with 
6% of fathers, p=.048, see Appendix B, Table B1)—this difference was not 
solely about men and women. Instead it indicated the inclusion of liable 
mothers: payee mothers and payee fathers had similar reports of being 
fearful (9% and 7%, p=.511). In contrast, liable mothers had significantly 
higher reports of fearful than other mothers (18% compared with 9%, 
p=.017). Further, of those liable mothers who ever agreed to pay more 
child support than required (n=37), 28% did so because of concern for 
their own safety and 74% because they wanted as little as possible to do 
with their former partner.100 Although reports of negative parental 
relationships were higher in the CSRS, especially for liable mothers, than 
in recent cohorts of separated parents (De Maio et al. 2013), Kaspiew and 
colleagues (2009) earlier noted high levels of fearful relationships among 
                                       
100 This was comparable or higher than reported by recently separated payee mothers 
who agreed to accept less child support (see Smyth et al. 2010). 
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mothers with daytime-only contact. Recent research suggests liable 
mothers’ experiences of physical or emotional abuse were high (Qu et al. 
2014). The present study’s findings are consistent with this Australian 
work, and the international research, noting ‘poorer’ relationships 
characterised by conflict when the father had majority-time (Buchanan, 
Maccoby & Dornbusch 1992; Kielty 2006a; Vanassche et al. 2013) and 
domestic violence (Bemiller 2008; Herrerias 2008).101 The finding here 
that this applied to liable mothers as a group is new. 
  Parenting arrangement decision 
Liable mothers were significantly less likely to have solely decided the 
parenting arrangements. This could indicate that mothers were seen as 
the decision-maker (especially by fathers) when the children lived with 
their payee mother. Alternatively, minority-time mothers could be 
reluctant to say they made the decision if they felt this was incompatible 
with gendered expectations of the mother role. Fearful relationships may 
play a part. Around a third of liable mothers who reported that the father 
decided the arrangements were fearful, as were around half who reported 
that the child decided. This suggests that family dynamics are an 
important part of the story for liable mothers.  
  Former partner self-employment 
Liable mothers were nine times more likely to have a self-employed 
former partner. Here time and relative income are relevant: 40% of 
former partners were self-employed where the liable mother had split-
residence and 25% when all the children were with her. Self-employed 
parents may have low taxable incomes not representative of actual 
capacity to pay. In addition, self-employment is gendered with fathers 
more often self-employed than mothers. The impact of self-employment 
found here is consistent with other research (Fehlberg & Millward 2014) 
                                       
101 The present study uses the term ‘domestic violence’ rather than ‘family violence’ to 
emphasise that the descriptor ‘fearful’ applied to the relationship between former 
intimate partners. 
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which noted minimisation of income by self-employed shared-time 
fathers where the mother was the liable parent. 
  Income 
It was expected based on the nonresident mother literature highlighting 
financial difficulties (see, for example, Bemiller 2010; Greif & Pabst 1988; 
Herrerias 1995; Herrerias 2008) that mothers would be financially worse-
off than fathers. Instead, liable parents had similar net personal and 
household incomes and had a similar proportion of households below 
60% of the median equivalised income for their household size (once 
expected child support was considered). This applied even though liable 
fathers worked significantly more hours than liable mothers: 39% worked 
45 hours or more each week compared with 10% of mothers. It is 
possible that some liable mothers had higher earning capacity per hour 
worked than fathers (which is likely to be why they are the liable parent 
under an income-based formula). However, behind this finding were 
dissimilar circumstances that affected household income but ‘cancelled 
out’ each other: liable mother households were more likely to include a 
resident child and liable fathers had significantly higher deductions for 
child support.  
The absence of significant income differences related to who was liable. 
First, the minimum liability only applied to parents whose income was 
less than the self-support amount if they had minority-time, otherwise 
there was no current liability. Second, having equal or majority-time and 
being liable rather than the payee or having no current liability indicated 
they were the higher income parent. The present study’s finding that 
liable mothers were not objectively worse-off than liable fathers reflects 
mothers’ diverse parenting arrangements (inclusive of shared and 
majority-time) and that some liable fathers were economically vulnerable 
because of low human capital. (The former point is explored further in 
Chapter 6 profiling intragroup differences among liable mothers.)  
Nonetheless, liable fathers had marginally higher self-assessed poor 
financial circumstances than liable mothers. Gender differences could 
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indicate that men and women rate their financial wellbeing differently, 
with some evidence that men perceive loss more than women (Haugen 
2003) and that divorced men with children view themselves as worse-off 
than women (de Vaus et al. 2009; Smyth & Weston 2000). Liable fathers 
might experience the impact of paying child support on household 
incomes more than liable mothers. (As discussed later, mothers had 
lower liabilities than fathers.) This coupled with fathers’ higher rate of 
resident stepchildren compared with liable mothers could affect fathers’ 
perceptions. 
  Sex of children 
The other expected difference was that mothers would be mainly liable 
for boys. Some Australian research highlights that majority-time fathers 
more often had boys (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
2003; Lodge & Alexander 2011; Parkinson, Cashmore & Single 2005), 
with international research supporting this trend (see, for example, 
Cancian & Meyer 1998; Juby, Le Bourdais & Marcil-Gratton 2005). Here 
boys were not over-represented with 32% of liable-mother cases involving 
only boys (compared with 28% for liable fathers, see Table 5.6). More 
boys were in majority-time with their father or split-residence than girls 
but this was nonsignificant and supports prior nonsignificant findings 
from Qu’s (2004) study. This suggests that in Australia whether the child 
is a boy has less impact on living arrangements than elsewhere. 
  Summary  
This chapter sought to explore whether liable mothers in Australia have a 
distinct profile. It did this by examining differences between liable 
parents across a broad range of measures.  
A lower proportion of mothers were liable to pay child support at each 
original Scheme time category than fathers with the same amount of 
nights, and at no category were more than half of mothers liable. This is 
reflected in the key differences between liable parents. 
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Liable mothers had older children reflecting their higher rate of split 
residence cases. Liable mothers had more overnights with the focal child 
(mean=135 nights compared with 64 nights for liable fathers). 
Consequently, they were significantly less likely to have minority-time of 
all their children. Overall, 46% of liable mothers had at least one 
majority-time or shared-time child compared to 16% of liable fathers.  
Liable mothers were less likely to live alone. Once the arrangements for 
all the former relationship children were taken into account, liable 
mothers were 4.38 times more likely to be living with a partner with no 
resident children than liable fathers. Liable mothers worked fewer hours 
than liable fathers and were 8.97 times more likely to have a self-
employed former partner. Liable mothers reported a more negative 
relationship with their former partner in the last 12 months: 2.75 times 
more likely to report ‘lots of conflict’ and 4.88 times ‘fearful’. In all, 18% 
of liable mothers were fearful. This was significantly higher than other 
mothers in the CSRS as a whole. 
The next chapter (Chapter 6) analyses the intragroup differences and 
profiles liable mothers across the range of post-separation parenting 
arrangements.  
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Chapter 6  Differences between liable mothers 
Findings in Chapter 5 apply to the key differences between liable parents. 
But differences also exist within the liable mother group. While 84% of 
fathers were liable for minority-time children, liable mothers had a range 
of arrangements. To further explore the characteristics of liable mothers 
in Australia and to better understand within-group variations, a typology 
based on the living arrangements of all former relationship children aged 
18 years or younger was developed for the present study. This typology is 
based on the present study’s theoretical concept of ‘intensive mothering’ 
as outlined in Section 1.5 and the operationalising of this concept as 
explained in Section 4.4.1. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section (Section 6.1) 
outlines how the liable mother groupings were chosen. The second part 
(Section 6.2–6.5) profiles the four groups of liable mothers. The final 
section (Section 6.6) discusses some key differences.  
  A liable mother typology 
Liable mothers were selected into four groups based on the ‘intensity’ of 
their day-to-day involvement as a mother, measured by the 
arrangements for all former relationship children. The four types of liable 
mothers were: ‘less-time’ (that is, less than half of the time); ‘equal-time’ 
(that is, around half the time); ‘more-time’ (that is, more than half the 
time); and ‘split-residence’ (that is, siblings have different arrangements). 
Details of the survey responses determining membership of these four 
groups are in Table 6.1. 
This typology is used to explore whether intensity of mothering (that is, 
presence) is relevant as proposed in the theoretical approach advanced in 
Chapter 1. This approach suggests that enacting a mother role relates to 
a specific, gendered identity and behavioural norms for being a ‘good’ 
mother centring on direct caregiving and on prioritising children’s needs. 
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Table 6.1  Liable mother typology  
Group  
% of all liable 
mothers  
Survey response 
for each former 
relationship 
child 
Arrangement 
Less-time liable 
mothers  
54.2 All: ‘less than 
50% of the time’ 
or ‘never’ 
Mainly with 
father 
Equal-time liable 
mothers  
10.9 All: ‘roughly a 
50/50 split’ 
Equal-time 
More-time liable 
mothers  
10.6 All: ‘more than 
50% of the time’ 
or ‘always’ 
Mainly with 
mother 
Split-residence 
liable mothers  
24.3 One or more 
children: ‘more 
than 50% of the 
time’ or ‘always’ 
and one or more 
children: ‘less 
than 50% of the 
time’ or ‘never’ 
OR  
One or more 
children: ‘roughly 
a 50/50 split’ and 
one or more 
children: ‘less 
than 50% of the 
time’, ‘never’, 
‘more than 50% 
of the time’ or 
‘always’ 
Siblings split 
between parents 
Total 100.0   
Notes: Liable mothers (n=185). Percentages are based on weighted data. Percentages 
may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Excludes former relationship children aged 19 
years or older. Children aged 18 years are included as those still in secondary education 
remain eligible for child support until the end of the school year. Categories may not 
match the focal child’s time based on nights.  
  Technical notes 
This typology used living arrangements of all former relationship 
children102 rather than overnights with the focal child for four reasons: (i) 
to ensure that all children were treated the same in allocating categories; 
(ii) some respondents had missing data on nights with the focal child; (iii) 
the small number of liable mothers with substantial (n=10) and major-
                                       
102 Split-residence includes cases where one or more children were in equal-time and 
one or more children were mainly with their mother or father. A sensitivity analysis 
was run with these cases included under the equal-time liable mother type. No 
changes in significance were found. Results discussed in this section use the inclusive 
definition of split-residence.  
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time (n=11) and; (iv) to differentiate arrangements where split-residence 
applied.  
Three groups represent liable mothers with all children in the same time 
category—more-time, equal-time and less-time. The fourth group, split-
residence, is important for the present study’s theoretical approach as 
this represents liable mothers with more-time and less-time.  
Profiling in this chapter covers liable mothers. Consequently, findings in 
this chapter do not represent mothers with these arrangements who were 
payees or had no current liability.  
Again, variables chosen are those that intuitively relate to the present 
study’s theoretical focus of the gendered performance of mothering. 
Socio-demographic variables are examined first, followed by family 
dynamics and wellbeing. Tabulations are performed using the svy: tab 
command and means are determined using the svy: mean command and 
restricted to the subpopulation of liable mothers using the subpop option 
in Stata. The former process produces an F-transformed Rao-Scott chi-
squared test statistic as a default (Heeringa, West & Berglund 2010: 167) 
to take account of the complex survey data. The latter process produces 
linearised standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of the mean. The 
test command run post-estimation produces an adjusted Wald Test and 
an F-Ratio to show whether the means are statistically equivalent or not 
(UCLA Statistical Consulting Group n.d.). 
Table 6.2 presents significant differences between these four small 
groups of liable mothers on socio-demographic variables.  
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Table 6.2  Differences between liable 
mothers: socio-demographic 
characteristics 
 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers 
n=25 
Household 
composition (%) 
    
Lived alone or 
shared with 
other adults 
37.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Resident children 
and no partner  
17.7 38.1 81.0 45.3 
Partnered and no 
resident children 
41.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Partnered and 
resident children 
3.8 61.9 19.1 54.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p<.001     
Main income 
source (%)  
    
Salary or wages 52.1 84.8 82.7 90.6 
Self-employment 
or other 
8.6 14.9 9.4 6.9 
Government 
payment 
39.3 0.3 7.9 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.001     
Employment (%)     
Not in paid 
employment 
47.9 6.8 10.5 3.3 
Short part-time 
(1–20 hours) 
6.6 6.5 4.4 1.3 
Long part-time 
(21–34 hours) 
8.0 18.5 9.2 18.2 
Standard full-
time (35–44 
hours)  
29.1 60.0 71.8 59.8 
Long full-time 
(45 hours or 
more) 
8.5 8.2 4.1 17.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.001     
Experienced 
hardship in last 
12 months (%) 
46.8 16.1 18.7 19.3 
p=.032     
Sex of former 
relationship 
children (%) 
    
All boys 38.5 15.9 66.1 11.6 
All girls 29.8 39.9 28.5 13.0 
Both sexes 31.7 44.2 5.4 75.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers 
n=25 
p=.003     
Age (years) 
(mean) 
39.48 37.81 43.81 40.50 
SE, CI 1.10, CI 
37.33–41.63 
1.11, CI 
35.63–39.99 
1.76, CI 
40.36–47.26 
0.93, CI 
38.69–42.32 
p=.029     
Hours worked 
per week (mean) 
18.91 32.57 33.90 36.92 
SE, CI 3.54, CI 
11.97–25.85 
2.38, CI 
27.92–37.22 
3.56, CI 
26.92–40.88 
2.06, CI 
32.88–40.96 
p<.001     
Net annual 
personal income 
(mean) 
$29,209.48 $41,507.20 $47,311.86 $50,683.49 
SE, CI $3,237.80, CI 
$22,862.00–
$35,556.96  
$3,183.16, CI 
$35,266.82–
$47,747.58 
$3,034.99, CI 
$41,361.96–
$53,262.75 
$4,849.30, CI 
$41,176.75–
$60,190.23 
p<.001     
Net annual 
household 
income (mean) 
$46,445.53 $63,129.84 $51,633.19 $62,587.06 
SE, CI $5,553.72, CI 
$35,557.82–
$57,333.23 
$4,286.31, CI 
$54,726.81–
$71,532.87 
$2,476.55, CI 
$46,778.08–
$56,488.30 
$6,843.34, CI 
$49,171.14–
$76,002.98 
p=.031     
Years separated 
(mean) 
7.55 5.60 8.58 9.13 
SE, CI 0.54, CI 6.49–
8.62 
0.84, CI 3.96–
7.23 
2.50, CI 3.67–
13.49 
0.85, CI 7.46–
10.80 
p=.029     
Number of 
children with 
former partner 
(mean) 
2.06 1.99 1.41 3.22 
SE, CI 0.15, CI 1.75–
2.36 
0.26, CI 1.49–
2.50 
0.23, CI .97–
1.86 
0.52, CI 2.20–
4.24 
p=.007     
Child age (years) 
(mean) 
12.41 9.86 12.83 14.66 
SE, CI 0.87, CI 
10.69–14.12 
0.40, CI 9.08–
10.65 
1.10, CI 
10.67–15.00 
0.48, CI 
13.71–15.60 
p<.001     
Youngest child 
age (years) 
(mean) 
11.90 9.25 12.57 12.85 
SE, CI 0.91, CI 
10.11–13.69 
0.38, CI 8.50–
10.01 
1.21, CI 
10.20–14.94 
0.76, CI 
11.36–14.35 
p<.001     
Employment of 
former partner 
(%) 
    
Employee 44.2 70.1 16.6 50.1 
Self-employed 24.2 11.4 25.1 38.2 
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 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers 
n=25 
Not in paid 
employment 
15.9 16.9 11.8 8.9 
Don’t know 15.7 1.6 46.5 2.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.064     
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. ‘Resident children’ means in the 
household at least 50% of the time and includes dependent adult children. Parents with 
no resident children could have 1–49% nights with one or more children. Employment 
categories based on definitions developed by Baxter, Gray, Hand and Hayes (2012). 
‘Child’ means focal child. 
Table 6.3 shows significant differences between the four groups of liable 
mothers on family dynamics. This covers variables that measure the 
relationship between parents, and emotional closeness to their child. 
Whether the mother used a lawyer or mediation service and distance 
between parents’ houses are included under family dynamics as they can 
be a proxy for current or past conflict between parents. Of note, 
differences between liable mothers on the level of general conflict and 
conflict over money were nonsignificant.  
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Table 6.3  Differences between liable 
mothers: family dynamics 
 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers 
n=25 
Parental 
relationship 
quality in the 
last 12 months1 
(%) 
    
Friendly 15.9 32.2 2.2 12.6 
Cooperative 18.8 15.5 11.2 32.9 
Distant  32.6 9.4 57.2 3.9 
Lots of conflict 14.1 40.7 12.4 27.3 
Fearful 18.5 2.2 16.9 23.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.051     
Great deal or 
some general 
conflict (%) 
37.1 60.0 27.3 58.5 
p=.321     
Frequently or 
sometimes 
argue over 
money (%) 
19.8 53.7 25.1 36.7 
p=.198     
Parenting 
arrangement 
decision (%) 
    
Mother decided 2.4 2.1 1.0 5.1 
Parents agreed 
or parents and 
child agreed 
31.5 54.1 3.1 46.4 
Child decided 5.7 1.0 0.0 15.8 
Father decided 19.4 26.6 1.0 4.8 
Judge decided 37.9 15.4 63.4 27.9 
Other or just 
happened 
3.1 1.0 3.7 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.199     
Used lawyer or 
mediation (%) 
70.6 38.2 87.6 85.4 
p=.023     
Parenting 
arrangement 
working well for 
mother (%) 
31.9 72.6 83.1 47.5 
p=.012     
Distance 
between houses 
(%) 
    
10 km or less 18.9 73.1 31.5 33.9 
11–25 km 18.8 9.4 4.3 7.4 
26–50 km 12.9 17.5 9.4 6.4 
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 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers 
n=25 
51–100 km 18.0 0.0 47.3 2.7 
101–500 km 11.4 0.0 0.0 3.5 
501–1000 km 7.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
More than 1000 
km or overseas 
12.4 0.0 7.6 46.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.026     
Distance 
between 
parents’ houses 
(mean) 
298.15 km 11.26 km 154.32 km 820.11 km 
SE, CI 83.22, CI 
135.00–461.30 
2.54, CI 6.29–
16.24 
100.87, CI 0–
352.06 
359.17, CI 
115.98–
1,524.24 
p<.001     
Emotionally 
very close to 
child2 (%)  
57.7 97.5 77.1 54.7 
p=.030     
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. ‘Child’ means focal child. 1 ‘Distant’ 
includes ‘no contact with former partner in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 2. 
Emotional closeness was not asked if either parent never saw the focal child (n=11 
mothers). 
Table 6.4 shows differences between the four groups of liable mothers on 
variables measuring personal wellbeing.  
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Table 6.4  Differences between liable 
mothers: personal wellbeing 
 
Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers 
n=25 
Satisfaction 
with life as a 
whole (0=totally 
dissatisfied, 
10=totally 
satisfied) 
(mean) 
7.06 8.00 8.63 6.69 
SE, CI 0.44, CI 6.19–
7.93 
0.35, CI 7.32–
8.68 
0.71, CI 7.16–
10.10 
0.40, CI 5.91–
7.47 
p=.019     
Personal 
wellbeing 
(3=low, 
15=high) (mean) 
10.62 11.03 12.57 10.18 
SE, CI 0.40, CI 9.82–
11.41 
0.30, CI 
10.44–11.63 
0.76, CI 
11.07–14.07 
0.57, CI 9.06–
11.30 
p=.072     
Notes: Data are weighted. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data.  
The following sections provide a profile of the four liable mother types.  
  Less-time liable mothers 
Less-time mothers had all children living mainly with their father and 
represented around half (54%) of liable mothers. Most (79%) had no 
resident children.  
Less-time liable mothers appear to be particularly disadvantaged; 48% 
were not in paid employment and 39% had government payments as 
their main income. Most liable mothers receiving government payments 
(n=17/21) were less-time liable mothers. Nine out of 17 were paid a 
Disability Support Pension. Consequently, 85% of less-time liable 
mothers had net personal incomes below $40,000 and low household 
incomes (mean=$46,446). Less-time liable mothers reported more than 
twice the level of hardship in the last 12 months as other liable mothers 
(47% compared with 16–19%).  
Less-time liable mothers mainly had older children: 72% of focal children 
and 65% of youngest children were 11 years or older. They were less 
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satisfied with parenting arrangements: 68% felt it was not working well 
for them. Arrangements were often not reached amicably; 71% used a 
lawyer or mediation service, 38% had a judicial determination and 19% 
reported that the father solely decided the arrangements (data not 
shown).  
Six per cent of less-time liable mothers spent no time with the focal child 
in the last 12 months and 26% had daytime-only contact.103 Of those 
with no time, half (n=4/7) reported that their former partner ‘prevented 
contact’ and they were fearful. The remainder stated that their child did 
not want to see them. Those with daytime-only contact reported distance, 
child choice or other reasons for this arrangement.104 
Less-time liable mothers were evenly divided between positive, neutral 
and negative relationships with 18% fearful. Conflict was low, both 
generally and over money. A fifth lived at least 500 kilometres from their 
child, some perhaps as the outcome of a relocation dispute. Australian 
research notes a number of disputed cases where the mother moved 
without the child (Behrens, Smyth & Kaspiew 2009; Parkinson, 
Cashmore & Single 2010). 
Less-time liable mothers had the second lowest life satisfaction and self-
reported personal wellbeing. For some mothers, health problems could 
have affected the decision for minority-time: 23% rated their health as 
fair or poor (compared to 6–10% of other liable mothers). Data from the 
Family Court detailed in Section 1.3.2 suggest this could be relevant. For 
others, lower life satisfaction could be in response to the parenting 
arrangement which the majority (68%) also felt was not working well for 
them, but this is speculation.  
In contrast to other liable mothers, and signalling less parenting time, a 
‘poor’ pre-separation parent–child relationship or change in 
                                       
103 Data relate to liable mothers with all children with their father. One split-residence 
liable mother had daytime-only contact. 
104 Parents who saw the focal child in the daytime-only or had no time were asked the 
main reason for this. The information in this paragraph is based on responses to these 
two questions.  
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arrangements, 58% of less-time liable mothers reported being 
emotionally very close to their child. This figure may be even lower as it 
excludes mothers with no time with the focal child (n=7). 
In summary, less-time liable mothers had poorer financial circumstances 
and low life satisfaction. More than half were outside the workforce or 
marginally attached and therefore reported the most hardship (47% had 
at least one measure of hardship in the last 12 months). Negative 
parental relationships were as common as positive or neutral. Two-thirds 
felt the arrangements were not working well for them and just over half 
(58%) reported being emotionally very close to their child.  
  Equal-time liable mothers  
Equal-time mothers represented 11% of liable mothers. They had equal 
time of all their children, or unequal shared-time and reported ‘roughly a 
50/50 split’. Consequently, they all lived in households with children, 
62% with a partner. They mainly had girls: 40% involved all girls.  
Most (93%) equal-time liable mothers were in paid employment, with 
68% full-time. They had the highest part-time (25%) and self-employment 
(15%). This pattern was not unexpected considering their substantial 
day-to-day caregiving and younger children. Long rather than short part-
time hours applied, indicating better paid jobs with flexible arrangements 
partly because 26% had a degree or higher qualification.  
Equal-time liable mothers had the second lowest personal income but 
the highest household income (mean=$63,130) reflecting repartnering. 
Hence, they had the lowest reported hardship in the last 12 months and 
41% describing their financial circumstances as ‘comfortable’ or 
‘prosperous’. Because of the way child support is calculated for shared-
time cases, they were the relatively ‘better-off’ shared-time mothers. 
(Lower income equal-time mothers were more often payees or had no 
current liability.) 
Equal-time liable mothers had the shortest relationships with 55% not 
previously married. They were younger than other liable mothers 
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(mean=37.8 years), recently separated (mean=5.6 years) and therefore 
newer cases. Two-thirds of focal children were aged 6–10 years (as were 
75% of youngest children), highlighting peak age for equal-time and 
perhaps egalitarian views on sharing parenting of a recently separated 
cohort.  
Reflecting the logistics of equal-time parenting, 73% lived within 10 
kilometres and all within 50 kilometres of their former partner’s house. 
Half had agreed parenting arrangements and 73% reported this was 
working well for them. However, 27% of equal-time liable mothers had an 
arrangement mainly decided by their former partner, suggesting a 
subgroup of less consulted, and less satisfied, liable mothers.  
Almost all (98%) were emotionally very close to their child. Positive 
parental relationships were common: 32% friendly and 16% cooperative. 
Parental relationship quality could be bi-directional with parents 
reporting a positive relationship more likely to have equal-time, 
consistent with prior work (see, for example, Kaspiew et al. 2009; Smyth, 
Qu & Weston 2004). Nonetheless, 60% reported some or a great deal of 
general conflict and 34% frequently or sometimes argued about money. 
Equal-time creates more opportunities for conflict, particularly if parents 
communicate frequently. Perceptions of fairness over child support may 
overlay this. 
Although conflict was relatively high—60% reported general conflict and 
54% argued about money—equal-time liable mothers had the second 
highest life satisfaction and wellbeing. Higher wellbeing could be related 
to time with children and corresponding satisfaction with the workability 
of arrangements. Alternatively, financial wellbeing was similarly high and 
both types of wellbeing might be associated.  
In summary, equal-time liable mothers had more recent separations and 
younger children. ‘Reasonably comfortable’ financial circumstances were 
common. Around half had a positive relationship with their former 
partner, with agreed parenting arrangements that worked well. 
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Nonetheless, some equal-time liable mothers had negative relationships, 
were less satisfied and reported conflict generally, and over money. 
  More-time liable mothers 
More-time mothers represented 11% of liable mothers. These mothers 
reported that all their children lived mainly with them. Some had a child 
in unequal shared-time where they had more nights (n=7/31) rather than 
‘sole’ time while others could be new majority-time arrangements where 
parents were still resolving the reassessment with the Child Support 
Agency. 
Most (81%) lived with resident children and no partner. More-time liable 
mothers were older, as were their children who were predominantly boys: 
78% of focal children were 11 years or older and 70% were boys.  
The majority (76%) were employed full-time signalling higher income 
than their former partner as the mother had more nights. They had lower 
household incomes (mean=$51,633) than liable mothers with equal-time 
and split-residence perhaps because of lower repartnering. Still, 95% 
(n=28/31) reported ‘just getting along’ or better with 19% experiencing 
hardship in the last 12 months.  
Almost all (92%) lived less than 100 km from their former partner; closer 
than other liable mothers except those with equal-time. Yet, they had the 
least involvement with their former partner: 57% described their 
relationship as distant (or no contact) and 17% fearful. Conflict in 
general and over money was low, probably because of low interaction 
between parents.  
Agreed arrangements were less common: 63% had a judicial decision and 
88% used a lawyer or mediation service. Nonetheless, 83% felt 
arrangements were working well for them, perhaps because of more 
nights with all their children. This could also explain their significantly 
higher life satisfaction and better wellbeing.  
In summary, more-time liable mothers had fewer children and were 
mainly not repartnered. More than half had distant relationships with 
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their former partner and, although they had high levels of intervention to 
resolve their parenting arrangements, they were the most satisfied with 
the workability and had the highest life satisfaction and personal 
wellbeing.  
  Split-residence liable mothers 
Split-residence mothers represented 24% of liable mothers, and when 
weighted, the second largest group. Most (n=19/25) involved children of 
both sexes. Two-thirds were boys, slightly more often mainly with their 
mother and girls mainly with their father. More than half lived with a 
partner, a possible factor for changed arrangements for older children. 
Split-residence liable mothers had larger families: 37% had four children 
with their former partner and 10% had this many under 19 years. Split-
residence requires at least two children: 73% of split-residence liable 
mothers had two eligible children, one in their majority-time or, 
occasionally, shared-time, and another in minority-time 
Almost all (98%) focal children, and 82% of youngest children, were 11 
years or older. Reflecting this, split-residence liable mothers had been 
separated longer (mean=9.1 years). Most (77%) were employed full-time 
with 17% working long full-time hours. Those part-time were commonly 
working long part-time hours suggesting better quality jobs.  
As expected, being liable when siblings were split between parents, they 
had the highest mean net personal income. Even so, 22% reported poor 
financial circumstances (compared with 5–9% of other liable mothers), 
and 19% reported experiencing hardship.  
Most (90%) had salary or wages as their main income source and only 
7% were self-employed. In contrast, 38% had a former partner who was 
self-employed. Other research (Fehlberg & Millward 2014) noted the 
implications of fathers’ self-employment for mothers’ liability in shared-
time cases. The present study notes that self-employment might also be 
relevant to determining the liability in split-residence cases. In these 
cases, the mother’s income from salary or wages is higher than the 
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father’s reported income from self-employment where more scope exists 
to minimise income (either legitimately or not).  
Further, the employment and generally higher income of split-residence 
liable mothers highlight the importance of identifying arrangements for 
all children in the case. Where the focal child was in minority-time 
(n=11/25), assuming that the same arrangement applied to siblings 
would misclassify split resident liable mothers as ‘high income’ minority-
time liable mothers. 
Split-residence liable mothers had children who were more involved in 
the parenting arrangements: for 16% the child decided and 10% the 
parents and child agreed. Most (85%) used a lawyer or mediation. 
Perhaps indicating decisions made by adolescents moving from shared or 
majority-time with their mother, 53% felt that the arrangement was not 
working for them, with distance an additional factor in lower satisfaction. 
Split-residence liable mothers lived farthest from their former partner 
and at least one of their children (mean=820 kilometres). A third lived 
within 10 kilometres perhaps indicating previous shared-time or a 
current mix of shared and majority/minority-time.  
Parental relationships were evenly divided between positive (mainly 
cooperative) and negative. Split-residence liable mothers had the highest 
rate of fearful relationships of all liable mothers at 23%. Higher levels of 
conflict were apparent reflecting the complexity of arrangements and 
perceptions of fairness: 58% had some or a great deal of general conflict. 
Conflict over money was less common with 37% reporting frequent or 
some arguments about money. 
Split-residence liable mothers reported the lowest life satisfaction and 
wellbeing, possibly because they had minority-time with at least one 
child or were fearful. 
In summary, around half of split-residence liable mothers lived with a 
partner, 96% were in paid employment with the highest personal 
incomes. They had larger families with older children. For a substantial 
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minority (26%) the child agreed to, or decided, the arrangements. Half of 
split-residence liable mothers had negative parental relationships, often 
fearful, with high parental conflict in general, but less so about money. 
They often lived some distance from their former partner and at least one 
child. 
  Discussion  
This chapter offered a typology of liable mothers based on four small 
parenting time groups—‘less-time’, ‘equal-time’, ‘more-time’ and ‘split-
residence’—and explored between-group differences. A main finding is 
the association between employment, income, parenting time and 
liability. While 38% of less-time liable mothers were in full-time 
employment and 52% (n=23/79) in paid employment in total, 93% 
(n=47/50) of equal-time liable mothers, 89% (n=28/31) of more-time 
liable mothers and 97% (n=23/25) of split-residence liable mothers were 
in paid employment. The high levels of employment in the latter three 
parenting time groups, with 68–77% working full-time, was not 
unexpected as income and employment are central to determining the 
liable parent in cases with these parenting arrangements. These three 
groups comprised 46% of all liable mothers.  
In contrast, less-time liable mothers were predominantly disadvantaged, 
with 39% relying on government payments as their main income source 
and almost half (47%) reporting at least one indicator of hardship in the 
last 12 months. Poor mental and/or physical health or other personal 
challenges could play some part105 in their low employment rate and 
lower income as less-time liable mothers had poorer self-reported health 
and significantly lower life satisfaction. In addition, some less-time liable 
mothers reported that the Disability Support Pension was their main 
income source. This suggests that there is a substantial gap between the 
socioeconomic circumstances of (mainly low income) less-time liable 
mothers and liable mothers with shared or more time. Socioeconomic 
                                       
105 The literature in Chapter 2 (for example, Kaspiew et al. 2009) and information on 
reasons for Family Court decisions on less than 30% time also suggest poorer mental 
health as relevant. 
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differences could be obscured when liable mothers are considered in 
aggregate. 
Significant differences in family dynamics and wellbeing were evident. 
Mothers with all or at least one child in minority-time frequently 
described the relationship with their former partner in negative terms: 
33% of less-time and 51% of split-residence liable mothers reported lots 
of conflict or were fearful. Less-time and split-residence liable mothers 
also had lower personal wellbeing and significantly lower life satisfaction 
perhaps reflecting their lower day-to-day interactions with at least one 
child considering the gendered expectations of mothering as ‘ever 
present’.  
While men often become the minority-time parent by default (Kielty 
2006b), and some resist having the identity of ‘father’ imposed on them 
(Mandell 1995a; Myers, M & Wilson 2014), minority-time is rare for 
mothers. It could signal less attachment to the ‘primary carer' role or 
lower parenting capacity, with substance misuse, or mental health issues 
shaping child or judicial decisions (see, for example, Moloney 2001a). 
Family Court data (2009: 4–5) reveal that mental health issues explained 
a third of orders for ‘no time’ or ‘less than 30% time’ for mothers. Factors 
influencing minority-time mothering may affect selection into the Scheme 
caseload. Majority-time fathers may have less expectation of payment 
from mothers already facing disadvantage or health challenges and 
therefore chose not to apply. In addition, major mental health issues may 
preclude some mothers from being involved in surveys such as the CSRS 
either by exclusion from the sample for selection for interview (for 
example, no telephone, a Restricted Access Case, in prison or other 
institutional care), or refusal to be interviewed when contacted. 
Further differences between liable mothers in child support, compliance, 
in-kind payment and other financial contributions are explored in the 
following chapters.  
The next chapter (Chapter 7) examines child support and compliance.  
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Chapter 7  Are liable mothers less compliant than liable 
fathers?  
This chapter addresses the second research question: “Are liable mothers 
less compliant than liable fathers?” Anecdotal evidence suggests low 
compliance among liable mothers. The empirical research points to 
non-payment but whether this equates to non-compliance has not 
been adequately tested, particularly from liable mothers’ perspective. 
In Australian research with recently separated parents (see, for 
example, Kaspiew et al. 2009) payee fathers report the lowest 
compliance: less than half received payment in full and on time. 
Liable mothers reported lower compliance than liable fathers but 
whether this was significantly lower was not stated. However, in the 
sole qualitative study with liable mothers and payee fathers 
(Millward, Campo & Fehlberg 2011) compliance did not appear to be 
lower in the cases where the mother was liable than those where the 
father was liable.  
In the US, the lower compliance reported when the mother was the 
liable parent (Grall 2011; Stewart 2010) used data from payee fathers, 
and the difference was not statistically significant for the census data. In 
the limited US research using liable mothers’ reports, compliance was 
not found to be lower than for liable fathers (Greif 1997; Pearson & 
Anhalt 1994). In Norway, minority-time mothers were significantly less 
likely to pay than minority-time fathers (Lyngstad 2010) but some of this 
difference related to lower expectations of payment because mothers had 
more nights.  
Evidence is scant and not clear-cut. What is expected to be paid; how 
compliance is measured; and what liable mothers contribute overall 
(either directly, in-kind or formal child support) are relevant to 
understanding compliance, but underexplored.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section identifies the 
liable parents included in the analyses in this chapter and compares 
liable mothers and liable fathers on a range of child support 
variables. The second section details the child support compliance 
   
159 
 
measure and compares the compliance of liable mothers and liable 
fathers. The third section compares reports of compliance across the 
four groups (liable mothers, liable fathers, payee mothers and payee 
fathers). The fourth section describes the liable mothers and payee 
fathers who were former partners and reported on the same case. 
This section examines the reports of former partners about child 
support paid and how these reports converge or diverge from each 
other. The final section discusses intragroup differences among liable 
mothers on child support measures and compliance. 
  Analytic sample: child support and compliance  
As before (see Section 5.2) similarities and differences between liable 
mothers and liable fathers are explored. The bivariate analyses in this 
section involve cross-tabulations using the svy: tab command and 
means using the svy: mean command and are restricted to the 
subpopulation of liable parents using the subpop option in Stata. Cross-
tabulations in Section 7.3 compare liable parents and payees using the 
subpop option in Stata, here restricted to those with valid data on 
compliance. The cross-tabulations and means in Section 7.5 are 
restricted to the subpopulation of liable mothers. Again, the test 
statistics produced take account of the complex survey data.  
To recap, liability status was identified from questions detailed in Section 
4.2. Parents were asked if they currently paid or received child support, 
and if not, whether child support had been replaced by another 
arrangement. If both responses were negative, they were then asked if 
they were meant to pay or receive. 
Significant differences were noted: 93% of liable fathers reporting they 
currently paid and 1% that they should pay (compared with 80% and 7% 
of liable mothers, p=.001). This could represent more liable mothers who 
were non-compliant or paid none of their liability. A minority of parents 
(n=313/5,046: n=24/185 liable mothers and n=72/1,692 liable 
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fathers)106 had some other arrangement replacing cash child support: 
12% of liable mothers and 6% liable fathers. 
The comparative analyses use the full sample of 185 liable mothers and 
1,692 liable fathers. Comparisons on compliance exclude parents with 
other arrangements. 
  How the liability was determined 
Parents were asked whether the amount of child support was determined 
by the Child Support Agency or did they work out the amount privately 
and register the agreement with the Agency. No significant differences 
were found when categorised into four groups (assessment, private 
agreement, registered agreement107 and other, p=.171) because of small 
cell sizes and thus lack of statistical power. As expected, the majority 
(77–88%) of liable parents had an administrative assessment.  
When the method of liability determination was categorised into 
assessment and agreement (private and registered agreement combined), 
more liable fathers reported an agreement (23% compared with 12% of 
liable mother, p=.032). Reports of agreements may be higher for liable 
fathers because of their higher rate of Private Collect. Private Collect 
liable fathers may view the transferring of the assessed amount privately 
as an ‘agreement’.  
Alternatively, liable fathers’ higher reports of positive relationships may 
be influential with agreements, particularly private agreements, more 
common among friendly and cooperative parents.108  
Of note, not all liable parents who reported that another arrangement 
replaced cash child support identified these as agreements, perhaps 
because they were not registered with the Child Support Agency. Half of 
liable mothers (n=12/24) and some liable fathers (n=25/72) who reported 
                                       
106 See Section 4.2 for an explanation of how this subgroup of liable parents was 
determined. 
107 No liable mothers reported “other”. 
108 Further analysis of the data show 86% of liable mothers and 67% of liable fathers 
with private agreements had a friendly or cooperative relationship. 
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another arrangement also reported that there was an assessment in 
place which they apparently ignored. 
  Method of collection  
Payments can be transferred privately between parents (Private Collect) 
or collected and transferred by the Child Support Program (Child 
Support Collect). Liable parents differed significantly by collection 
method. As Table 7.1 indicates, fathers were evenly split between 
collection methods while 66% of liable mothers had Child Support Collect 
and were significantly more likely to have always had this arrangement. 
Table 7.1  Liable parents: child support 
collection method  
 
Liable mothers 
n=184 
Liable fathers 
n=1,680 
Collection method (%)   
Child Support Collect 65.5 51.0 
Private Collect 34.5 49.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.027   
Child Support Collect 
now, previously 
Private Collect (%) 
16.6 44.8 
p<.001   
Private Collect now, 
previously Child 
Support Collect (%) 
31.6 13.7 
p=.013   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Child 
Support Collect mothers (n=115) and fathers (n=949). Private Collect mothers (n=67) 
and fathers (n=733).  
High rates of Child Support Collect were unexpected as official data 
indicate that Child Support Collect applied in 42% of registered cases 
with a female payer (Child Support Agency 2009a: 27). Some of this 
difference is the inclusion in the official data of cases with no current 
liability. These cases were mainly Private Collect. In addition, time since 
separation (as a proxy for time since registration) may explain this as 
liable mothers in the CSRS had been separated significantly longer than 
liable fathers. Older cases were registered at a time when Child Support 
Collect was the dominant method.  
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  Expected child support amount 
As indicated in Table 7.2, the expected liability for liable mothers was 
less than half of liable fathers (mean=$2,901 compared with $6,702, 
p<.001). Further, 15% of mothers had a liability less than the $339 
minimum assessment and 43% less than $1,000. In contrast, 22% of 
liable fathers had a liability below $1,000 and 44% $6,000 or more. Just 
11% of mothers had a mean liability equivalent to, or more than, the 
mean amount for fathers. The median expected amount109 for liable 
mothers was $1,976 and $5,200 for liable fathers. Lower liabilities could 
relate to lower incomes, shared-time or split-residence.  
Mothers’ lower expected payment was consistent with the limited 
Australian research (Silvey & Birrell 2004; Wolffs & Shallcross 2000) 
indicating more mothers with a minimum liability.  
  
                                       
109 While medians are mentioned where appropriate, the complex survey design limits 
the validity of statistical testing of differences in medians between liable mothers and 
liable fathers. 
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Table 7.2  Liable parents: expected 
amount and actual child support paid 
 
Liable mothers 
n=160 
Liable fathers 
n=1,531 
Expected amount of 
child support (%) 
  
$0 3.0 2.0 
$1–339 12.5 9.9 
$340–999 27.9 9.8 
$1,000–1,999 7.1 5.3 
$2,000–2,999 5.9 4.8 
$3,000–3,999 19.1 7.9 
$4,000–4,999 11.0 8.2 
$5,000–5,999 1.4 7.9 
$6,000–6,999 0.8 6.5 
$7,000–7,999 4.9 7.8 
$8,000–8,999 0.0 4.1 
$9,000–9,999 2.7 3.2 
$10,000–10,999 1.0 4.4 
$11,000–11,999 0.0 2.0 
$12,000 or more 2.7 16.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p<.001   
Expected child 
support (mean) 
$2,900.66 $6,701.68 
SE, CI $381.88, CI $2,152.01–
$3,649.31 
$279.35, CI $6,154.03–
$7,249.33 
p<.001   
Actual child support 
paid (mean) 
$3,093.72 $6,719.17 
SE, CI $396.72, CI $2,315.97–
$3,871.48 
$267.00, CI $6,195.73–
$7,242.48 
p<.001   
Notes: Data are weighted. Actual amount paid: mothers (n=130) and fathers (n=1,482). 
Actual amount paid excludes liable parents who reported that they paid none of the 
expected amount. (Mean $3,048.71 mothers and $6,680.31 fathers if nothing paid was 
included) Most liable parents with an expected amount of $0 had another arrangement 
that replaced cash child support (all liable mothers and n=17/18 liable fathers). The 
minimum assessment was $333 or $339 depending on whether the child support period 
commenced from 1 January 2008 or earlier. 
  Actual child support paid 
Almost all (98%) fathers reported paying something (compared with 89% 
of mothers, p=.002). This means that 11% of liable mothers paid none of 
the expected amount. 
Actual amount paid by mothers, excluding those who paid none of the 
liability, was significantly lower (mean=$3,094 compared with $6,719 for 
fathers, p<.001) reflecting lower expected amounts.  
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  Paid in full 
The majority (85–92%) of liable parents reported paying in full. This did 
not differ by collection method. 
While slightly more fathers than mothers reported paying more than 
expected, this was nonsignificant and consistent with fathers’ reports in 
other Australian research (De Maio et al. 2013: 110). Higher amounts 
could be genuine additional payments or for arrears.  
  Paid on time 
Timeliness is the other important component of compliance (Ha, Cancian 
& Meyer 2011) although often not measured. Both fullness and 
timeliness matter if child support is relied upon for household expenses. 
As Table 7.3 shows, most (75–83%) liable parents reported paying 
‘always’ on time and 10–19% ‘mostly’ on time. A minority of mothers 
admitted ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ paying on time. Of those who paid late, 50% of 
mothers and 61% of fathers previously paid regularly. 
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Table 7.3  Liable parents: regularity of 
payment  
 
Liable mothers 
n=144 
Liable fathers 
n=1,582 
Paid on time (%)   
Always 75.4 83.3 
Mostly 19.2 10.8 
Sometimes 1.4 4.0 
Rarely 1.0 1.0 
Never 3.0 0.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.138   
Child Support Collect 
and always on time (%) 
74.4 77.9 
p=.734   
Private Collect and 
always on time (%) 
77.8 89.3 
p=.083   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Child 
Support Collect mothers (n=101) and fathers (n=910). Private Collect mothers (n=43) 
and fathers (n=660). 
Payments transferred between parents were more regular than via Child 
Support Collect, although mothers differed little by collection method. 
Private Collect mothers were marginally less regular than fathers (78% 
compared with 89%, p=.083). Small cell sizes limited comparisons by 
collection method to always on time. 
  Ever paid and reasons for non-payment  
Parents who were meant to pay (n=10 mothers and n=24 fathers) were 
asked if they had ever paid and the main reason for current non-
payment. Most (84–86%) previously paid. Six mothers claimed child 
support was ‘not needed’: four because they had shared-time or split-
residence; one paid expenses in lieu of child support; and one had a 
former partner who told her ‘not to worry about paying’. The other three 
gave reasons specific to their case: they were briefly liable when the child 
was with his father; they were in dispute about liability as the father 
minimised his income; and the father never paid when he was liable. 
In contrast, more than half of fathers (n=13/24) were unwilling to pay 
because they had no time with their child; the amount was unfair or 
unaffordable (for some because of current unemployment); or ‘it was not 
spent on the child’. Seven fathers did not pay because they felt it was ‘not 
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needed’: time or expenses were shared; an agreement between parents 
was in place; or the father now had ‘sole time’. Three were organising for 
deductions to be set up and one father refused to answer.  
While both mothers and fathers reported unfairness as an explanation, 
affordability, inappropriate spending and lack of parent–child time were 
only raised by liable fathers.  
  Compliance 
As detailed in Section 4.4.2, compliance was measured as payment made 
in full and always on time. All payment not in full and/or not on time is 
treated as non-compliance. While a strict definition of compliance, this 
measure is used because both fullness and timeliness are important. 
This definition is consistent with other contemporary Australian research 
on compliance (see Smyth, Vnuk, Rodgers and Son 2014 and research 
conducted by AIFS such as Kaspiew et al. 2009; Qu & Weston 2010; Qu 
et al. 2014; De Maio et al. 2013). Further, it is consistent with the 
expectation by the CSA that payment is made in full and on time (Child 
Support Agency 2008). 
  Compliance by assessment and collection method 
Table 7.4 shows the rate of compliance for liable mothers and liable 
fathers overall; in assessment cases; and by collection method. Although 
liable mothers had lower compliance overall (64% compared with 77% 
fathers, p=.102), the difference did not reach significance. To test if 
compliance was overestimated by including agreements (especially 
private agreements where compliance was 100% for mothers), 
comparisons were restricted to assessment cases. Differences now 
approached significance (62% mothers compared with 78% fathers, 
p=.057). 
Liable parents did not differ significantly on compliance in Child Support 
Collect cases. In contrast, differences in compliance for Private Collect 
cases approached significance (67% for mothers and 81% for fathers, 
p=.092).  
   
167 
 
It is probable that the compliance rate for liable mothers was not 
significantly lower than liable fathers overall—even though more than 
one-in-ten liable mothers paid none of the liability—because the rate of 
timeliness of payment was similar for liable mothers and liable fathers.  
Table 7.4  Liable parents: compliance 
by assessment type and collection 
method 
 Liable mothers 
n=146 
Liable fathers 
n=1,496 
All (%)  64.4 77.1 
p=.102   
Assessments (%) 62.1 77.7 
p=.057   
Child Support Collect 
(%) 
63.8 73.6 
p=.364   
Private Collect (%) 66.6 80.8 
p=.092   
Notes: Data are weighted. Child Support Collect mothers (n=98) and fathers (n=876). 
Private Collect mothers (n=47) and fathers (n=607). 
  Compliance rates for liable parents and payees 
Australian research comparing reports from resident fathers and 
nonresident mothers on compliance are not common. (This has changed 
somewhat since 2008.). As noted in Chapter 1, child support research 
focuses on resident parents’ (mainly mothers’) reports. While this 
research noted low receipt of child support by resident fathers this 
frequently reflected ‘anything paid’, not compliance (see Smyth, Vnuk 
et al. 2014 for discussion of the evolution of compliance measures in 
Australia). 
In this section reports of compliance from liable mothers, liable fathers, 
payee mothers and payee fathers are compared. While not as detailed as 
the previous sections comparing liable parents, it is important to 
illustrate the overall picture. To recap, parents who have no current 
liability (or where the liable parent or payee reports that the expected 
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amount is $0)110 are not included in the analytic sample for comparison 
of compliance rates.  
To aid in comparisons with the post–2008 Australian family law 
evaluations (where compliance was reported for all four groups), results 
detailed at Table 7.5 are based on the four-level compliance measure 
used in the AIFS’ work reviewed in Chapter 2.  
Table 7.5  Liable parents and payees: 
compliance 
 Liable 
mothers 
n=146 
Liable 
fathers 
n=1,496 
Payee 
mothers 
n=2,026 
Payee 
fathers 
n=159 
Compliance 
(%) 
    
In full and on 
time 
64.4 77.1 45.5 39.0 
In full and not 
on time  
16.9 12.4 22.1 21.7 
In time and 
not in full 
2.3 3.7 3.2 3.0 
Neither in full 
nor on time  
16.4 6.9 29.3 36.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p<.001     
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. ‘Neither in 
full nor on time’ includes parents who should pay or receive (including did not know 
expected amount or varies). Excludes parents with (i) expected amount $0; (ii) always on 
time but missing expected and/or actual; (iii) full payment but did not know regularity; 
(iv) missing regularity and expected and/or actual; and (v) other arrangements (n=24 
liable mothers, n=72 liable fathers, n=87 payee mothers and n=22 payee fathers). 
Differences between liable fathers and payee mothers (p<.001) and between liable 
mothers and payee fathers (p=.088).  
As expected, liable fathers reported the highest compliance and payee 
fathers the lowest. Differences between liable fathers and payee mothers 
were significant (p<.001), and those between liable mothers and payee 
fathers marginally significant (p=.088).  
Non-compliant liable fathers mainly paid in full and late. In contrast, 
non-compliant liable mothers were as often in full and late as neither in 
full nor on time. Liable mothers were twice as likely to report being 
                                       
110 One liable father, 10 payee mothers and two payee fathers reported that they paid, 
received, or should receive, child support and reported an expected amount of $0. 
These parents may pay or receive child support in another form such as in-kind or 
have a debt offset in place. 
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neither in full nor on time (16% compared with 7% of liable fathers, 
p=.040), reflecting that 11% of mothers (compared with 2% of fathers) 
paid none of the expected amount. In contrast, both payee fathers and 
payee mothers had high reports of receiving payments neither in full nor 
on time (36% fathers and 29% mothers. p=.221).111  
However, when compliance was measured with a dichotomous variable 
(compliant/non-compliant), unlike in Table 7.5 where only the difference 
between liable fathers and payee mothers reached significance, now both 
comparisons were significant. Liable mothers reported significantly 
higher compliance than payee fathers (64% compared with 39%, p=.017) 
and liable fathers than payee mothers (77% compared with 45%, p<.001). 
The pattern of compliance found here is consistent with the post-2008 
survey research using cohorts of recently separated parents. This 
research found that liable mothers reported lower compliance than 
liable fathers (Kaspiew et al. 2009; Qu & Weston 2010; Qu et al. 
2014) and that payee fathers in these studies and in more recent 
cohorts (De Maio et al. 2013) consistently reported the lowest rate. 
Notably, unlike the research presented here, the lower compliance 
reported by payee fathers in the most recent cohort (Kaspiew, 
Carson, Dunstan et al. 2015) was significantly lower than for payee 
mothers.112  
  Discussion 
Research with nonresident fathers and resident mothers (hereafter 
‘liable-father cases’)113 indicates that nonresident fathers consistently 
report higher compliance than resident mothers (in Australia see, for 
example, Sutton cited in Fehlberg & Smyth 2000; Harrison 1993). 
Differing reports reflect parents who self-select into surveys, with 
                                       
111 None of the expected amount was received by 19.3% of payee mothers and 21.6% of 
payee fathers (p=.176). 
112 Compliance rates for liable parents were not calculated. Liable parents reported 
similar rates of full payment. 
113 The term 'liable-father-case’ is used as shorthand to indicate research with 
nonresident fathers, resident mothers and child support research that focuses on 
payments from liable fathers to payee mothers regardless of the parent whose reports 
were analysed. 
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separated fathers and mothers coming from different segments of the 
population (Smyth 2002). Australian research includes more involved, 
higher income minority-time fathers (Smyth, Sheehan & Fehlberg 
2001b). Parents who are untraceable, rarely or never see their child 
(Kaspiew et al. 2009) or do not provide financial support (Smyth & 
Weston 2004) appear less likely to participate. In contrast, payees’ 
responses (mainly mothers) span the range of nonresident parent 
involvement, therefore samples ‘contain “average”…[majority-time] 
parents and “active”…[minority-time] parents’ (Jensen & Clausen 1997: 
23). Another view is that majority-time mothers’ reports indicate their 
level of satisfaction with the father as a provider and are lower than the 
actual support provided (Madhavan, Richter & Gross 2015). This partly 
explains differences between mothers and fathers in liable-father cases.  
Research using responses from both members of a former couple and 
where the children lived mainly with their mother (Braver et al. 1991; 
Harrison 1993; Kitterod 2004) found fathers reported substantially 
higher compliance than mothers, reflecting the ways that men and 
women view financial contributions (Harrison 1993; but see Smock & 
Manning 1997). The small amount of research involving ‘role reversal’ 
former couples in Norway indicate a higher level of concordant reports on 
parent–child time when the children lived mainly with their father than 
when they lived mainly with their mother (Jensen 2005). However, 
parents were not asked about child support and the level of concordant 
reports could differ when money is measured. 
Further, internalised gender role expectations may influence liable 
parents’ reports of compliance. While child support is assumed to be 
gender-neutral, liable fathers who want to avoid being labelled ‘deadbeat’ 
may report always paying. If so, fathers’ responses could indicate social 
desirability and be aspirational, rather than actual, behaviour with some 
evidence from the international research that social desirability does 
affect fathers’ responses about financial responsibility (Madhavan, 
Richter & Gross 2015) based on the prevailing expectations of involved 
post-separation fathering. 
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In contrast, liable mothers (particularly those with minority-time) might 
already feel judged as a ‘bad’ mother. Mothers are more harshly judged 
by the general community when they are the liable parent (see, for 
example in Australia, Funder & Smyth 1996a; Smyth & Weston 2005), 
partly because they are perceived to be not living up to the expectations 
of the mother role as self-sacrificing and ever present. For some liable 
mothers being labelled as ‘deadbeat’ for non-compliance could have a 
lesser impact, especially when they are contributing financially and/or in 
other ways. However, this is speculative. 
To test the extent to which differences on reported compliance between 
liable parents and payees (particularly liable mothers and payee fathers) 
reflect different populations of separated parents, responses from the 
former couple sample were examined. This confirmed that liable mothers 
and payee fathers in the CSRS did come from different segments of the 
separated parent population. This was apparent from variables 
measuring objective factors such as number of former relationship 
children. To better understand different perceptions of compliance by 
gender, the next section explores responses from the former couple 
sample. 
  Compliance in the former couple sample 
The results described in Table 7.5 represent all parents with valid 
compliance information including where both former partners were 
interviewed—1,990 liable parent/payee former couples.114 This section 
explores the extent to which former partners’ responses on child support 
payment match (i.e., ‘concordant reports’) or do not match (i.e., 
‘discordant reports’). The focus is on the 78 former couples where the 
mother was the liable parent (hereafter ‘liable-mother dyads’). Where 
applicable, comparisons are made with 827 former couples where the 
father was the liable parent (hereafter ‘liable-father dyads’). (Data on 
liable-father dyads are deliberately not reported in the same detail as 
liable-mother dyads.) Dyadic analysis provides a comprehensive view of 
                                       
114 The rationale for excluding the 90 ex-couples who were not liable parent/payee is 
explained in Chapter 4.  
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the meaning of child support and financial responsibility from the 
perspective of each parent. Former couple data compare reports of the 
same case and ‘although couple and family data do not make for tidy 
analysis, they better represent the accuracy of differential perceptions 
in families’ (Ahrons 2011: 530).  
An important caveat is that the former couple data are reported 
unweighted and, because of oversampling, include substantially more 
shared-time parents than the weighted data described above. In addition, 
payees (especially fathers) report on more involved former partners than 
found among all payees, with more overnights and few liable parents who 
never saw the focal child.115 This is common with former couple samples 
(see, for example, Qu et al. 2014; Seltzer & Schaeffer 2001).  
Data in section 7.4.1 to 7.4.3 are largely descriptive. The first part 
describes the liable-mother dyad sample in aggregate. This is followed by 
an analysis of the concordance of responses. Data from former partners 
for relevant questions were extracted and reproduced in spreadsheet 
format so that responses from both parents could be examined side-by-
side and compared for level of concordance. 
  Characteristics of parents in the liable-mother dyads 
Liable mothers were on average 40.5 years old and payee fathers 45.6 
years old. More mothers than fathers had repartnered (40% and 26%). 
Ex-partners were together on average 12 years, separated for 6 years and 
had 2 children. The focal child was around 11 years old (mean=11.4 
years) as was the youngest child (mean=10.6 years). The focal child lived 
roughly equally with both parents or mainly with their mother in 53% of 
cases. Parenting arrangements were agreed by 36–38% of parents and 
30% determined by a judge. The child spent 145 nights in the last 12 
months with their mother according to her report and 129 nights 
according to her ex-partner. When all former relationship children were 
                                       
115 For example, 23% of payee fathers reported that the liable mother had no overnights 
in the full sample (unweighted) compared with 9% in the former couple sample.  
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considered, 37–38% of cases involved all children mainly with their 
father.  
Negative relationships were reported by 37–42% of former partners: 18% 
of mothers and 8% of fathers were fearful. Around a third frequently or 
sometimes argued about money in the last 12 months. This reveals 
higher conflict for fathers than the full sample where 45% of payee 
fathers had a positive relationship. This could have implications for the 
level of concordance between reports of former partners if, as research 
suggests (see, for example, Waller & Emory 2014), parental relationship 
quality affects responses. (Details of socio-demographic characteristics 
and family dynamics are presented in Appendix B, Table B2.) 
Child support was mostly determined by an assessment with 10% of 
mothers and 16% of fathers reporting a registered or private agreement. 
Two-thirds were Child Support Collect. The mean expected amount was 
$3,516 according to mothers and $3,004 according to fathers. Mothers 
reported they paid a mean actual amount of $3,689 and fathers that they 
received a mean amount of $3,494 (excluding parents who reported that 
none of the expected amount was paid). 
  Concordance on reports on fullness, timeliness and 
compliance in the liable-mother dyads 
In the overall sample, payee fathers reported significantly lower 
compliance than liable mothers (39% payee fathers compared with 64% 
liable mother, p=.017). To test whether this represents sample differences 
in the two groups and to better understand compliance, responses from 
former couples on fullness, timeliness and compliance were compared. 
(This was restricted to liable-mother dyads where both parents had valid 
information.) Discrepant reports were common. For fullness (n=51 ex-
couples) 78% gave the same response. In 69% of liable-mother dyads 
both reported payment in full. Concordance on timeliness (n=62 ex-
couples) was lower than for full payment: 63% gave the same response. 
In 40% of liable-mother dyads both reported payment always on time. 
Concordant reports of former partners on fullness were slightly higher 
than the compliance rate reported by all payee fathers (69% compared 
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with 66%) but timeliness was lower (40% compared with 58%). (Detailed 
tables for levels of concordance on fullness and timeliness are shown in 
Appendix B, Tables B3–B6.) 
Table 7.6 presents a matrix comparing former partners’ reports of 
compliance. Percentages in bold represent concordance and that in 
italics possible concordance where one parent reported another 
arrangement116; or the payee father reported compliance and the mother 
had (i) missing expected and/or actual payment and always paid on time 
or (ii) full payment and regularity was not known.  
  
                                       
116 This includes one payee father who stated that the expected amount was $0 and one 
payee father who reported always on time but the expected and actual varies. These 
could represent other arrangements in lieu of cash child support. 
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Table 7.6  Comparison of reports from 
78 former couple liable-mothers and 
payee fathers: compliance 
 Payee 
father: 
comply 
(%) 
Payee 
father: 
non-
comply 
(%) 
Payee father: 
should 
receive if 
liable mother 
has other 
arrangement. 
(%) 
Payee father: 
other 
arrangement 
(%) 
Payee 
father: 
missing 
expected, 
actual or 
regularity 
(%) 
Liable 
mother: 
comply (%) 
19.2 28.2  1.3 7.7 
Liable 
mother: non-
comply (%) 
2.6 20.5  3.8 1.3 
Liable 
mother: 
should pay if 
payee father 
has other 
arrangement. 
(%) 
   1.3  
Liable 
mother: 
other 
arrangement 
(%) 
1.3  5.1 Not applicable 1.3 
Liable 
mother: 
always paid 
on time, 
missing 
expected 
and/or 
actual (%)  
3.8     
Liable 
mother: in 
full, missing 
regularity (%)  
1.3     
Liable 
mother: 
missing 
expected 
and/or 
actual (%) 
    1.3 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Sum of percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding 
Percentages in bold represent concordant reports and those in italics possible 
concordant reports where one parent had another arrangement or the payee father 
reported compliance and the liable mother reported (i) always paid on time but missing 
expected and/or actual amount or (ii) full payment but missing regularity.  
Concordance on compliance was low because of more divergent 
responses on timeliness. Where restricted to former couples where both 
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had valid information (n=55), 56% of ex-partners gave the same response 
and in 27% (n=15) of liable-mother dyads both reported that the mother 
was compliant. Concordance on non-compliance was slightly higher 
(n=16) than for compliance. In the overall sample, 39% of payee fathers 
reported compliance.  
  Differences in level of concordance in liable-mother and 
liable-father dyads 
In this section liable-mother dyads are compared with liable-father 
dyads. As seen in Table 7.7, liable-mother dyads had a slightly lower rate 
of concordance on fullness, and regularity than liable-father dyads, but 
higher concordance on not in full, and on not always on time, most 
notable in the latter. There was higher discordance among former 
partners in the liable-mother dyads than for in the liable-father dyads for 
fullness (78% compared with 83%) but little difference on timeliness (63% 
compared with 65%). Payee fathers had the lowest reports of full 
payment and timeliness and thus responses in liable-mother dyads were 
expected to be more discordant.  
Table 7.7  Liable-mother and liable-
father dyads: level of concordant 
reports on whether payment made in 
full and always on time 
 Liable-mother dyads 
n=62 
Liable-father dyads 
n=760 
Former partners’ 
reports for paid in full 
(%) 
  
Both reported paid in 
full  
68.6 78.5 
Both reported not in full  9.8 4.2 
Discordant responses 21.6 17.3 
Total  100.0 100.0 
Former partners’ 
reports on paid on 
time (%) 
  
Both reported paid 
always on time  
40.3 53.6 
Both reported not paid 
on time 
22.6 11.7 
Discordant responses  37.1 34.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Fullness: liable-mother dyads (n=51) liable-father dyads 
(n=623). ‘Should pay’ or ‘should receive’ are treated as not in full and not always. 
Excludes dyads where fullness and/or regularity cannot be determined or where one 
parent had another arrangement. 
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Table 7.8 details the level of concordance on compliance between former 
partners in the liable-mother and liable-father dyads. While high levels of 
discordance were common (44% and 40%), the pattern of concordant 
reports differed. As expected, liable mothers and payee fathers had a 
substantially lower rate of concordant reports that the payment was in 
full and always on time (27% compared with 45% in liable-father dyads) 
but higher concordance—almost double—on non-compliance (29% 
compared with 15% in liable-father dyads). Notably, reports of former 
partners more often matched when the liable mother was non-compliant 
than compliant. This may be partly explained by the higher reported rate 
of payment of none of the expected amount by liable mothers. 
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Table 7.8  Liable-mother and liable-
father dyads: level of concordant 
reports of compliance 
 
Liable-mother dyads 
n=55 
Liable-father dyads 
n=672 
Former partners’ 
reports on compliance 
(%) 
  
Both reported 
compliance  
27.3 44.9 
Both reported non-
compliance 
29.1 15.5 
Discordant reports  43.6 39.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding 
Excludes dyads where either parent had (i) missing information on expected and/or 
actual amount; (ii) expected amount of $0; (iii) another arrangement; or (iv) full payment 
but did not know regularity. Parents who should pay or should receive and did not know 
the expected amount or it varies are treated as non-compliant. 
  Discussion 
A similar rate of compliance was found among former couples in liable-
father dyads as the rate for payee mothers in the full sample (45%) but 
lower for former couples in liable-mother dyads than for payee fathers in 
the full sample (27% compared with 39% for all payee fathers). 
Examination of responses from former couples confirmed that the 
pattern of compliance found in the full sample also applied when 
responses from both parents in the case were compared.  
Of interest, discordant reports on compliance were still high among 
former couples (40–44% of reports did not match). This could reflect the 
higher reported rate of negative relationships for all groups except liable 
fathers. Research with former couple dyads (Coley & Morris 2002; 
Mikelson 2008; Waller & Emory 2014) suggests that reports on aspects 
of post-separation parenting are more divergent where relationship 
quality is lower.  
Non-response bias is frequently encountered with multi-actor surveys 
where permission is required to interview another party or contact 
information sought from the first person interviewed. This bias results in 
an over-representation of parents with positive relationships. 
Respondents with a ‘poor’ relationship might not know contact details or 
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not want the other party to be interviewed. Likewise, a ‘good’ relationship 
may affect the response rate of the other party.  
It is probable that the CSRS former couple data are less affected by this 
type of non-response bias (that is, parents with positive relationships) as 
participants did not know whether the other parent could be, or was, 
interviewed. This was particularly apparent in liable-mother dyads: in 
54% of dyads one or both parents reported a negative relationship. 
Among these parents, discordant reports on compliance were higher (for 
parents with negative relationships (n=17/31 had discordant reports). 
  Differences between liable mothers on child support payments 
and compliance 
As in Chapter 6, intragroup differences for liable mothers were examined. 
Table 7.9 details the differences in expected amount; private agreement 
rather than assessment; collection method; and compliance. (Numbers 
are small in some subgroups and therefore observations are tentative). 
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Table 7.9  Differences between liable 
mothers: child support arrangements 
and compliance 
 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers  
n=25 
Expected 
amount 
(mean) 
$2,556.57 $2,443.04 $1,166.86 $4,499.62 
SE, CI $449.79, CI 
$1,674.78–
$3,438.35 
$732.59, CI 
$1,006.84–
$3,879.25 
$171.91, CI 
$829.84–
$1,503.87 
$993.43, CI 
$2,552.06–
$6,447.18 
p<.001     
Has Private 
Collect (%) 
27.3 84.3 31.7 29.9 
p=.014     
Has an 
agreement 
not an 
assessment 
(%) 
11.6 33.1 17.6 6.1 
p=.134     
Compliance 
(%) 
    
In full and on 
time 
81.2 69.6 21.5 42.2 
In full, not on 
time  
9.7 6.9 3.8 39.5 
On time, not 
in full 
0.0 2.3 0.0 7.7 
Neither in full 
nor on time  
9.1 21.3 74.8 10.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p=.002     
Pays none of 
the expected 
amount (%) 
1.1 21.3 63.2 6.2 
p<.001     
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. Compliance excludes mothers with (i) 
another arrangement; (ii) always on time but missing expected and/or actual; (iii) full 
payment but did not know regularity; and (iv) missing regularity and expected and/or 
actual.  
Less-time liable mothers predominantly had Child Support Collect and 
administrative assessments. They had the second highest liability, 
although still small ($49 a week) considering they had the least 
overnights; slightly higher than equal-time mothers. This reflected their 
generally lower income. Less-time mothers had the highest compliance 
(81%) and almost all (99%) paid something.  
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In contrast, one-third of equal-time liable mothers had an agreement and 
84% were Private Collect (compared with 27–32% of other liable mothers, 
p=.014) indicating more recent registration and positive relationships. 
Nonetheless, 21% paid none of the expected amount. 
More-time liable mothers had the smallest mean liability but 75% paid 
neither in full nor on time and 63% paid none of the expected amount. 
This could suggest dissatisfaction with being liable when they had more 
nights with all their children than their former partner. (Satisfaction with 
the child support payment is explored in Chapter 8.) 
Split-residence liable mothers had the highest mean liability. Less than 
half were compliant, with timeliness the main reason. 
Liable mothers differed significantly on compliance and on whether they 
paid any of the expected amount. Liable mothers with the most time with 
their children (or to state this differently, those who matched the 
intensive mothering role more closely) were least likely to pay some of the 
expected amount. (This is explored further in Chapter 9.) 
  Summary 
Liable mothers were significantly more likely to pay none of the expected 
amount than fathers and appear to have lower compliance than liable 
fathers, although this was not significantly lower overall. This difference 
was marginally significant for assessment cases and in Private Collect. 
Notably, liable mothers had a similar compliance rate whatever collection 
method was in place.  
When all four groups of parents were compared, liable fathers reported 
the highest compliance followed by liable mothers, payee mothers, and 
then payee fathers. 
This pattern also applied in the former couple sample with lower 
concordance on compliance in liable-mother than liable-father dyads 
(27% and 45%). It is noteworthy that liable mothers and payee fathers 
had slightly higher concordant reports on non-compliance (29%) than 
compliance.  
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Non-compliance does not necessarily mean absence of financial support. 
Other informal, voluntary financial assistance may be provided. Gender 
differences could affect patterns of in-kind contributions. This is explored 
in the next chapter (Chapter 8).  
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Chapter 8  In-kind contributions 
In-kind contributions and direct spending on children when in each 
parents’ household are similarly gendered and relevant to compliance. 
Shared-time mothers feel they meet most of the incidental expenses 
(Fineman 1991; Lacroix 2006; Markham & Coleman 2012; Tolmie, 
Elizabeth & Gavey 2010b), a responsibility also noted by nonresident 
mothers (Babcock 1998; Bemiller 2005; Herrerias 2008; Kielty 2006b; 
Maccoby et al. 1992). While sometimes recognised as in lieu of child 
support (Millward, Campo & Fehlberg 2011; Wolffs & Shallcross 2000), 
in-kind contributions are rarely included in child support research, 
underestimating mothers’ financial contributions. Resident fathers 
acknowledge receipt of gifts, clothes and groceries significantly more 
frequently than resident mothers: 70% compared with 58% (Grall 2011).  
This chapter is structured as follows. First, reports of in-kind 
contributions (i) made by liable parents; (ii) received by payees; and (iii) 
paid in the former couples dyads are compared. Second, a flexible 
measure of compliance (‘soft’ compliance) that includes in-kind 
contributions, agreed lower payments and other arrangements is 
discussed. Finally, satisfaction with child support and fairness for liable 
parents are compared, and then for liable mothers with different 
parenting arrangements, to provide a comprehensive picture of financial 
arrangements and parental satisfaction.  
As with the previous results chapters, comparisons involve cross-
tabulations and comparisons of means for the liable parent subgroup 
(Section 8.1.1–8.1.3 & 8.2.1), for the liable parents and payee subgroup 
(Section 8.1.4 & 8.2.2) and for the liable mother subgroup (Section 8.3.1). 
Once again because of the complex survey data, the statistical testing for 
the cross-tabulations produces an F-transformed Rao-Scott chi-squared 
test statistic as a default (Heeringa, West & Berglund 2010: 167)117 and 
the test command run post-estimation produces an adjusted Wald Test 
                                       
117 This is a design-adjusted form of the Pearson Chi-Squared Test with a second-order 
design correction incorporated.  
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and an F-Ratio to show whether the means are statistically equivalent or 
not (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group n.d.).Exact p-values are reported 
in the text and tables.118 Significant differences at p<.05 are noted. All 
data are weighted using the design and response weights developed to be 
representative of the Scheme active caseload. Numbers reported in the 
text and tables are unweighted. Methodology used for the comparisons of 
the former partner dyads (Section 8.1.5 and 8.2.3) varies from this 
approach and is detailed further in the relevant sections on in-kind 
contributions and ‘soft’ compliance. 
  Prescribed in-kind items 
As detailed in Section 4.4.2, payment for prescribed items such as school 
fees, essential medical expenses and the payee’s housing costs can be 
credited for up to 30% of the liability without payee agreement in Child 
Support Collect cases (and in full if agreed). Further, in-kind is common 
in Private Collect.  
Around half of liable parents (51% mothers and 56% fathers) made an in-
kind contribution under one or more of the prescribed categories. 
Amounts paid did not differ significantly (mean=$4,806 mothers and 
$3,188 fathers, p=.115).119 As Table 8.1 indicates, childcare fees were the 
least paid (3% of parents) and essential medical or dental expenses the 
most (42% of mothers and 32% fathers). School expenses were also 
common (31–37% parents). There were no significant differences between 
liable mothers and liable fathers under any of these categories of in-kind 
contributions. 
  
                                       
118 P-values below .001 are reported as p<.001. 
119 The range for payments was quite wide: $50–$40,000 for liable mothers and $30–
$100,000 for liable fathers. The median amount paid by liable mothers was $2,500 
and liable fathers $1,000. 
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Table 8.1  Liable parents: in-kind 
contributions for prescribed items 
 Liable mothers 
n=151 
Liable fathers 
n=1,596 
In-kind payment type1    
Childcare fees (%) 2.6 2.8 
Pre-school or school 
fees (%) 
35.2 31.3 
Uniforms or books (%) 37.2 36.4 
Essential medical or 
dental expenses (%) 
41.5 31.8 
Payee’s share of rent, 
mortgage or utilities 
(%) 
14.7 9.8 
Payee’s motor vehicle 
costs (%) 
15.1 10.4 
Any item on the 
prescribed list (%) 
  
Yes 51.0 56.0 
No 49.0 44.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.546   
Amount paid (mean)2 $4,805.96 $3,187.57 
SE, CI $980.05, CI $2,884–
$6,727.40 
$301.10, CI $2,597.24–
$3,777.90 
p=.115   
Payment made by 
agreement (%)  
52.1 73.9 
Yes 52.1 73.9 
No 47.9 26.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.009   
In-kind payment 
partially or fully 
replaced cash child 
support (%) 
  
Yes 23.5 13.3 
No 76.5 86.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.154   
Notes: Data are weighted. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 
Excludes parents who were not asked about in-kind contributions. 1. Multiple 
responses allowed. 2. Mean amount excludes 3 liable fathers who reported paying for a 
prescribed item but reported the amount paid as $0.  
  Agreement to pay in-kind 
Liable parents who made one of these payments were asked if it was 
instead of regular child support (fully or in part) and whether they and 
the other parent agreed. A minority of liable parents reported that it 
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replaced regular child support in full or part (12% mothers and 7% 
fathers). However, liable mothers were significantly less likely to say the 
in-kind payment was by agreement (52% compared with 74% fathers, 
p=.009).120  
  Anything else paid  
As well as prescribed items, parents were asked if they currently paid for 
anything else for their child such as clothing, computer, mobile phone 
costs, hobbies or sports equipment. As indicated in Table 8.2, more liable 
parents reported that they paid for something else than for prescribed 
items (83% mothers and 74% fathers, mean=$3,026 mothers and 
mean=$1,888 fathers).  
Again, more fathers said this was by agreement (23% compared with 13% 
mothers), but this was nonsignificant. Payment could replace child 
support by agreement, particularly in Private Collect. Respondents were 
not asked about this, potentially underestimating agreed contributions in 
lieu of child support.  
  
                                       
120 Based on these responses, 6% of mothers were eligible for the 30% prescribed 
payment credit (compared with 1% fathers). This means that they made a payment 
under one or more of these categories and the payee did not agree that it was for child 
support. This was partly because more liable mothers had a Child Support Collect 
case than liable fathers and liable mothers were less likely to report that the 
prescribed item was paid by agreement. Whether they actually applied for credit for a 
prescribed payment is not known. 
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Table 8.2  Liable parents: pays for 
anything else in kind 
 Liable mothers 
n=151 
Liable fathers 
n=1,589  
Pays for anything else 
(%) 
  
Yes 83.1 74.0 
No 16.9 26.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.240   
Amount paid (mean) $3,025.53 $1,888.47 
SE, CI $1,147.35 $776.11–
$5,274.94 
$116.25 $1,660.55–
$2,116.38 
p=.324   
Who decided (%)   
Liable parent 74.5 70.7 
Other parent 9.0 5.1 
Parents agreed 13.2 23.1 
Child 3.3 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.144   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data. Excludes parents who were not asked 
about in-kind payments.  
  In-kind payments and compliance 
Most liable parents (89% mothers and 82% fathers) made an in-kind 
contribution, either for a prescribed item or something else. All liable 
mothers who did not pay in full paid in-kind compared with 67% of liable 
fathers. 
  In-kind contributions for liable parents and payees 
As with compliance, reports of the four groups (liable mothers, liable 
fathers, payee mothers and payee fathers) on in-kind payments were 
compared. As Table 8.3 indicates, payees were less likely than liable 
parents to report that an in-kind contribution was made. In contrast to 
compliance, the group with the lowest reports was payee mothers.121 
Overall 89% of liable mothers and 82% of liable fathers reported that 
they contributed something in-kind. In contrast, 55% of payee fathers 
and 50% of payee mothers reported that they received something in-kind. 
However, one category does warrant attention. Liable mothers’ reports of 
                                       
121 Payee mothers were significantly less likely to report receiving a prescribed item (29% 
compared with 44% of payee fathers, p=.013). Payee mothers also had lower reports of 
anything else paid (33% and 48%, p=.484) and any in-kind contribution (50% and 
55%, p=.465), but the latter two were nonsignificant.  
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prescribed items more closely matched payee fathers’ reports (51% and 
44%, p=.498) while liable fathers’ and payee mothers’ reports differed 
significantly (56% compared with 29%, p<.001).122 Prescribed items are 
probably more obvious (and thus memorable) when paid compared with 
payment for other things such as presents, pocket money or items that 
may be bought and kept at the liable parent’s home. Nonetheless, payee 
mothers’ and liable fathers’ reports did differ significantly in the CSRS 
and this matched previous research on differing reports (see, for 
example, Coley & Morris 2002; Seltzer & Brandreth 1994). However, 
these findings relate to independent samples of parents. Differences in 
reports of payment and receipt of in-kind contributions are explored 
further in the former couple subsample in Section 8.1.5. 
Table 8.3  Liable parents and payees: 
in-kind contributions  
 
Liable 
mothers 
n=149 
Liable 
fathers 
n=1,589 
Payee 
mothers 
n=1,957 
Payee 
fathers 
n=153 
Liable parent 
paid for a 
prescribed 
item (%) 
51.0 56.0 29.3 44.2 
p<.001     
Liable parent 
paid for 
something 
else (%) 
83.1 74.0 38.1 42.6 
p<.001     
Liable parent 
made any in-
kind 
contribution 
(%) 
88.7 81.9 50.3 55.0 
p<.001     
Notes: Data are weighted. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 
Excludes parents who were not asked about in-kind contributions. Significant 
differences between liable fathers and payee mothers (p<.001). Significant differences 
between liable mothers and payee fathers for something else (p<.001) and any in-kind 
contribution (p=.004) but no difference for prescribed items (p=.498). 
 
                                       
122 These findings related to independent samples of parents. Differences in reports of 
payment and receipt of in-kind contributions are explored further in the former couple 
subsample in Section 8.1.5. 
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  Prescribed in-kind payments and anything else paid in the 
former couple sample 
The discussion above focused on reports of in-kind contributions for the 
sample overall. Again, dyadic data provide further insight. As with 
Section 7.4, data from former partners for relevant questions were 
extracted and reproduced in spreadsheet format so that responses from 
both parents could be examined side-by-side and compared for level of 
concordance. However, unlike the presentation of data on payments and 
compliance, data on in-kind contributions were further analysed to allow 
testing of comparisons between concordance in the liable-mother and 
liable-father dyads. To do this, several variables were created 
representing concordance or discordance based on the responses by 
former partners. Variables were then compared via cross–tabulation and 
Pearson Chi-squared test statistic produced. Mean amounts paid were 
not tested as the substantial “don’t know” response rate precluded 
meaningful analysis. 
As indicated in Table 8.4, concordance of reports that a prescribed item 
was made was significantly higher in liable mother than liable-father 
dyads (51% compared with 31%, p=.006). The mean amount paid in 
liable-mother dyads ($4,873 and $4,960) was substantial, and somewhat 
higher than reported in liable-father dyads ($3,626 and $2,559), 
suggesting that the contribution was meaningful and acknowledged. 
Median amounts were also higher in the liable-mother dyads, with payee 
fathers reporting the highest median amount paid. Further, reports on 
payment of prescribed items were less discordant—78% of former 
partners in the liable mother dyads gave the same response—than the 
responses on compliance. 
Concordance of reports on anything else paid was higher in liable-mother 
dyads (51% compared with 38% in liable-father dyads), although this 
difference did not reach significance. Mean and median amount reported 
paid were lower for anything else than for prescribed payments, 
particularly for payees. Again, liable mothers reported the highest mean 
amount paid. 
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Overall former partners in the liable-mother dyads were marginally more 
likely to both report that some contribution was made in-kind than in the 
liable father dyads (64% and 52%, p=.066). 
Table 8.4  Liable-mother and liable-
father dyads: concordance on reports of 
in-kind contributions 
 
Liable-mother dyads 
n=61 
Liable-father dyads 
n=750 
Prescribed items (%)   
Both former partners 
reported paid 
50.8 31.3 
Both former partners 
reported not paid  
27.9 33.1 
Discordant reports 21.3 35.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.006   
Amount paid (mean)   
Liable parent  $4,873.39 $3,643.56 
Payee  $4,960.44 $2,559.45 
Amount paid (median)   
Liable parent  $2,500 $1,500 
Payee  $2,600 $720 
Anything else paid (%)   
Both former partners 
reported paid 
50.9 38.4 
Both former partners 
reported not paid  
14.0 15.7 
Discordant reports 35.1 46.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.167   
Amount paid (mean)   
Liable parent  $3,701.52 $2,636.23 
Payee  $617.27 $684.17 
Amount paid (median)   
Liable parent  $1,500 $1,500 
Payee  $640 $650 
Liable parent made 
any in kind 
contribution: Both 
former partners 
reported paid (%) 
p=.066 
64.4 52.0 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. 
Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. Only includes responses 
where both parents were asked.  
  Discussion 
The nonresident mother literature highlights that the majority of mothers 
paid something in-kind (Herrerias 2008; Kielty 2006b; Wolffs & 
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Shallcross 2000). The data above confirm this pattern of in-kind support 
for liable mother-cases based on reports from liable mothers (89% 
contributed something) and on reports from former partners in the liable 
mother dyads where in almost two-in-three (64%) of cases both reported 
that something was provided.  
Research with minority-time fathers indicates that in-kind payments 
have symbolic meaning, being ‘earmarked for children only’ and 
‘render[ing] their status as giver visible’ (Bradshaw et al. 1999: 217).In 
contrast, Greif (1997b) suggested that for nonresident mothers in-kind 
payments indicate that she knows best what the child needs. Until the 
present study, this issue has not been investigated in Australia for liable 
mothers.  
Liable mothers were significantly less likely than liable fathers to 
contribute towards prescribed items by agreement than unilaterally. 
(This applied to anything else paid, although this did not reach 
significance.) Liable mothers’ higher unilateral purchases, especially for 
prescribed items, could suggest a gendered response relating to the 
mother role and the requirement to be child-focused. Prescribed items 
could be classified as more of an essential or routine nature than those 
covered under the ‘anything else’ catch-all question. Payment of a 
prescribed item may reflect an identification of children’s needs and thus 
the purchases made without discussion with the other parent. 
Alternatively, this could reflect that mothers (whether liable or not) had 
more say in decision-making for education and routine medical or dental 
care123 than liable fathers and took responsibility for these expenses.  
Data in Section 8.1.3 are consistent with previous findings for liable 
fathers (generally based on resident mothers' reports, see for example, 
Bell, Kazimirski & La Valle 2006; Qu & Weston 2013; Teachman 1991; 
                                       
123 Parental decision-making was not covered in the CSRS at Time 0 but it was at T1. 
Unpublished analysis of responses about parental decision-making indicate that liable 
mothers were significantly more likely to be the main decision-maker for health and 
education than liable fathers: 51% compared with 6% and 38% compared with 4%. 
(author’s calculations) 
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Zubrick et al. 2008) that in-kind contributions are significantly more 
likely to be additional to cash child support. The results above indicate 
that, regardless of whether the expected child support was paid in full, 
most liable mothers provided in-kind support. Other research with 
shared-time mothers in New Zealand (Tolmie, Elizabeth & Gavey 2010a) 
highlighted that mothers report being the ‘bottom-line parent’ who is 
responsible for organising and paying for medical and dental expenses. 
(See also Lacroix 2006.) This appears to be confirmed here for liable 
mothers regardless of parenting time or compliance. 
The CSRS data are the first Australian data comparing payee fathers’ 
and liable mothers’ reports on in-kind contributions. None thus far have 
compared the four groups using dyadic data. The CSRS data show 
considerable concordance on reports of former partners about in-kind 
payment for liable mothers. Further, payee fathers in the liable-mother 
dyads more often reported in-kind contributions than in the payee father 
group overall: 64% concordant reports of any in-kind contribution. When 
both former partners were asked, 51% of payee fathers and liable 
mothers both said a payment was made compared with 44% for a 
prescribed item and 38% for anything else in the full sample of payee 
fathers. 
Dyadic data reveal significantly higher concordance among former 
partners in the liable-mother dyads than in the liable-father dyads that 
an in-kind payment of a prescribed item was paid.124 These are the 
additional costs such as school fees and medical expenses that research 
indicates payee mothers want their former partner to pay but according 
to their reports rarely do (see, for example, Qu & Weston 2013 where less 
than 20% of payee mothers received help with medical costs, childcare or 
school fees). Notably, the higher concordance among liable-mother dyads 
confirms that these are more often paid and acknowledged by payee 
fathers.  
                                       
124 Concordant reports of other (non-prescribed) in-kind contributions were higher 
among liable mothers and payee fathers than in the liable-father dyads, although this 
latter comparison was not statistically significant. Whether any in kind contribution 
was marginally different. 
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  ‘Soft’ compliance 
To extend understanding of compliance, this section focuses on a 
broader measure that includes other financial contributions and 
negotiated agreements between parents. This measure (hereafter ‘soft’ 
compliance) was developed by Vnuk for the compliance study of Smyth, 
Vnuk, Rodgers and Son ( 2014). It takes into account that financial 
responsibilities can be met by other mutually acceptable arrangements 
such as agreed lower (or no) payment, or allocation of the costs of the 
children between parents that may not match the formal administrative 
assessment. The present study uses a modified measure that includes 
in-kind contributions and all payments less than expected by agreement 
regardless of timeliness.  
‘Soft’ compliance was met when the payment was: 
• mostly on time and 100% or more was paid; or 
• always on time and 90–99% of the liability was paid; or 
• made in-kind from the prescribed payment list and the payment 
was intended to fully or partly replace child support (hereafter ‘in-
kind payment’); or 
• less than expected and agreed to (if the payee) or the former 
partner was reported to have agreed (if the liable parent); or 
• replaced by another arrangement. 
This classification system is hierarchical, with ‘100% and mostly’ and 
‘90–99% and always paid on time’ given primacy because they could 
overlap with in-kind or agreed lower amount. Agreed in-kind payment 
was then considered. If none of these applied, then whether the lower 
amount paid was by agreement was determined. Parents with another 
arrangement were examined separately as the other categories were not 
relevant. 
Using this broader definition, the largest group of liable parents moving 
to ‘soft’ compliance was those who paid 100% mostly on time. A small 
number of fathers but no mothers paid 90–99% of the liability always on 
time. A further 3% of mothers and 12% of fathers made an in-kind 
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payment in lieu of child support. Finally, 7–8% reported that the payee 
agreed to receive less than full payment; around half of those with a 
lower actual payment.125 Mothers who paid less than expected or nothing 
by agreement had equal-time or split-residence. No association with 
parenting time was noted for liable fathers who all reported paying some 
of the expected amount.  
As Table 8.5 shows, of those liable parents deemed non-compliant under 
the ‘in full and on time’ measure (see Table 7.5) 48% of mothers and 41% 
of fathers were not ‘soft’ compliant either.  
Table 8.5  ‘Soft’ compliance for liable 
parents previously treated as ‘not in full 
and/or not on time’  
 Liable mothers 
n=57 
Liable fathers 
n=311 
‘Soft’ compliance (%)   
100% and mostly 41.8  35.7 
90–99% and always 0.0 4.2 
In-kind payment agreed 
in lieu of child support 
3.4 11.9 
Agreed to difference  7.0 7.6 
Not ‘soft’ compliance 47.8 40.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.664   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Includes 
three liable mothers and 11 liable fathers previously omitted because of missing data on 
expected or actual amount or regularity. ‘Agreed to difference’ includes payments made 
‘sometimes’ to ‘never’ on time and regularity unknown. 
Table 8.6 shows compliance including those who met the ‘soft’ 
compliance measure. As indicated below, 17% of liable mothers and 10% 
of liable fathers met neither compliance measure. Including liable 
parents who were ‘soft’ compliant did not change the level of statistical 
significance (comparisons on compliance and non-compliance were 
nonsignificant) although the difference between liable parents slightly 
narrowed. 
  
                                       
125The remaining liable mothers did not know or it was still being resolved. Liable 
fathers were divided between not agreed, did not know and still being resolved.  
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Table 8.6  Liable parents: compliance 
and ‘soft’ compliance 
 Liable mothers 
n=149 
Liable fathers 
n=1,507 
Compliance or ‘soft’ 
compliance (%) 
  
In full and on time or 
‘soft’ compliance  
82.8 90.0 
Neither 17.2 10.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
p=.185   
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Excludes 
(i) parents with another arrangement and (ii) where compliance was unable to be 
determined because of missing data on regularity, expected or actual amounts or the 
amount varies. Includes three liable mothers and 11 liable fathers previously omitted 
because of missing data on expected or actual amount or regularity.  
  Liable mothers with another arrangement 
Some parents (n=303) reported that cash child support payments had 
been replaced by another arrangement.126 Data were collected on these 
‘other arrangements’ to assist in understanding how child support works 
‘on the ground’.127 As noted above, parents with another arrangement 
were treated as ‘soft’ compliant. To provide some insight into this group, 
a detailed description of the type of arrangements and the cases covered 
for liable mothers follows. (While it is probable that details will not be 
identical in all aspects, the information below shares some common 
features of other arrangements of liable fathers, payee fathers and payee 
mothers who reported that cash child support was replaced.) 
Liable mothers were twice as likely to report that they had another 
arrangement that replaced cash child support (12% compared with 6% 
liable fathers, p=.034). Their higher shared-time and split-residence 
suggest that another arrangement applied because expected amounts 
were small; the liable parent in the case was changeable; or views about 
which parent (if any) should pay differed from the assessment.  
The remainder of this section details other arrangements reported by 
liable-mothers (n=24). Arrangements were generally informal and not 
                                       
126 This group comprised 24 liable mothers; 72 liable fathers; 87 payee mothers; 22 
payee fathers; and 53 fathers and 45 mothers who were neither liable or a payee. 
127 This is one of the strengths of the CSRS—the inclusion of detailed questions about 
child support practices in a large dataset representative of the caseload. 
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influenced by the amount of any administrative assessment. 
Nonetheless, half (n=12/24) claimed that an assessment applied. Few 
arrangements were registered as an agreement with the Child Support 
Agency (n=3/24). The high proportion of private (informal) agreements 
could explain why nine parents did not know the expected amount or 
reported that it varies, and four reported that no payment was expected.  
Some private agreements specified how the liability was paid, such as 
school fees or other expenses (n=7/24) indicating that in-kind payments 
were common. Other parents appeared to be ignoring the assessment 
and sorted things out completely between themselves. For those with 
shared-time or split-residence, expenses were also shared or split 
between parents, or no money changed hands (n=11/24). As expected, 
83% were Private Collect. 
For mothers with other arrangements the liability appears nominal. As 
mentioned, almost half shared expenses or no money was transferred. 
Several (n=3/24) described arrangements involving transfers in the 
opposite direction to their Child Support Agency-allocated liability. These 
private agreements could indicate a ‘fairer’ negotiated outcome than the 
formal assessment of financial responsibility they replaced. (Further 
details of these arrangements are shown in Appendix B, Table B7.) 
All parents with another arrangement were treated as ‘soft’ compliant 
because a substantial minority had registered agreements and the 
remainder operated with an assessment in the background that could be 
enforced. Further, some informal agreements were essentially about the 
mode of payment in Private Collect cases. While important not to 
automatically assume that all arrangements financially benefitted the 
children, 82% of these mothers had a positive or distant relationship and 
those few with a negative relationship paid school fees, shared expenses 
or no money changed hands.128  
                                       
128 The one mother who described the relationship with her former partner as fearful 
had a registered agreement where the father paid the school fees.  
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  ‘Soft’ compliance for liable parents and payees 
Table 8.7 shows compliance and ‘soft’ compliance for all liable parents 
and payees including those with another arrangement. The pattern 
mirrors the previous compliance rate (see Table 7.5). Under this broader 
measure 91% of liable fathers, 85% of liable mothers, 69% of payee 
mothers and 66% of payee fathers reported compliance or ‘soft’ 
compliance. In contrast, 77% of liable fathers, 64% of liable mothers, 
45% of payee mothers and 39% of payee fathers reported compliance 
using the stricter measure of in full and on time.  
Table 8.7  Liable parents and payees: 
compliance and ‘soft’ compliance 
 Liable 
mothers 
n=173 
Liable 
fathers 
n=1,582 
Payee 
mothers 
n=2,130  
Payee 
fathers 
n=182 
Compliance or 
‘soft’ compliance 
(%) 
    
In full and on time 
or ‘soft’ compliance  
85.1 90.6 68.7 66.1 
Neither 14.9 9.4 31.3 33.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
p<.001     
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Includes 
parents with another arrangement and those previously missing who meet the criteria 
for ‘soft’ compliance. Excludes one payee father with another arrangement where ‘soft’ 
compliance could not be determined. Differences were significant between liable 
mothers and payee fathers (p=.021) and between liable fathers and payee mothers 
(p<.001). 
  ‘Soft’ compliance in the former couple sample 
Table 8.8 indicates the extent of concordance in the liable-mother and 
liable-father dyads on compliance and ‘soft’ compliance. As previously in 
the section covering former partner dyads and compliance (Section 7.4), 
no statistical testing is reported for the level of concordance of responses. 
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Table 8.8  Liable-mother and liable-
father dyads: concordance on reports of 
compliance and ‘soft’ compliance  
 Liable-mother dyads 
n=67 
Liable-father dyads  
n=709 
Former partners (%)   
Both former partners 
reported in full and on 
time or ‘soft’ compliance  
64.2 71.4 
Both former partners 
reported neither 
compliance or ‘soft’ 
compliance 
4.5 11.6 
Discordant reports  31.3 17.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Excludes 11 liable-mother dyads and 118 liable-father 
dyads where compliance cannot be determined for one or both parents.  
As discussed previously, in 27% of liable-mother dyads and 45% of 
liable-father dyads both former partners reported that payments were 
made in full and on time (see Table 7.7). With ‘soft’ compliance including 
other arrangements, the level of concordance increased to 64% for liable-
mother dyads and 71% for liable-father dyads. Of interest, the 
concordance on non-compliance found previously in the liable-mother 
dyads (that is, slightly higher than concordance on compliance) 
disappeared once ‘soft’ compliance was considered. Further analysis 
revealed that most (n=12/16) former couple liable mothers and payee 
fathers who both reported non-compliance using the stricter measure 
had discordant responses once a more flexible measure of ‘soft’ 
compliance was used. 
  Satisfaction and fairness of child support payment 
This section looks at satisfaction and fairness. Parents were asked to rate 
their satisfaction with the overall amount of child support they paid, or 
the way child support balances out if not currently paying, and fairness 
for the child, themselves, former partner and, if applicable, current 
partner. This area is important to examine to see if views differ between 
liable parents (and in the latter part of this section, among liable mothers 
with different parenting arrangements). Differences between liable 
parents on expected amount and parenting time suggest that fairness 
and satisfaction might also differ. 
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Nonetheless, there were no significant differences between liable parents 
on mean satisfaction or for child and personal fairness. Although 
differences in mean fairness for their former partner approached 
significance (mean=8.58/10 mothers compared with 8.18 fathers, 
p=.093), total fairness was the same (mean=17.95).129 Among the 
subgroup of repartnered parents, liable fathers had a lower score for 
fairness for their current partner (mean=4.18 compared with 6.01 for 
mothers, p=.008). (See Appendix B, Table B8 for details). 
  Differences between liable mothers: in-kind, ‘soft’ 
compliance and fairness 
Using the typology of liable mothers outlined in Chapter 6, comparisons 
were made on in-kind contributions, ‘soft’ compliance and 
satisfaction/fairness. As indicated in Table 8.9 no significant differences 
were found on frequency of in-kind contributions. This was expected as 
mothers in three of the four liable mother types have at least one child 
mainly in their household. All more-time and equal-time liable mothers 
made an in-kind contribution as did 98% of liable mothers with split-
residence. In-kind contributions were also made by 82% of less-time 
mothers.  
In contrast, significant differences were found between liable mothers for 
‘soft’ compliance. Using the typology detailed in Chapter 6, less-time 
liable mothers had the highest rate: 90% were compliant or ‘soft’ 
compliant, followed by equal-time liable mothers (87%) and split-
residence mothers (85%). More-time liable mothers had the lowest rate at 
47%. This was the same pattern as found for overall compliance and 
follows the ‘intensity’ of the mother role. 
Differences were also apparent for levels of satisfaction and personal 
fairness between liable mothers.130 Reflecting the gender lens applied to 
these analyses, significant differences on mean satisfaction and fairness 
                                       
129 A total score was calculated for parents who had valid responses on fairness for 
themselves, the child and their former partner (n=156 mothers and n=1,363 fathers). 
130 Fairness for the child was also low (2.12–5.75, p=.005) and in the same direction as 
personal fairness. Fairness for former partner was high regardless of parenting 
arrangements (8.27–9.27, p=.314). Overall fairness scores (n=156) followed the same 
pattern as personal fairness (p=.010).  
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between the four groups of liable mothers were found, with both trending 
downwards as their parenting time increased. Differences were not driven 
by parental relationship quality: those comparisons were nonsignificant. 
In contrast, liable fathers’ satisfaction and personal fairness did not differ 
significantly by parenting time (data not shown).  
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Table 8.9  Differences between liable 
mothers: in-kind contributions, ‘soft’ 
compliance, satisfaction and fairness of 
child support payment 
 Less-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=79 
Equal-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=50 
More-time 
liable 
mothers 
n=31 
Split-
residence 
liable 
mothers  
n=25 
Made any in-
kind 
contribution 
(%)  
82.0 100.0 100.0 97.7 
p=.163     
Compliance 
or ‘soft’ 
compliance 
(%) 
90.0 87.0 47/4 89.9 
p=.023     
Satisfaction 
with amount 
of child 
support paid 
(0=totally 
dissatisfied, 
10=totally 
satisfied) 
(mean) 
6.22 5.03 3.45 3.45 
SE, CI 0.47, CI 5.30–
7.13 
0.83, CI 3.40–
6.65 
0.55, CI 2.37–
4.54 
0.85, CI 1.78–
5.11 
p=.001     
Fairness of 
child support 
arrangement 
for liable 
mother 
(0=totally 
unfair, 
10=totally 
fair) (mean) 
5.48 4.45 2.89 3.47 
SE, CI 0.51, CI 4.47–
6.49 
0.93, CI 2.62–
6.28 
0.49, CI 1.93–
3.85 
0.78, CI 1.95–
5.00 
p=.003     
Notes: Data are weighted. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 
Less-time liable mothers had the highest satisfaction (mean=6.22/10 
compared with 3.45–5.03) and fairness scores (mean=5.48 compared 
with 2.89–4.45), almost double that of more-time liable mothers. 
Although equal-time liable mothers had the second highest fairness 
score, it was below mid-point (mean=4.45) and could point to issues with 
being the liable parent for these mothers. More-time liable mothers had 
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low satisfaction and personal fairness scores (and a very low score for 
fairness for the child, mean=2.12, data not shown). Split-residence liable 
mothers had the same low mean satisfaction score as more-time liable 
mothers, and reported a low personal fairness score. These low scores 
could reflect that split-residence liable mothers were required to pay 
when at least one child was mainly with them.  
  Summary 
Most (89%) liable mothers whether compliant or not provided in-kind 
support, as did all mothers who did not pay in full. In contrast, in-kind 
support was significantly higher for compliant liable fathers than non-
compliant fathers. Put simply, for liable fathers, in-kind support tended 
to accompany regular child support payment. 
Payee fathers’ reports supported those of liable mothers, with 
significantly higher concordance on reports of prescribed in-kind items 
and marginally significant concordance levels for overall in-kind 
contributions than in liable-father dyads. Overall 64% of former partners 
in the liable-mother dyads both reported that an in-kind contribution 
was made. Of note, half (51%) of former partners in the liable-mother 
dyads both reported that a prescribed item such as school fees or 
medical expenses were paid. Concordant reports among liable-father 
dyads were significantly lower at 31%. These type of expenses tend to be 
seen by payees as routine but often seen by liable fathers in the previous 
research as already covered by their child support and if paid, a ‘top-up’ 
to child support (see, for example, Hawthorne 2005). Gender role may be 
relevant here with liable mothers identifying and meeting children’s 
needs as part of the mother role—and payee fathers more often 
acknowledging this contribution. 
Overall, 85% of liable mothers and 66% of payee fathers were compliant 
using the more flexible ‘soft’ compliance measure, up from 64% and 39% 
under the stricter definition. Among liable-mother dyads 27% of former 
partners both reported that the liable mother was compliant. With ‘soft’ 
compliance, this increased to 64% including those with another 
arrangement.  
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While liable mothers and liable fathers had similar views on satisfaction 
and fairness of the child support paid or expected, within the liable 
mother subgroup mothers’ satisfaction and fairness decreased as their 
parenting-time increased. This suggests that child support payment may 
be less problematic for mothers with less time.  
The following chapter (Chapter 9) explores possible reasons for non-
compliance for liable mothers. 
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Chapter 9  Why are some liable mothers non-compliant? 
This chapter addresses the third research question: “What are the 
apparent reasons for non-compliance by liable mothers?” The analytic 
approach adopted in the present study is to model the odds of non-
compliance defined as not in full and/or not on time. To restate, non-
compliance comprises late payments, partial payments and payment of 
none of the expected amount.  
First, the theoretical approach underpinning the analyses in this chapter 
is outlined. Second, the odds of non-compliance for a range of variables 
for liable mothers are detailed. Third, a model identifying the key factors 
associated with non-compliance for liable mothers is developed. 
Reference is made where relevant to previous research findings on factors 
associated with non-compliance in liable-father cases to determine to 
what extent, if any, these apply to liable mothers.  
  Theoretical approach 
Previous research (Lyngstad 2010; Stewart 1999b, 2010) found that 
there were gender differences in child support payment between 
nonresident mothers and nonresident fathers and that traditional gender 
roles partly explained mothers’ lower payments. However, these findings 
applied to nonresident parents, and did not explicitly address non-
compliance.  
The meaning of money may be different in separated families where 
‘conventional, gendered parenting roles are abandoned, applied less 
strictly or reversed’ (Bakker & Mulder 2013: 852). Financial 
responsibilities are easier to define where caretaking roles are clearly 
reversed than for other permutations of sharing time.  
Using a feminist theoretical approach, the present study tests whether 
mothers’ compliance behaviour is related to the gendered norms of 
parenting where mothering is seen as being primarily associated with 
caregiving as the ‘pre-eminent cultural ideology of motherhood that is 
powerful, pervasive and persistent’ (Arendell 1999: 2). 
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As detailed in Chapter 7, liable mothers had lower compliance than liable 
fathers, with marginally significant differences for Private Collect and 
assessment cases. Mothers were significantly more likely to pay neither 
in full nor on time than liable fathers, and to pay none of the liability.131 
In addition, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, liable parents had different 
patterns of parenting time. Mothers were less likely to never spend time 
with the focal child and more likely to have equal-time or more with at 
least one of their children. Intragroup differences in liable mothers’ 
compliance (see Section 7.5) indicate that gender behavioural norms 
about mothering may be relevant to non-compliance. This chapter tests 
this proposition.  
Australian researchers have noted the nexus between child support and 
parenting time when the mother is the payee (Fehlberg & Smyth 2000; 
Funder 1993; Hawthorne 2005) but whether there is a relationship 
between time and money for liable mothers is untested. In one rare 
Australian study, Smyth and Ferro (2002) noted that money and time 
might be unrelated and that minority-time mothers remain involved 
regardless of child support. In their study, majority-time fathers who had 
not repartnered and reported that they received child support mainly had 
arrangements where the mother had some overnights. Smyth and Ferro 
suggested that the better financial situation of these fathers might be 
relevant. Whether this finding represented substitution of time for money 
or that mothers with more nights had no liability was not explored. 
In this chapter, logistic regression is used to test whether factors with 
significantly higher odds of non-compliance relate to the social 
expectations of the gendered role of mother as present, that is ‘emotional 
and physical availability’ (Walzer 2008: 8).  
                                       
131 Although different relationships have been found for full payment, partial payment 
and none of the expected amount paid in liable-father cases (Losoncz 2008; Meyer & 
Bartfeld 1998), numbers were too small to test with non-compliant liable mothers. 
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  Odds of non-compliance for liable mothers 
This section examines bivariate relationships between each potential 
factor and the probability of the liable mother being non-compliant 
logistic regression analyses as a first step in building a logistic regression 
model identifying the key predictors of non-compliance for liable 
mothers.  
For ease of reference it is useful to restate the way compliance is 
operationalised in the present study. To recap, compliance is payment of 
the full amount of the liability always on time.132 As explained previously, 
the compliance measure is only applicable where the expected amount of 
child support is more than $0.  
The analyses use data from 146 liable mothers with valid compliance 
information. Factors to be assessed rely on the research with liable-
father cases133 and the limited research with minority-time mothers 
detailed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. These relate to socio-demographic 
characteristics; income; parenting time; parental relationship quality; 
conflict; personal wellbeing; and fairness of the liability.  
This analysis produces odds ratios (and confidence intervals at the 95% 
level), which assess whether the probability of non-compliance is the 
same for two groups (for example, mothers with and without resident 
children). Use of the Stata svy command produces results that report a 
model F test and t statistics that take into account the survey design 
degrees of freedom to compute p-values (Statacorp 2015). Variables with 
significant odds of non-compliance are discussed. As the numbers of 
liable mothers with valid information to determine compliance (n=146), 
and those reporting non-compliance (n=54), are only of moderate size, 
                                       
132 Omitted from the analytic sample for testing the odds of non-compliance are liable 
mothers who (i) always paid on time but missing expected and/or actual; (iii) paid in 
full but did not know regularity; (iv) had missing regularity and expected and/or 
actual; and (v) had another arrangement. 
133 For example, Meyer and Bartfeld (1998) list (i) ability to pay; (ii) economic needs of 
the payee; (iii) the relationship between parents and between the parent and the 
child; and (iv) the stringency of the enforcement system. See also the Child Support 
Agency Compliance Program (Child Support Agency 2010). 
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variables that approached significance are discussed where relevant. Of 
note, some variables had substantially higher or lower odds of non-
compliance but nonetheless were not statistically significant. Some 
factors associated with non-compliance could be overlooked because of 
the modest sample size (Type II error) and some significant differences 
could disappear once the multivariate analyses are undertaken. 
Seven broad categories were examined covering: 
• liability and collection method (Section 9.2.1) 
• current circumstances (Section 9.2.2) 
• former relationship (Section 9.2.3) 
• parenting time (Section 9.2.4) 
• family dynamics (Section 9.2.5) 
• personal wellbeing (Section 9.2.6) 
• satisfaction and fairness of child support payment (Section 9.2.7) 
  Liability and collection method 
Table 9.1 shows the odds of non-compliance by liability and collection 
method. Previous Australian research with parents in liable-father cases 
found that the larger the liability, the higher the compliance (Weston 
2010). However, no statistically significant odds were found by expected 
amount, method of liability calculation, or collection method for liable 
mothers. Odds were lower (odds 0.22, p=.183) for mothers with a private 
or registered agreement for child support rather than an administrative 
assessment. However, the number of mothers with an agreement even 
when private and registered agreements were combined was small. Most 
(92%) liable mothers with valid compliance information had an 
administrative assessment. When the two very small groups of mothers 
with agreements were examined separately, it became apparent that 
mothers with a registered agreement (n=8) had lower but non-significant 
odds of non-compliance (odds 0.76, p=.811, data not shown) but all 
mothers with a private agreement (n=8) were compliant. These differences 
were concealed by combining the two agreement groups together, that is, 
conceptual lumping.  
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Table 9.1  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to the liability 
Factor 
Odds of being 
non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Assessment or 
private/registered 
agreement 
(ref: assessment) 
agreement 0.22 0.25 0.03–2.03 –1.33 p=.183 
Collection 
method 
(ref: Private 
Collect)  
Child Support 
Collect 
1.13 0.72 0.32–3.97 0.19 p=.849 
Expected annual 
child support 
For each $10 
increase in 
annual liability 
1.00 0.00 0.999–
1.001 
0.59 p=.553 
Notes: Data are weighted. Odds of 1.00 may not equal exactly 1.00 due to rounding. 
n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 
  Socio-demographic circumstances 
Table 9.2 details the odds of non-compliance for socio-demographic 
factors.  
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Table 9.2  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to socio-
demographic circumstances  
Factor 
Odds of 
being non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Household 
composition 
(ref: alone or 
only with 
other adults) 
resident 
children 
and no 
partner 
1.63 1.27 0.35–
7.51 
0.63 p=.532 
 
partner and 
no resident 
children 
0.36 0.30 0.07–
1.83 
–1.23 p=.218 
 
partner and 
resident 
children 
1.95 1.88 0.29–
12.93 
0.69 p=.490 
Has a resident 
child  
(ref: no 
resident child) 
resident 
child 
2.95 1.87 0.85–
10.23 
1.71 p=.088 
Biological 
children from 
more than one 
relationship1 
(ref: former 
relationship 
children only) 
children 
from more 
than one 
relationship 
0.14 0.10 0.06–
0.58 
–2.73 p=.006 
Has degree or 
higher 
qualification 
(ref: no) 
yes 0.70 0.43 0.21–
2.31 
–0.59 p=.553 
Hours worked 
per week 
For each 
additional 
hour  
1.02 0.02 0.99–
1.06 
1.46 p=.146 
Main income 
source 
(ref: salary or 
wages) 
self-
employment 
or other 
10.88 10.06 1.77–
66.68 
2.58 p=.010 
 
government 
payment 
0.18 0.16 0.03–
0.999 
–1.96 p=.050 
Net annual 
personal 
income  
For each 
$100 
increase in 
income 
1.00 0.00 0.998–
1.002 
0.21 p=.830 
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Factor 
Odds of 
being non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Net annual 
household 
income  
For each 
$100 
increase in 
income 
1.00 0.00 0.998–
1.001 
–0.16 p=.874 
Self-assessed 
poor financial 
circumstances  
(ref: just 
getting along 
or better) 
poor or very 
poor 
2.34 1.65 0.59–
9.31 
1.20 p=.229 
Experienced 
hardship in 
last 12 
months 
(ref: no) 
yes 0.52 0.33 0.15–
1.83 
–1.03 p=.305 
Notes: Data are weighted. Odds of 1.00 may not equal exactly 1.00 due to rounding. 
n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 1. Biological 
children include adopted children but not stepchildren. 
Household composition was not significant. However, having a child in 
the household marginally increased the odds of non-compliance with the 
presence of a resident child almost tripling the odds of being non-
compliant (odds 2.95, p=.088). Further, mothers with children from more 
than one previous relationship (n=22) had significantly lower odds than 
those with former relationship children only.  
Contrary to expectations based on the literature discussed in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 (see, for example, Babcock 1998; Bemiller 2005; Greif 
1986; Herrerias 1995; McMurray 1992; Wolffs & Shallcross 2000), low 
capacity to pay did not appear relevant. Odds of non-compliance did not 
differ significantly as hours of work increased (odds 1.02, p=.146) nor as 
income increased.134 However, liable mothers receiving government 
payments (n=12) had significantly lower odds of non-compliance than 
those receiving salary or wages (odds 0.18, p=.050). This could be 
                                       
134 Both net annual personal income and net annual household income significantly 
decreased the odds of non-compliance for liable fathers for each $100 increase in 
income. 
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because all these mothers had a Child Support Collect case and 
deductions from their government payments for child support were 
routinely put in place.  
In contrast, mothers whose main income was self-employment or other 
non-wage source (n=11) had significantly higher odds of being non-
compliant than mothers whose main income was salary and wages (odds 
10.88, p=.010), consistent with previous research with liable fathers 
(Atkinson & McKay 2005; Boden & Corden 1998; Murray Woods and 
Associates 1997). This demonstrates hard to enforce compliance among 
those with irregular, and here quite low, income.  
  Former relationship 
Research with liable-father cases suggests that factors measuring 
relationship commitment such as prior marital status and years together 
were factors associated with compliance in liable-father cases (Atkinson 
& McKay 2005; Losoncz 2007). As Table 9.3 indicates, only years 
separated had increased odds of non-compliance and these were 
marginally higher (odds 1.17, p=.069). This finding could be related to a 
reduction in compliance as time passes but data were not collected about 
how long parents had been liable and other explanations could apply.  
Odds were significantly higher if the liable mother reported that her 
former partner had repartnered where known (odds 3.48, p=.047). Once 
new or stepchildren were considered odds were marginally higher where 
their former partner had repartnered and had no new or stepchild. 
However, this four-level variable was nonsignificant overall. This may be 
because of lack of statistical power.  
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Table 9.3  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to the former 
relationship 
Factor Odds of 
being non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Previously 
married 
(ref: yes) 
no 1.51 1.30 0.28–
8.13 
0.48 p=.630 
Years together For each 
additional 
year  
0.97 0.05 0.88–
1.07 
–0.64 p=.522 
Number of 
former 
relationship 
children 
For each 
additional 
child 
1.40 0.52 0.67–
2.91 
0.90 p=.371 
Age of 
youngest child 
For each 
additional 
year 
1.04 0.08 0.90–
1.21 
0.54 p=.590 
Years 
separated 
For each 
additional 
year  
1.17 0.10 0.99–
1.38 
1.82 p=.069 
Employment 
of former 
partner 
(ref: in paid 
employment) 
self-employed  0.65 0.53 0.13–
3.26 
–0.53 p=.598 
 not in paid 
employment  
1.84 1.46 0.39–
8.67 
0.77 p=.439 
 don’t know 2.73 2.96 0.33–
22.76 
0.93 p=.353 
Former 
partner 
repartnered1 
(ref: no) 
yes 3.48 2.18 1.01–
11.91 
1.98 p=.047 
Former 
partner 
repartnered 
with a 
new/stepchild 
(ref: not 
repartnered)2 
repartnered 
and no 
new/stepchild 
5.52 5.25 0.86–
35.57 
1.80 p=.072 
 repartnered 
and a 
new/stepchild  
2.63 1.70 0.74–
9.34 
1.50 p=.134 
 don’t know 5.08 5.06 0.72–
35.90 
1.63 p=.104 
Notes: Data are weighted. n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables may be less due 
to missing data. 1. ‘Don’t know’ responses (n=15) are treated as missing. Odds were the 
same when ‘don’t know’ was included as a discrete category. 
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  Parenting time 
Recent Australian research indicates a positive relationship between 
parenting-time and liable fathers’ compliance (Qu & Weston 2013; Qu et 
al. 2014) with fathers who rarely spent time with their child having the 
lowest compliance. In contrast, more time was related to non-compliance 
for liable mothers regardless of how the time was measured.  
As indicated in Table 9.4, odds of non-compliance increased with each 
additional night the focal child spent with the mother. Comparisons 
using original Scheme categories are not reported as this produced 
subgroups too small for valid comparisons.135 Instead, testing using a 
dichotomous variable (less than one night a week/one night a week or 
more) revealed that liable mothers who had at least one overnight a week 
with the focal child were six times more likely to be non-compliant than 
those with fewer nights.  
  
                                       
135 Compared with mothers who had minor time, odds of non-compliance were higher 
for all other Scheme time categories. Numbers of mothers with substantial, major and 
sole time and who had valid compliance information were small (n=8–14). Differences 
were significant for mothers with sole-time. 
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Table 9.4  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to the former 
relationship children  
Factor 
Odds of 
being 
non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Mother’s 
nights with 
child in last 
12 months  
For each 
additional 
night  
1.01 0.003 1.004–
1.01 
3.66 p=.0003 
Mother’s 
overnights per 
week  
(ref: less than 
one) 
one or more 
a week 
5.85 3.93 1.57–
21.85 
2.63 p=.009 
Arrangements 
of former 
relationship 
children  
(ref: children 
mainly with 
father) 
Children 
mainly with 
mother 
15.76 15.89 2.18–
113.84 
2.73 p=.006 
 
equal-time 1.89 1.28 0.50–
7.12 
1.94 p=.349 
 
split-
residence 
5.92 4.69 1.25–
28.01 
2.24 p=.025 
Split-residence 
(ref: no) 
yes 3.62 2.89 0.76–
17.34 
1.61 p=.108 
Notes: Data are weighted. n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables are less due to 
missing data. ‘Child’ means focal child. ‘Former relationship children’ mean those aged 
18 years or younger. 
When all former relationship children were considered, odds of non-
compliance were higher where the mother had more-time, equal-time and 
split-residence compared with less-time, although equal-time did not 
reach significance. Odds were highest for mothers who had all children 
mainly with them.  
Of note, higher odds for split-residence mothers were nonsignificant 
when the reference group was same arrangement for all siblings (odds 
3.62, p=.108). The small numbers of split-residence mothers (n=20) with 
valid compliance information may play a role.  
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  Family dynamics 
Nonresident fathers who have a cooperative relationship with their 
former partner are more compliant (see, for example, Andrews et al. 
2011; Bradshaw et al. 1999; Ryan 1991; Skinner 2002; Sonenstein & 
Calhoun 1990). As Table 9.5 shows, parental relationship quality in the 
last 12 months (with ‘cooperative’ as the reference group); ‘great deal or 
some’ general conflict136; and whether the mother used a lawyer or 
mediation service (here a proxy for conflict in early separation) were 
nonsignificant. The latter is not surprising as the majority (74%) of liable 
mothers had legal or other intervention. Compared with mothers with a 
cooperative relationship, those with a fearful relationship had 
marginally lower odds (odds 0.13, p=.058). However, when fearful 
mothers were compared with all other liable mothers (as a group), odds 
of non-compliance were significantly lower (odds 0.22, p=.027).  
  
                                       
136 As detailed in Section 4.4.1, conflict was measured by a dichotomous variable (‘great 
deal/some’ and ‘very little/none’) to maximise power.  
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Table 9.5  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to family dynamics  
Factor 
Odds of 
being non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Parental 
relationship 
quality in the 
last 12 
months 
(ref: 
cooperative) 
friendly 0.22 0.25 0.02–
2.01 
–1.35 p=.178 
 
distant 0.57 0.66 0.06–
5.54 
–0.48 p=.629 
 
lots of 
conflict 
0.63 0.67 0.08–
5.07 
–0.44 p=.661 
 
fearful 0.13 0.14 0.02–
1.07 
–1.89 p=.058 
Fearful 
(ref: no) 
yes 0.22 0.15 0.06–
0.84 
–2.22 p=.027 
Great deal or 
some conflict 
in the last 12 
months1 
(ref: great deal 
or some) 
very little or 
none 
1.40 0.94 0.37–
5.217 
0.50 p=.620 
Used lawyer or 
mediation 
(ref: no)  
yes 2.59 1.82 0.65–
10.31 
1.35 p=.176 
Conflict over 
money in last 
12 months2 
(ref: frequently 
or sometimes 
argued) 
rarely or 
never 
argued or 
did not talk 
about 
money 
5.54 3.33 1.71–
18.01 
2.85 p=.004 
Emotionally 
very close to 
child3 
(ref: yes)  
no 1.38 0.82 0.43–
4.42 
0.55 p=.583 
Distance 
between 
parents’ 
houses 
For each 
additional 
km apart 
1.00 0.00 0.999–
1.001 
0.94 p=.346 
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Factor 
Odds of 
being non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
How well 
parenting 
arrangements 
working for 
liable mother 
(ref: working 
well) 
not working 
well 
0.26 0.16 0.08–
0.85 
–2.23 p=.025 
Notes: Data are weighted. Odds of 1.00 may not equal exactly 1.00 due to rounding. 
n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables may be less due to missing data. ‘Child’ 
means focal child. 1. ‘Great deal or some’ includes ‘varies’. ‘Very little or none’ includes 
‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 2. ‘Did not talk about money’ 
includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 3. Emotional closeness 
was not asked if either parent never saw the focal child.  
Conflict over money was related to non-compliance but not as expected. 
Significantly higher odds (odds 5.54, p=.004) were found for liable 
mothers who rarely or never argued over money or did not talk about 
money than those with frequent or some arguments.  
Emotional closeness, a factor relevant to compliance in liable-father 
cases (Davis & Wikeley 2002), was nonsignificant. Odds were 
significantly lower for liable mothers who felt that the arrangements were 
not working well for them. This finding indicates a reverse relationship 
for liable mothers between satisfaction with parenting arrangements and 
compliance than found in research with parents in liable-father cases 
(see, for example, Alderson-Gill and Associates 2003; Arditti & Keith 
1993; Atkinson & McKay 2005).  
  Personal wellbeing 
Table 9.6 focuses on the liable mother’s wellbeing. The odds of non-
compliance did not differ significantly for life satisfaction or personal 
wellbeing. 
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Table 9.6  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to personal 
wellbeing 
Factor 
Odds of 
being 
non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Life satisfaction  
For each 
incremental 
increase  
1.04 0.16 0.77–
1.39 
0.24 p=.807 
Personal wellbeing  
For each 
incremental 
increase  
1.22 0.18 0.91–
1.64 
1.33 p=.184 
Notes: Data are weighted. n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables are less due to 
missing data. 
  Satisfaction and fairness of the child support payment 
As Table 9.7 indicates, satisfaction with payment amount and fairness of 
child support had no significant impact on non-compliance for liable 
mothers. This is in contrast to the positive relationship between fairness 
and compliance found in research for liable fathers (Davis & Wikeley 
2002; Lin 2000). Significant variation in satisfaction and fairness 
scores for liable mothers across different parenting arrangements 
(see Table 8.9) could be relevant to the nonsignificant results. 
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Table 9.7  Liable mothers: odds of non-
compliance related to satisfaction and 
fairness of child support payment 
Factor 
Odds of 
being 
non-
compliant 
(where 
reference 
group 
odds=1) 
Odds SE 95% 
conf. 
interval 
t p>t 
Satisfaction 
with amount of 
child support 
paid 
For each 
incremental 
increase  
0.95 0.07 0.82–1.10 –0.69 p=.493 
Fairness of 
child support 
for liable 
mother 
For each 
incremental 
increase 
1.01 0.08 0.87–1.17 0.11 p=.911 
Notes: Data are weighted. n=146 mothers. Numbers for some variables are less due to 
missing data 
  Modelling of the key predictors of non-compliance for liable 
mothers 
To sum up, liable mothers had significantly higher odds of non-
compliance in the bivariate analyses if they had: (i) more overnights with 
the focal child; (ii) all children mainly with them or in split-residence; (iii) 
a former partner who had repartnered; (iv) self-employment as their main 
income source; and (v) low conflict over money. Odds were marginally 
higher for mothers with a resident child; for each additional year since 
separation; and if their former partner had repartnered with no new or 
stepchildren rather than not repartnered. Lower odds applied if they had: 
(i) biological children from more than one relationship; (ii) government 
payment as their main income; (iii) arrangements that were not working 
well for them; and (iv) a fearful parental relationship.  
Notably, all liable mothers with a private agreement (n=8) were 
compliant. This latter factor was precluded from being considered in the 
logistic modelling of non-compliance as it perfectly predicted failure (odds 
1.00). This result may be because of the small size of the sample 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2001: 522) and would need to be tested with a 
larger sample to see if this association still held.  
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To determine the appropriate variables to use in the modelling that will 
as a set predict non-compliance for liable mothers, significant and 
marginally significant137 variables were examined for the possibility of 
multicollinearity, that is, a strong relationship between variables (see 
Tabachnick & Fidell 2001: 522-523). As the present study’s theoretical 
framework proposed that enacting the mother role would matter for liable 
mothers’ non-compliance and, as shown in Chapter 6, there are 
significant differences within the liable mother group relating to 
parenting-time, significant variables were first tested to confirm whether 
they were strongly associated with overnights. (Variables that directly 
measured parenting time such as equal-time with focal child and 
arrangements for all former relationship children were not tested.) It was 
determined that having a resident child and reporting that the parenting 
arrangements for the focal child were working well were associated with 
more overnights. Further, time since separation was associated with 
whether the former partner had repartnered. As the latter variable had 
substantial missing data (n=19 did not know the repartnering status), 
this variable was omitted from the modelling. All other variables were not 
strongly associated with another variable considered for the models.  
Logistic regression modelling was used to determine the predictors of 
non-compliance for liable mothers. The dependent variable was 1=non-
compliance, 0=compliance. The model predicts the probability that the 
liable mother is non-compliant. As all measures of parenting-time had 
significantly higher odds of non-compliance when the liable mother had 
more time, one measure of parenting-time was chosen for the final 
model: the mother’s overnights with the focal child.  
As in the previous logistic regression analyses (see Section 5.3.1), 
significant and marginally significant variables were considered for 
inclusion in the logistic regression modelling. Six variables were originally 
selected as predictors: (i) overnights, (ii) conflict over money, (iii) main 
                                       
137 Former partner repartnered with a new/stepchild was not tested as former partner 
repartnered (a significant variable) substantially covers this concept, only one category 
was marginally significant and it was nonsignificant overall. 
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income source; (iv) time since separation; (v) fearful parental 
relationship138; and (vi) biological children from more than one 
relationship. Although this model was significant overall (F=4.95, 
p<.001), the addition of the latter two variables did not provide any 
additional predictive power. Both were nonsignificant once conflict over 
money was included in the modelling. Time since separation was 
marginally significant (p=.064) as was low conflict over money (p=.059) 
controlling for the other variables. Overnights and self-employment were 
significant (p<.001) although the latter had very high odds and a wide 
confidence interval (odds 59.94, CI 9.24–388.79)139. (A model with these 
six predictors is shown at Appendix B, Table B9.)  
The final model (Model 1) shows the odds of non-compliance for each 
additional overnight with the focal child140 and low conflict over money. 
Overnights with the focal child was chosen to reflect the ‘intensity’ of day-
to-day involvement in mothering. This model was statistically significant 
(p<.001) confirming the working hypothesis that non-compliance for 
liable mothers was associated with the intensity of the mother role. 
Table 9.8 details the results of the modelling.   
                                       
138 The fearful relationship variable was chosen to represent parental relationship 
quality rather than the five-level relationship quality variable as the former was 
significant while the latter was marginally significant. 
139 This variable was included because of its importance to the analysis. Discussion on 
the inclusion of this variable in the modelling is outlined later in this section.  
140 Details of a model using the parenting-time with all former relationship children 
measure (an alternative measure of intensity of mothering) is shown at Appendix B, 
Table B10. This model was significant overall (p=.001). Liable mothers with more-time, 
and equal-time had significantly higher odds of non-compliance and split-residence 
liable mothers had marginally higher odds. Low conflict over money had significantly 
higher odds of non-compliance.  
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Table 9.8  Logistic regression model of 
odds of non-compliance for liable 
mothers: Model 1 
Factor Odds ratios  
Mother’s overnights with the focal child in last 12 
months 
(for each additional night) 
1.01 
(p<.001) 
Conflict over money in last 12 months 
(ref: frequently or sometimes argued) 
rarely or never argued or did not talk about money  
6.59 
(p=.002) 
Number of liable mothers 143 
F  
11.68 
F(2, 5002) 
Prob> F p<.001 
Notes: Data are weighted. ‘Did not talk about money’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 
months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 
To summarise, for each additional overnight the mother spent with the 
focal child, odds of non-compliance increased by 1% and were 6.6 times 
higher for mothers with low conflict over money. 
An alternative model (Model 1a) is shown at Table 9.9. This model 
includes two variables omitted from Model 1. This is shown to illustrate 
the impact of having self-employment as the main income source. One 
consequence is that the number of cases in Model 1a drop to 137. The 
other result is the very large odds and wide confidence intervals for self-
employed liable mothers (n=11 with compliance information) reflect the 
small cell sizes. Numbers with a main source of government payments 
were also low (n=12). Issues of sparse data were exacerbated when other 
predictors were added to Model 1a. Nonetheless, this was not extensive 
enough to cause failure of convergence.141 Variables with wide confidence 
intervals because of sparse data can be used in logistic regression if they 
are important to the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell 2001). Moreover, large 
odds can mean a large effect (Greenland, Schwartzbaum & Finkle 2000). 
This is probably the case here as 86% of self-employed liable mothers 
were non-compliant—although it is unlikely to be of the magnitude 
                                       
141 Stata provides a warning where convergence is not possible (de Irala, Navajas & del 
Castillio 1997). 
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shown in Model 1a. Results from this variable should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
Time since separation, the other additional variable in Model 1a, was 
nonsignificant when the other three variables were considered. 142 
Because of these reservations, and to maximise numbers of cases with 
the least number of predictors necessary, Model 1 at Table 9.8 which 
omits main income source (and, as a consequence, time since separation) 
is preferred. 
Table 9.9  Logistic regression model of 
odds of non-compliance for liable 
mothers: Model 1a  
Factor Odds ratios  
Mother’s overnights with the focal child in last 12 
months 
(for each additional night) 
1.01 
(p<.001) 
Conflict over money in last 12 months 
(ref: frequently or sometimes argued) 
rarely or never argued or did not talk about money  
4.25 
(p=.026) 
Main income source 
(ref: salary or wages) 
self-employed/other 
65.63 
(p<.001) 
government income support 
1.00 
(p=.999) 
Time since separation 
1.13 
(p=.078) 
Number of liable mothers 137 
F  
6.94 
F(5, 4,993) 
Prob> F p<.001 
  Discussion 
Overnights with the focal child and low conflict over money together 
predicted non-compliance for liable mothers. This section examines these 
two predictors in more detail and discusses two factors (financial 
circumstances and positive parental relationships) found to predict 
compliance in the research with liable-father cases but nonsignificant for 
liable mothers in the present study.  
                                       
142 Once main income source was omitted from the model, time since separation which 
was marginally significant in the model with six predictors (see Appendix B, Table B9) 
moved to nonsignificant (p=.382) and was also removed from the final model (Model 1). 
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Of note, one limitation of the bivariate analyses above, and the logistic 
modelling, was that some variables had small subgroups and therefore 
lacked statistical power to test relationships. Further, some variables 
with significantly higher odds of non-compliance had categories with 
large confidence intervals. Results for these variables, and the discussion 
below, should be read with this caution in mind. 
  Non-compliance and parenting time 
Liable mothers’ compliance decreased with the number of overnights, as 
illustrated in Figure 9.1 below.  
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Figure 9-1 Liable mother compliance by 
overnights per week with focal child  
Mothers’ non-compliance could be interpreted as substitution of time for 
money and enacting the socially expected, gendered mother role. This 
finding indicates a different association between time and money to that 
found in the research with liable-father cases where regular payment of 
child support was positively associated with time spent with children 
(see, for example, Amato 2010; Graham & Beller 2002; Juby, Le 
Bourdais & Marcil-Gratton 2005). Further, non-compliant fathers 
frequently report no time with children or maternal gatekeeping as 
reasons for non-compliance (see, for example, Bradshaw et al. 1999; 
Dubey 1995; Dudley 1991; Mandell 1995a). While the recent Australian 
research on compliance and parenting time noted that shared-time 
liable fathers had similar high compliance to those with less time (see, 
for example, Qu & Weston 2010; Qu et al. 2014)143 this research showed 
that payee mothers reported significantly lower compliance for fathers 
with no time.  
                                       
143 While the small group of equal-time liable fathers reported slightly lower compliance 
in one wave of this study (Qu & Weston 2010), their compliance was the same as 
fathers with no time and nonsignificant.  
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The association between overnights and compliance for mothers needs to 
take into account different patterns of parenting for liable mothers and 
liable fathers. As noted previously, 43% of liable mothers had substantial 
time or more with the focal child. In contrast, this applied to 17% of 
liable fathers.144 Further, mothers with no overnights (including those 
who spent no time with the focal child in the last 12 months) had the 
highest compliance of all liable mothers. While the odds of non-
compliance for liable fathers did not differ as overnights increased, odds 
increased significantly as the frequency of face-to-face contact decreased. 
Fathers who saw their child at least fortnightly had lower odds of non-
compliance than those who saw their child less frequently (odds 0.55, 
p=.024, data not shown).  
While it is clear that more parenting-time is associated with non-
compliance, the small numbers of liable mothers in the present study 
who made a late payment (n=26), a partial payment (n=7) or paid none of 
the expected amount (n=17) precluded a detailed analysis of non-
compliance separately for these three subgroups. There may be a 
different relationship between factors that affect late payment and not 
paying in full, or at all. There is some evidence for this view as it is 
probable (as foreshadowed in Section 7.5), that liable mothers who paid 
none of the expected amount had more parenting-time with all their 
children.145  
  Split-residence 
The significantly higher odds of non-compliance for the substantial 
minority of liable mothers with split-residence (27% of liable mothers 
with compliance information) is interesting. This group comprised 
mothers with at least one child in shared or majority-time and therefore 
                                       
144 These two figures are based on liable parents with valid compliance information and 
thus may differ slightly from the figures that apply to the full sample of liable parents 
detailed in Chapter 5.  
145 A comparison of the odds of a liable mother paying none of the expected amount 
showed that compared with a majority-time liable mother, liable mothers with equal or 
more-time with all their children were significantly more likely to pay none of the 
expected amount: equal-time odds 24.35 (p=.007) and more-time odds 155.15 
(p<.001).  
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performing the role of mother as ‘present’. As indicated in Table 7.9, non-
compliant split-residence mothers mainly paid in full but late.146 It is 
possible that different factors affect late payment. The high rate of late 
payment among split-residence liable mothers may have occurred by 
chance. Further research on different types of non-compliance with 
larger datasets of liable mothers may clarify this. 
  Arguments about money 
The finding of higher odds of non-compliance among liable mothers who 
rarely argued about money was surprising. While it was first considered 
that this finding reflected the concentration of liable mothers in Child 
Support Collect, where ‘choice’ to comply is less relevant and payments 
can be enforced, having a Child Support Collect case is unlikely to be the 
main reason for this finding. Collection method was nonsignificant (odds 
1.13, p=.849) and the compliance rate was similar regardless of collection 
method (64–67%).147  
Research with minority-time fathers (Philip 2014) suggests that low 
conflict can be treated as a proxy for trust, that is, the liable fathers 
trusts the payee mother to spend child support appropriately. Issues of 
trust and lack of control over how child support is spent are common 
reasons for non-payment for liable fathers in Australia (see, for example, 
Hawthorne & Lennings 2008; Natalier & Hewitt 2010) and internationally 
(see, for example, Dubey 1995; Mandell 1995b).  
Here liable mothers with cooperative relationships and low conflict over 
money had the lowest compliance which suggests that other reasons for 
the association with non-compliance could apply. For example, liable 
mothers’ smaller expected amounts, in-kind contributions, or more 
overnights requiring more direct spending on the child, could be relevant. 
                                       
146 Split-residence liable mothers were significantly more likely to pay late than other 
liable mothers (40% paid late compared with 10% less-time, 7% equal-time and 4% 
more-time liable mothers, p=.028) based on a cross-tabulation of late payment by 
liable mother group types.  
147 This may also reflect that, apart from government payments, deductions from salary 
and wages and other non-voluntary methods of collection are not routinely used until 
the liable parent defaults on regular payments.  
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This makes sense as liable mothers with more nights had the least 
arguments about money.  
  Income and employment  
Vnuk (2010) in her review of the previous literature hypothesised that 
‘inability to pay’ would be a factor in compliance for liable mothers in 
Australia. Referring to the scant literature on liable mothers, Vnuk noted 
the generally low incomes of minority-time mothers even when employed. 
These mothers frequently rely on income support and, as highlighted by 
the research in Chapter 2, are concentrated at the lower end of the 
liability continuum.  
The research with liable-father cases in the US highlight the role of 
income as a predictor of non-compliance (Meyer & Bartfeld 1994; 
Sonenstein & Calhoun 1990), with affordability frequently reported by 
fathers as a reason for their non-compliance in the US (Dubey 1995; 
Dudley 1991) and in Australia (Blamey & Sutton 1999).148  
Contrary to the research with liable-father cases and the scant research 
on mothers’ payment of child support that focused only on nonresident 
mothers, self-reported ‘poor’ financial circumstances, low income and 
lack of paid employment—factors that featured in the international 
qualitative literature outlined in Chapter 3 as reasons for non-payment—
did not significantly increase the odds of non-compliance for liable 
mothers. Two reasons may account for this finding. First, the present 
study used a strict definition of compliance rather than the broader 
‘payment’ category. Second, liable mothers in Australia are not 
equivalent to nonresident (minority-time) mothers covered in the 
international literature. As emphasised previously, only 54% of liable 
mothers with compliance information fit into the definition of a minority-
time mother, that is do not have at least equal-time with one or more of 
their children.  
                                       
148 A review of the compliance literature informing the Canadian child support system 
(Alderson-Gill and Associates 1999) reiterated the role of willingness to pay. 
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Of the two possible explanations, the second one may be the more likely. 
Being the liable parent but not having minority-time of all former 
relationship children indicates that you are the higher income parent in 
the case. The inclusion of this substantial subgroup (46% of all liable 
mothers) could cancel out the impact of low income minority-time 
mothers. Mothers with the lowest incomes (and thus the lowest capacity 
to pay) are the least able to avoid being compliant. These were minority-
time liable mothers reliant on a government payment as their main 
income source. They had lower odds of non-compliance because, unlike 
deductions from wages and salary, deductions are routinely set up for 
parents with Child Support Collect (here, all liable mothers relying on 
government payments). Further, government payments became 
nonsignificant once overnights were considered suggesting that parenting 
time plays a role.  
As shown in Model 1a, non-compliance was high for self-employed 
mothers. Other variables indicate that self-employed liable mothers were 
a disadvantaged group with high levels of hardship. Of note, most (91%) 
self-employed mothers reported low conflict over money and this might 
be applicable. This is the sole predictor of non-compliance that appears 
to be gender-neutral. Analysis of liable fathers’ non-compliance shows 
increased odds for self-employed fathers (odds 3.16, p<.001, data not 
shown). 
  Parental relationship quality 
While parental relationship quality predicts compliance in the research 
with liable-father cases (Bell, Kazimirski & La Valle 2006; Ryan 1991; 
Teachman 1991; Walter 2002), and in the UK is seen as the key driver of 
compliance behaviour (Andrews et al. 2011; Skinner 2013), the 
association with amicable relationships was positive. Research with 
payee mothers (see, for example, Zubrick et al. 2008) found a significant 
linear relationship between conflict and full payment. Here, liable 
mothers with negative relationships had the lowest odds of non-
compliance. Most (87%) fearful mothers were compliant. They had 
significantly lower odds of non-compliance (odds 0.22, p=.027) when 
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compared with liable mothers who did not describe their relationship as 
fearful. Odds became nonsignificant once conflict over money was 
considered in the modelling (see Appendix B, Table B9). This suggests 
that conflict over money may overlap with having a fearful relationship: 
40% of fearful mothers reported that money frequently or sometimes 
caused arguments.  
  Summary 
This chapter explored the factors that affected the odds of non-
compliance in liable-mother cases. Results revealed an association 
between parenting time and non-compliance for liable mothers. Odds 
increased with each additional overnight with the focal child. This 
relationship also held when all former relationship children were 
considered, odds were higher for more-time and split-residence mothers 
and marginally higher for equal-time mothers than for mothers with all 
children mainly with their father. Parenting time together with low 
conflict over money as a set predicted non-compliance.  
Further, in the smaller subgroups, all mothers with private agreements 
were compliant.149 Of course, this result may have occurred by chance. 
The few mothers with self-employment as their main income source had 
significantly higher odds of non-compliance. Self-employment was the 
one factor predicting non-compliance equally applicable to liable mothers 
and liable fathers. 
The next and final chapter (Chapter 10) summarises the key findings 
from each chapter in the context of the study’s feminist theoretical 
approach and provides insights for policy, service delivery, and future 
research. 
 
  
                                       
149 This factor could not be added to the logistic model as it perfectly predicted failure. 
   
231 
 
Chapter 10  Conclusion and future directions 
Child support compliance continues to attract considerable policy 
interest in Australia and internationally, as evidenced by the 2014 
Australian parliamentary inquiry into the Child Support Program (House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 
2015), and the 2016 UK Parliamentary inquiry. Low levels of compliance 
undermine the viability of any scheme, and put children at greater risk of 
child poverty.  
A commonly held view in Australia—especially by fathers’ groups—is that 
mothers with a child support liability ’never pay’.150 The present study 
sought to investigate whether this was indeed the case and, if so, why.  
Three research questions guided the study:  
Question 1: “What are the characteristics of mothers with a child support 
liability in Australia and what are the key differences between liable 
mothers and liable fathers?” 
Question 2: “Are liable mothers less compliant than liable fathers?”  
Question 3: “What are the apparent reasons for non-compliance by liable 
mothers?”  
These questions were addressed using data from the Child Support 
Reform Study. As the CSRS data were from a representative sample of 
separated parents with an active child support case in Australia, the 
findings can be generalised to the child support caseload. A feminist-
informed quantitative methodology was used to answer these questions. 
One of the strengths of quantitative research for policy analysis is that ‘it 
allows the understanding of patterns’ (Burkinshaw 2013: 237) and 
typically provides a more reliable basis for social change than anecdotal 
evidence (Sprague & Zimmerman 1993). This methodological approach is 
                                       
150 See, for example, the comments under the article ‘”Deadbeat dads” face fines in sweeping 
changes to child support’ (Bita 2015). 
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influenced by Risman (1993: 20) who points out that a methodology is 
feminist ‘if it can be used to further gender equity’.  
Feminist theory asserts that gender is socially constructed. As outlined 
in Chapter 1, it is not just men and women who are shaped by gender 
roles but specifically mothers and fathers. Behavioural norms for ‘good’ 
mothers and ‘good’ fathers differ. Mothers are expected to invest in their 
child and to be ever-present and all-caring (Ennis 2014; Hays 1996).  
While there is substantial feminist research on child support, this body 
of work mostly focuses on mothers as payees as this is the more common 
role for separated mothers and assumes a less-time father and a more-
time mother division of care. The present study makes a contribution to 
the feminist-informed research on separated mothers more generally, 
and to child support policy and its impact on separated mothers more 
specifically. It shows how applying a feminist approach to child support 
can be used to explore a wider range of mothering and liability (i.e., liable 
mothers) in the context of the pervasiveness of ‘hegemonic motherhood’ 
(Arendell 1999). In particular, it illuminates the role of male power and 
gendered patterns of parenting—both caregiving and employment—that 
influence the movement of mothers into the liable parent role and their 
child support compliance.  
I now summarise the answers to the three research questions. The 
implications of the research findings are then discussed in the context of 
a gender lens on contemporary child support policy and practice. 
  Question 1: What are the characteristics of mothers with a 
child support liability in Australia?  
Mothers with a liability are not a single homogenous group. That said, 
several factors characterised many of these mothers.  
First, liable mothers were still very engaged with their children: over half 
(57%) of liable mothers had at least one resident child while almost half 
(46%) had equal-time or more-time with a least one former relationship 
child. Liable mothers who had no resident children spent an average of 
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55 nights with the focal child in the previous 12 months: only three per 
cent spent no time with this child.  
Second, liable mothers were less likely to be in paid employment and to 
work full-time than liable fathers. They were marginally less likely than 
liable fathers to report self-employment as their main income source but 
they were significantly more likely to have a self-employed former 
partner.  
Third, more than one-in-three liable mothers described the relationship 
with their former partner in negative terms with 18% ‘fearful’. Further, 
cases with a liable mother were less likely to have parenting 
arrangements determined by the mother than when the father was liable.  
A final key characteristic was that liable mother cases generally involved 
older children: the youngest child in around two-thirds (65%) of these 
cases was aged 11 years or older.  
As there is little known about the composition of this group of separated 
mothers in Australia, a liable mother typology was developed for the 
present study. The typology is based on time with former-relationship 
children aged 18 years or younger representing the intensity of the 
mothering role: (i) less than half of the time (‘less-time’), (ii) ‘equal-time’, 
(iii) more than half of the time (‘more-time’), and (iv) ‘split-residence’. Two 
key findings emerged: (i) a lower rate employment (and consequently 
lower income) among less-time liable mothers with almost half (48%) not 
in paid employment compared with 3–11% in the other three subgroups 
of liable mothers; and (ii) wellbeing and positive family dynamics—
particularly satisfaction with the workability of the parenting 
arrangements and the frequency of arguments about money—generally 
had a positive relationship with time. In other words, liable mothers 
enacting a role that more closely matched the gendered norm of ‘good’ 
mothering reported higher satisfaction and personal wellbeing. 
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  Question 2: Are liable mothers less compliant than liable 
fathers?  
Whether there are differences in compliance between liable mothers and 
liable fathers depends on the way in which compliance is defined 
operationally, and whether financial and other contributions are 
considered. For example, most liable mothers made some in-kind 
payment towards the costs of their child. 
When compliance was measured as ‘paid in full and on time’, there was 
no statistically significant difference between liable mothers’ and liable 
fathers’ compliance rate (64% for mothers; 77% for fathers). Previous 
Australian research (see, for example, Qu et al. 2014) report a slightly 
lower rate of compliance by liable mothers than liable fathers but no 
results from any statistical tests.151  
Compliance was marginally lower for liable mothers than liable fathers (i) 
when restricted to administratively assessed cases (that is, agreement 
cases were excluded); and (ii) in Private Collect cases. Notably, liable 
mothers were significantly more likely to pay neither in full nor on time 
(16% compared with 7% of liable fathers) and significantly more likely to 
pay none of the expected amount (11% compared with 2% of liable 
fathers). 
However, this does not mean that liable mothers made no contribution 
towards their children’s needs. Specifically, liable mothers’ higher rate of 
shared-time and split-residence meant more direct spending on the child 
and more frequent arrangements that replaced cash child support. 
Moreover, half of liable mothers made a payment for a prescribed item 
such as school fees, uniforms and books and essential medical or dental 
costs. The majority (83%) contributed something in-kind, including all 
liable mothers who did not pay in full. This suggests that being aware of, 
                                       
151 Whether the lower compliance found by Qu and others (2014) was statistically 
nonsignificant or not significance was not tested is unclear.  
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and meeting, their child’s needs is an integral part of the mother role 
regardless of the intensity of day-to-day caregiving. 
Under the more expansive measure of compliance (‘soft’ compliance) 
which included agreed nil payment, 85% of liable mothers were 
considered compliant or ‘soft’ compliant, up from 64% when the stricter 
compliance measure was used (compared with 91% and 77% for liable 
fathers). Liable mothers’ generally lower liabilities (43% were less than 
$1,000 a year) are likely to be relevant.  
Around half of liable parents had a former partner who was also 
interviewed. Examination of reports from both former partners revealed 
low levels of concordance on compliance among liable-mother dyads with 
slightly higher concordance between reports of former partners on non-
compliance: 27% and 29%.  
However, concordance was somewhat higher when responses related to 
in-kind contributions were compared. In half of the liable-mother dyads 
both former partners reported payment for a prescribed item—this 
proportion was significantly higher than for the liable-father dyads. In 
64% of liable-mother dyads both ex-partners reported an in-kind 
contribution, a level of concordance not found here for liable-father dyads 
(52%), or in the previous research with liable-father cases. Concordant 
reports in the liable-mother dyads increased to 64% once ‘soft’ 
compliance was considered—more than double the level of concordance 
using the ‘in full and on time’ definition.  
  Question 3: What are the apparent reasons for 
non-compliance by liable mothers?  
Research exploring why some liable mothers are non-compliant based on 
their own reports is almost completely absent from the international 
child support survey work to date. The answer to Question 3 addresses 
this gap in the evidence base by providing reasons for non-compliance for 
liable mothers with a focus on the relationship with parenting time (that 
is, intensity of day-to-day involvement).  
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Parenting-time was associated with non-compliance for liable mothers. 
Based on the typology of liable mothers detailed in Chapter 6, 19% of 
liable mothers with less-time, 30% with equal-time, 78% with more-time, 
and 58% with split-residence were non-compliant.  
Two factors in tandem predicted non-compliance: more overnights and 
low levels of parental conflict over money. Odds increased with the 
number of nights with the focal child.152 This suggests that parenting 
time is being substituted for money and that this was generally 
acceptable for the payee father given that arguments about money were 
the lowest for mothers with more overnights. Of course, an alternative 
explanation is that money is substituted for time given the lowest non-
compliance was among the small number of mothers with no overnights. 
Of note, in the small group (n=8) of mothers with a private informal 
agreement for child support none was non-compliant. Most of these 
mothers (n=5) had less time with all their children. 
Low conflict over money could be reflective of the quality of the 
relationship between the parents. Less than half (46%) of mothers with a 
cooperative relationship were compliant. In contrast, almost all (87%) 
fearful mothers were compliant.  
While it was expected from the literature that low income mothers would 
have more difficulty paying child support in full and on time (see, for 
example in Australia Silvey & Birrell 2004; Wolffs & Shallcross 2000 and 
in the US Becerra & Org 2001; Herrerias 2008), this was not the case. 
Instead, mothers whose main income was a government payment had 
lower non-compliance than those with salary and wages. Self-employed 
liable mothers had very high odds of non-compliance even after 
controlling for number of overnights with the focal child.  
                                       
152 When the arrangements for all children were considered (an alternative measure of 
parenting time), liable mothers with more-time or split-residence had higher odds and 
equal-time liable mothers had marginally higher odds. 
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  Relevance of gender expectations of mothering 
These findings suggest that liable mothers did indeed differ from liable 
fathers and that this in part was related to the different gendered 
expectations for a ‘good’ mother. In the words of Miller (2005: 215), 
‘[m]othering is not just cast as a job; it is framed as an identity, and as 
such cannot be abandoned’. Although there is a potential for separation 
to allow parents to ‘undo’ or ‘redo’ gender, it appears that separated 
mothers—including those liable to pay child support—do indeed continue 
to ‘do gender’ (Natalier & Hewitt 2014). 
Non-compliance is often seen as a facet of disengagement, particularly of 
non-involved fathers. Nonetheless, there is a perception that mothers do 
not pay child support. The present study explored child support liability 
and compliance for liable mothers within this gendered context. Non-
compliance in liable-mother cases can be predicted by parenting time, 
that is, liable mothers with fewer overnights were more likely to comply. 
By contrast, mothers with the most overnights were the least compliant 
with formal child support but still provided in-kind support.  
The findings of the present study indicate that rather than ‘deadbeat’, 
disengaged parents, non-compliant liable mothers could be better 
described as ‘engaged non-compliers’. Put simply, they may not pay 
regular child support but in every other way they are involved in their 
children’s lives. 
   Gender neutral policy?  
What do the findings of the present study outlined above mean for child 
support policy? Gender-neutral policy does not necessarily produce 
gender-neutral results. The present study’s findings illustrate the 
importance of taking a gender perspective to policy or, as Broderick, a 
previous Sex Discrimination Commissioner, puts it, firstly ‘asking the 
woman question’, then ‘asking the man question’ followed by 
‘interrogating institutions and structures for hidden gender implications’ 
(Broderick 2012). 
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The study’s findings suggest a need to move beyond child support policy 
and research that solely positions mothers as payees and fathers as the 
liable parent. They indicate that a generic ‘liable parent’ based on liable 
fathers does not adequately represent liable mothers’ experiences. (The 
Australian Law Reform Commission extended its Terms of Reference in 
its 2011 inquiry into family violence based on this insight from my 
dissertation.) 
As outlined in Section 1.4.3, the Child Support Program Compliance 
Policy (2008) is underpinned by four key factors drawn from the extant 
research that affect motivation to comply: (i) the level of cooperation and 
the relationship between parents; (ii) time with the child and the quality 
of the parent–child relationship; (iii) perceptions of fairness; and (iv) 
employment. In other words, non-compliance is assumed to be 
associated with a less cooperative and poorer parental relationship, little 
or no time with the child (and thus, a poorer parent–child relationship); 
the view that child support is unfair; and unstable or no employment.  
The present study shows that the opposite relationship applies for the 
first two factors mentioned. Liable mothers with more overnights and 
high levels of cooperation were non-compliant. Perceptions of fairness did 
not significantly affect the odds of non-compliance on its own but 
fairness did relate to time for liable mothers, with fairness ratings 
decreasing as time with the children decreased. Finally, unemployed 
liable mothers were more compliant rather than less; an association 
operating in the opposite direction to that found in the liable father 
research. This probably reflects the impact of parenting time on liable 
mothers’ compliance—those mothers receiving government payments 
had less than shared-time. Once overnights were considered, no 
differences were found. Only one factor appears to be a gender-neutral 
influence on motivation to comply: self-employed liable mothers had 
significantly higher odds of non-compliance than those who were 
employees. To sum up, as hypothesised, behavioural responses to 
ostensibly gender-neutral laws do appear to be influenced by gender 
norms and expectations. 
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An inquiry into the child support system is a regular occurrence in 
Australia: the 2003 and 2014 House of Representative Standing 
Committees and the 2005 Ministerial Taskforce are three examples.153 It 
is important that child support policy is guided by empirical evidence 
rather than anecdote (Cook, K & Natalier 2016; Hancock 1998). The 
present study’s findings add to the evidence base154, especially to a 
surprisingly little studied group: liable-mother cases. Research with 
subgroups—on the margins—can illuminate central issues and offer new 
explanations for thorny policy problems. They can also help to shed light 
on the way forward. 
  Key issues for child support policy 
This section discusses six key findings of particular reference to child 
support policy in Australia. These findings have implications either for 
the formula (how the costs of children are calculated and distributed 
between parents) and/or for compliance. The findings relate to: (i) 
shared-time; (ii) split-residence and older children (iii) the minimum 
liability (iv) income from self-employment and other sources; (v) safety 
concerns; and (vi) Private Collect.  
  Shared-time 
Although shared-time is adopted by a minority of separated parents in 
Australia, shared-time appears more common among recent cohorts of 
separated parents (Hahn & Wilkins 2014; Kaspiew, Carson, Qu et al. 
                                       
153 Discussion of policy implications in the following sections take into account the 
2006–08 child support and associated Family Tax Benefit (FTB) reforms. (The CSRS 
data used in the analyses were from the pre-reform baseline data.) Recommendations 
from the 2014 inquiry into the Child Support Program (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2015) and the brief 
Government response to the Committee’s recommendations (Australian Government 
2016), are also referenced where applicable. (Details of the recommendations and the 
Government response are at Appendix C.)  
154 The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 
(2015) is the latest inquiry into the Child Support Program to highlight the lack of 
comprehensive caseload information and recommended additional demographic 
information be collected. This recommendation was recently accepted by the 
Government who acknowledged that this would ‘enable better targeting of service 
delivery initiatives and an improved capacity for policy development and advice’ 
(Australian Government 2016: 2). 
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2015 ),155 suggesting a substantial minority of children may experience a 
period of shared-time, particularly in the earlier years after separation. 
This has policy implications for liable mothers. While shared-time 
mothers were less likely to be liable than fathers (see Section 5.1), a 
larger proportion of the subpopulation of liable mothers had shared or 
more time. Or to put this another way, 43% of liable mothers in 2008 
had at least shared-time (30% or more nights) with the focal child 
compared with 18% of liable fathers.  
Shared-time is more relevant for research and policy in Australia because 
a parent can be liable when they have equal-time or more time than the 
other parent. As the present study reveals, this is particularly critical for 
liable mothers because 15% had equal-time and 22% more-time than the 
other parent. Also of concern, liable mothers with shared or more-time 
reported lower levels of fairness. Understanding liable-mother cases 
assists in understanding shared-time families more broadly. 
This is a good example of where a change to the formula is assumed to 
be gender neutral but because of gendered patterns of parenting, affect 
liable mothers more. Gendered patterns of parenting-time post-
separation mean that mothers often have more overnights. As the 
findings of this study indicate, some of these mothers can be liable. 
Although fathers generally have higher mean income after separation 
than mothers (de Vaus et al. 2015), mothers generally have more time 
with their children. Requiring child support from parents who have the 
higher proportion of time in unequal shared-time cases is likely to be 
more applicable for liable mothers than liable fathers. Similarly, relevant 
are changes to the formula that affect how costs are determined and then 
allocated between shared-time parents; thresholds for liability; and the 
broad components of the formula such as income.  
                                       
155 But see Smyth, Chisholm, Rodgers and Son (2014). Customised data from the Child 
Support Program indicate shared-time may have plateaued at 15–16% of children of 
recently separated parents, and 11% of children in the overall caseload. 
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  Split-residence and older children 
A second policy implication concerns split residence and older children. 
This raises two issues key issues for child support policy: movement into 
the liable parent role and how costs of children are determined and then 
allocated between parents. 
Liable mother cases were significantly more likely to involve older 
children: 65% had a youngest child aged 11 years or older. It is probable 
that this finding reflects a different liable parent ‘experience’ for mothers 
compared to fathers. Rather than being the liable parent from separation, 
some mothers (as indicated in Section 1.3.5) become liable later in their 
child support case after a period as the payee, perhaps when an 
adolescent moves to live mainly with their father. This could also create a 
split-residence arrangement if another former relationship child remains 
living mainly with their mother. While this movement has been noted in 
the Australian research with adolescent children in separated families 
(Lodge & Alexander 2011; Mance & Yu 2010), the present study 
highlights the implications for child support cases. A substantial 
minority of all liable mothers (24%) had split-residence.  
As noted above, one of the reforms to the formula in 2008 involved the 
allocation of higher costs for teenagers in the Cost of Children Table. As 
mothers are mainly liable for older children, this reform is likely to be 
more salient for liable-mother cases.156 
Another related aspect is how costs are allocated between parents with 
split-residence. The following scenario outlines the issue and is one 
example, of the ‘systematic double or triple ‘‘whammies”’ mentioned by 
Smyth and Henman (2010: 28) that can result from the 2008 reforms. 
Where there are two children in the case and the liable parent has 
majority-time of the older child, their liability increases when this child 
                                       
156 This may not always mean a higher liability. This is because the net liability is 
determined by the combined incomes of both parents and a larger proportion of the 
overall cost of children could be borne by the father if men’s incomes are typically 
higher than women’s incomes. In this case, the mother’s share of the cost would 
generate a lower liability than under the original formula because of the continuity of 
expenditure principle. 
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turns 13. This is because the cost of children changes from two children 
under 13 years to the higher mixed-age cost. The rationale is that while 
teenagers cost more, economies of scale mean that two children do not 
cost twice as much as one. But in this scenario, the liable parent with 
the older child would face higher costs with a teenager in their own 
household and a higher liability for the child in the other parent’s 
household. When the case involves more than three children, which the 
present study indicates is frequently the case for split-residence liable 
mothers, issues may also arise because the formula allocates the same 
cost for three or more children. Previously this was five children.  
There are two changes that have made the movement of older children 
between parents. The first was a fundamental change to the Scheme 
post-reform applying at a broader level has implications where children 
change from living mainly with one parent to mainly with the other 
parent. Previously, this would be a ‘terminating event’ ending the 
previous payee’s eligibility for this child, requiring the new payee to make 
a separate application to receive child support.157 Now, the case 
continues with the liability re-calculated, a timelier response to changes 
in living arrangements.  
Another policy implication for older children relates to the interaction 
between FTB and child support via the Maintenance Action Test (MAT) 
(see Section 1.3.1).158 Prior to January 2012, children aged 16–18 in low 
income families generally transferred on to Youth Allowance meaning 
that the MAT no longer applied to these children. A substantial increase 
to the maximum amount of FTB payable for this age group159 lead to the 
retention of older children in the FTB population and therefore the MAT 
continued to be relevant to more parents with older teenagers.  
                                       
157 In practice, if parents did not notify DHS of these changes promptly the outcome for 
each parent varied, with the ending of liability backdated to the terminating event but 
eligibility for child support only from the date of the new application for assessment 
which could not be backdated. Now, only one notification is required and can be from 
either parent. 
158 The Maintenance Action Test (MAT) requires an administrative assessment or 
registered child support agreement as a prerequisite to receive more than base rate 
FTB 
159 From $52.64 to $214.06 a fortnight See Family Assistance Guide, 
<http//guide.dss.gov.au/family-assistance-guide/3/6/1> (accessed 24 August 2017)  
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Of relevance to this issue, the Government accepted the recommendation 
from the 2014 Inquiry that the Cost of Children Table be reviewed 
(Australian Government 2016).160 The findings from the present study 
support this recommendation and highlight several components 
underpinning the formula that should be reviewed using the latest 
research and modelling. In particular, this work should consider how the 
costs of children are allocated in split-residence cases and whether the 
principle of economies of scale is appropriate to be applied. As the Cost of 
Children Table is based on costs net of FTB, changes in family assistance 
policy is also relevant, particularly for costs in the different age bands.  
  The minimum liability 
A third policy implication relates to the application of a minimum 
liability. As noted in the research on the introduction of the minimum 
liability in 1999 (Vnuk 2000; Wolffs & Shallcross 2000), the impact on 
mothers and fathers was not gender-neutral. Further, this group of liable 
mothers appear to be already disadvantaged. Almost half (47%) less-time 
liable mothers reported experiencing financial hardship. 
The impact of the 2008 reforms on low income liable mothers who had a 
minimum liability (around 16%) will depend on whether they had a 
regular-time child or not. International research suggests that when time 
is considered from a lower base in an income shares formula, fewer 
mothers remain liable (Lyngstad & Kitterod 2008). Recognition of regular-
time affects mothers’ liabilities as mothers are more likely to have some 
overnights. One outcome is that liability can be reduced to nil. In other 
words, this reform to the Scheme would move low income mothers with 
regular-time out of the liable parent role. However, this does not 
necessarily mean a net gain from the reforms once the loss of FTB was 
considered. This illustrates the complex policy interactions between FTB, 
                                       
160 But note, Vnuk, Smyth and Archer (2015: 155) foreshadowed ‘little capacity or 
political will to act on…[these] recommendations in the current economic climate’. 
This view was confirmed when the Australian Government (2016) responded to the 
Committee’s report in August 2016, that is accepting the recommendations for 
extending FDR ‘in principle’. 
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child support and government payments and their consequences for low 
income mothers who have some overnights but not shared-time.161 
A different outcome applies for liable mothers with less than regular-
time. After the reforms, very low-income parents with a single case and 
0–51 overnights had slightly higher liabilities (Smyth & Henman 2010), 
although this change resulted from the 2006 indexation of the minimum 
rate in Stage One of the reform package. However, these small increases 
should be seen in the context of already inadequate government 
payments especially Newstart. In addition, parents with 10–13% time lost 
their entitlement to pro-rata FTB (and associated rental assistance) and 
were not entitled to the higher ‘with-child’ rate of Newstart applying to 
those with regular-time.162  
Based on these findings, it may be appropriate to revisit the policy 
around the minimum liability. Concerns that a minimum liability can 
affect the liable parent’s capacity to afford to spend time with their child, 
first raised when the minimum liability was introduced in 1999 (Vnuk 
2000), are still pertinent. Consideration of a special rate of FTB payable 
to parents who spend some overnights with their child is one option. This 
would facilitate overnight stays without reducing the monies going to the 
primary parent’s household from child support and FTB. 
  Self-employment 
A fourth policy implication relates to how child support income is 
determined, particularly for self-employed parents. 
While just nine per cent of liable mothers had self-employment as their 
main income source, 26% had a self-employed former partner. Income 
source is relevant for calculation of child support as income from a 
business can be more easily minimised (either legitimately or not) than 
                                       
161 Low income parents with 14–34% time receive the higher ‘with child’ rate of Newstart 
and rental allowance. However, low income parents already receiving the ‘with child’ 
rate; those not on Newstart; or not in rental accommodation were not compensated for 
their loss of FTB. 
162 Regular-time parents otherwise eligible for FTB retained their entitlement to rental 
assistance, health care card and Medicare Safety Net (FaHCSIA 2008: 8).  
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wages/salary. Consequently, income source could affect which parent is 
deemed liable in split-residence and shared-time cases with mothers 
deemed liable where their former partner is self-employed and had the 
lower income.  
The income or earning capacity of a parent is grounds for an application 
for a change of assessment, a review process where in the special 
circumstances of the case a change is warranted.163 However, this 
process is complex, requires both parents to reveal their financial 
circumstances and often the outcome is not what the applicant expects.  
The challenges that non-wage/salary income poses for the Scheme are 
regularly raised in inquiries into the Child Support Program by payees 
and liable parents. While changes proposed by the Ministerial Taskforce 
(2005) made some important improvements to the definition of income, it 
is clear this is a thorny issue, particularly where the liable parent has 
more parenting-time than their self-employed former partner. As a higher 
proportion of liable mothers had majority-time than liable fathers, this 
suggests that this scenario has more salience for them than for liable 
fathers as a group. 
The 2014 inquiry provides an opportunity for these issues to be noted 
and again addressed. Several recommendations relating to lodgement of 
tax returns; consideration of the use of gross income in the formula; and 
a review of the ‘capacity to earn’ ground for change of assessment (House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 
2015) may be relevant to this issue.  
  Safety concerns 
A fifth policy implication concerns family violence. Liable mothers were 
three times as likely to describe the relationship with their former partner 
as ‘fearful’ (18% compared with 6% of liable fathers), and were twice as 
likely as payee mothers to do so. Although parents were not asked 
                                       
163 See Child Support Guide <http://guides.dss.gov.au/child-support-guide/2/6/14> 
(viewed 24 August 2017)  
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directly about domestic violence, reporting a ‘fearful’ relationship is a 
strong indicator of controlling and intimidating behaviour and is used in 
the present study as a proxy measure for current or previous experience 
of domestic violence.  
Other Australian research (see, for example, Fehlberg 2004; Sheehan & 
Smyth 2000) highlighted the inter-relationship between domestic 
violence and financial aspects of separation, with use of the family law 
system to continue to control (Behrens 2010). Domestic violence was a 
dominant theme in the qualitative nonresident mother literature 
discussed in Chapter 3, especially in more recent cohorts (see, for 
example, Bemiller 2008; Herrerias 2008; Kruk 2015). In Australia, 
research from Qu and others (2014) indicates that the majority of 
recently separated liable mothers reported emotional or physical abuse 
pre- or post-separation.  
The present study identified an overlap between the mother having less 
time with all (or some) children and fearful relationships. For example, 
one-in-five of less-time liable mothers and 23% of split-residence liable 
mothers described their relationship as fearful. More-time liable mothers 
also had high rates of fearful relationships (17%) indicating that some of 
these arrangements probably represent recent parenting-time changes, 
perhaps from majority-time father arrangements.  
These findings are consistent with research indicating domestic violence 
can affect the victim’s ability to parent effectively (Fish, McKenzie & 
MacDonald 2009), with undermining of mothering one target of coercive 
and controlling behaviour (Elizabeth, Gavey & Tolmie 2012; Radford & 
Hester 2006). Further, research suggests this behaviour can contribute 
to minority-time arrangements by judicial determination, ‘agreement’ in 
consent orders or coercion (see, for example, Braaf & Meyering 2011; 
Dick 1998; Laing 2010). The resulting loss of time with children, coupled 
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with a child support liability, could signal continuation of abuse (Green & 
Pearce 2002; Stahly 2000; Watson 2013).164  
It is noteworthy that 87% of fearful mothers were compliant; the highest 
rate of liable mothers. This highlights their concentration in Child 
Support Collect. 
The finding on fearful relationships highlights the role of male power in 
the composition and compliance behaviour for this group of separated 
mothers. The rate of fearful relationships among liable mothers was 
raised by Vnuk (2011) in her submission to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s (ALRC) Inquiry into Family Violence and Commonwealth 
Law. The ALRC (2011:19) made a range of recommendations concerning 
child support, including the need to screen all parents in the caseload165 
and to consider any safety issues when specific administrative actions 
were contemplated. (This is further discussed in Section 10.4.3.) 
Several recommendations from the 2014 Inquiry into the Child Support 
Program have policy relevance to liable mothers and safety concerns. In 
particular, the Committee recommended that mediation be used ‘at the 
initial stage of child support cases’ (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2015: xvii). While the 
Committee noted that mediation was not appropriate where family 
violence was present, implementation of this proposal would need to be 
carefully managed to ensure that safety concerns were adequately 
identified and potential power imbalances addressed.166 This 
recommendation has ‘in principle’ support from the Government. 
However, implications for the budget noted by the Government in their 
response (Australian Government 2016: 2) suggest that challenges with 
implementing this recommendation in full. 
                                       
164 Liable fathers frequently report child support as a form of financial abuse (Bagshaw 
et al. 2010). 
165 The final report by the ALRC (2011) made specific reference to the findings and policy 
implications identified by Vnuk (2011) based on the work in the present study, and 
recommended that all parents be screened for family violence not just payees. 
166 Family Relationship Centres have their own screening tools which provide several 
options for family violence to be identified. Whether DHS would determine which cases 
were not required to attend a FRC if this was a compulsory first step as suggested in 
the 2014 Inquiry, and what screening would be used, is undecided.  
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  Private Collect 
A sixth and final policy implication relates to Private Collect cases. 
Research with parents in liable-father cases suggests that compliance in 
Private Collect—while not 100%, as assumed by the Department of 
Human Services—is higher than in Child Support Collect (see, for 
example, Smyth et al. 2011; Smyth, Vnuk et al. 2014; Vnuk 2009).167 
This is confirmed in the present study for liable fathers, but not for liable 
mothers who reported similar compliance (64–67%) for Private Collect 
and Child Support Collect.  
While the present study confirms that characteristics of parents in 
Private Collect cases (such as shared-time and cooperative relationships) 
appear to be common across the caseload, the influence of these factors 
on compliance operates in divergent ways in liable-father and liable-
mother cases.168  
Payees can move or return to Child Support Collect if the liable parent is 
non-compliant. The present study suggests that payment of none of the 
assessed amount or a lower payment was often by agreement. Whether 
this is a challenge to the principles of the Scheme is a matter for policy 
consideration, and also has service delivery implications—in particular, 
whether the trade-offs implicit in the promotion of Private Collect (such 
as empowerment of parents, and the extent of conflict or cooperation) do 
indeed operate in ‘the best interests of children’.  
There are also implications for family payment policy. The present study 
noted that FTB was received by fewer payee fathers than payee mothers. 
Changes to eligibility for means-tested FTB (such as freezing of 
indexation of thresholds) may mean fewer parents are required to be 
registered with the Child Support Program to meet the MAT in the future. 
                                       
167 The 2014 Inquiry highlighted the lack of reliable data on actual payment in Private 
Collect cases. Recommendation 19 proposed that parents be regularly surveyed with 
results published in the Department of Human Services Annual Report. This 
recommendation was accepted by the Government (Australian Government 2016). 
168 For example, recent research with Private Collect payee mothers (also indicating less 
than full compliance), found some payees mothers were intimidated into staying in 
Private Collect (see, for example, Cook, K et al. 2015). 
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This could affect payee fathers as a group more than payee mothers. 
However, the changes to FTB for older teenagers detailed previously, 
could serve as a counter-balance for some low-income payee fathers.  
  Implications for service delivery  
The present study’s findings also have implications for service delivery by 
the Department of Human Services (DHS) under its Child Support 
Program.  
  Supporting liable mothers 
What can the Department of Human Services do for this group of liable 
mothers? The present study clearly shows that liable mothers are not a 
unitary homogeneous group. Tailored support for liable mothers in 
different situations and points in time is required. For example, for 
mothers who move between liable parent and payee, whether the other 
parent was compliant when they were liable and what triggered the 
change in liable parent could be important. While case management is 
provided to all newly registered cases to support parents to choose the 
right collection method for them and entrench compliance, some parents 
become liable later in their child support case when the relationship 
between the Child Support Program and parents is already in place—
perhaps after several years. Unless movement is triggered by a 
substantial change in overnights, no opportunity arises for DHS officers 
to recognise these changes and proactively offer appropriate support. 
Although not all changes will require case management, a procedure to 
identify cases that could benefit from additional services appropriate to 
their individual circumstances (either from DHS or community providers) 
should be considered. For example, split-residence cases appear to have 
quite specific challenges that may benefit from case management.  
  Non-compliance and debt 
Central point estimates of compliance based on administrative data from 
the Child Support Program by gender are rare. The last point-in-time 
release was mid–2010 and represents half of the caseload—those with 
Child Support Collect.  
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The Department has been accused of gender bias in its debt collection 
activities, implying that they only target ‘deadbeat dads’ as illustrated by 
the quote from Barry Williams of the Lone Fathers Association in Chapter 
1. The present study highlights that the lower liabilities in liable-mother 
cases compared to liable-father cases mean less debt attributed to 
mothers. Thus, DHS predominantly focus on liable-father cases because 
there are more liable fathers and they have, on average, larger debts.  
Currently litigation is only pursued where the parent has realisable 
assets. The general threshold for action is $5,000 (see, for example, 
Department of Human Services 2014; House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2014, 28 August: 7) as it is 
not economical to chase smaller debts. It would be expected that liable 
mothers’ generally lower liabilities would also generate less debt. In 
practice, this may mean that arrears owed to payee fathers may not be 
prioritised or followed-up.  
The present study suggests that non-compliance among liable mothers is 
not predominantly an issue of the Child Support Program’s inability to 
enforce payment. This has implications for how (and when) information 
on collection methods is provided to parents to ensure that both parents 
are fully informed of the pros and cons of each option. Movement 
between being the liable parent, the payee and no current liability may 
require repeated provision of information so that the parent who is 
currently the payee selects the method appropriate to their 
circumstances.  
A further implication for service delivery relates to opportunities to offset 
debt when the parents reverse roles in their child support case (that is, 
the liable parent becomes the payee). Both parents need to opt for Child 
Support Collect when they are the payee169 for this to operate. Only 
                                       
169 The collection method is chosen by the payee. Parents can jointly choose Private 
Collect but a liable parent cannot unilaterally determine whether the case is Private 
Collect or Child Support Collect.  
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arrears that accrue during a period of Child Support Collect can be offset 
as 100% of the liability is assumed to be paid in Private Collect.  
Two groups of liable mothers pose contrasting issues for compliance and 
collection of arrears. Self-employed liable mothers had very high odds of 
non-compliance (see Section 9.3). It appears that self-employed liable 
mothers and fathers are similar, at least regarding non-compliance.  
In contrast, the low rate of non-compliance for liable mothers with a 
government payment as their main income source (9% were non-
compliant) could indicate that DHS is successful in collecting the liability 
from this group. The 2008 reforms included a tripling of allowable 
deductions for child support arrears, suggesting deductions from 
Centrelink payments would be a useful avenue for collection of arrears 
from liable mothers, if warranted. However, as this group of liable 
mothers already experience a high rate of hardship, additional 
deductions for arrears may be onerous. 
Interventions found to have success in increasing child support 
compliance overseas focus on ‘responsible fathering’. These programs 
work with fathers (and sometimes mothers) to re-engage with their 
children, reduce parental conflict and provide practical support with legal 
problems and employment (see, for example, McHale, Waller & Pearson 
2012). Similar motivations underpin support services the Department 
has used to promote compliance behaviour and willingness to pay. These 
focus on the quality of the parental relationship post-separation such as 
‘Staying Connected’ and ‘Being Connected’ (O'Hanlon & Stevenson 2005) 
and on fathering after separation to reduce disengagement by fathers. 
These programs may not be appropriate for liable mothers in Australia as 
the present study suggests that disengagement is not an issue. 
  Responding to family violence  
Identification and support for liable mothers who have fearful 
relationships is a challenge for the Department overall. The Child 
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Support Program currently screens for family violence170 and makes 
referrals to other services where appropriate (Department of Human 
Services 2014) although it is unclear whether this ‘best practice’ 
approach is used for each contact or primarily for newly registered cases. 
Currently, interventions when domestic violence is present are focused 
on payees. Payees can apply to a Centrelink social worker for a 
recommendation to be exempt from collecting child support in full, or at 
all, if there are current safety concerns if child support is pursued.  
The Australian Law Reform Commission (2011) raised the need to take a 
broader approach to supporting separated parents affected by family 
violence. The present study suggests that further consideration is 
required to take account of the impact of domestic violence when the 
affected parent is the liable parent. One option is for a family violence flag 
to be placed on all case records where safety concerns have been raised 
regardless of whether the parent is a payee, a liable parent, or the case 
has no current liability. Changes in liability between parents in a case 
can occur at a later point without necessarily being triggered by a change 
in parenting time. The flagging of these cases would ensure that a Child 
Support Program case officer contacts the parent whenever any change 
in assessment occurs.  
A dedicated family violence response unit located in DHS, as 
recommended by the Committee in the 2014 Inquiry (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 
2015: 141), 171 could provide support to all affected parents. This 
recommendation was rejected by the Government (Australian 
Government 2016: 13) who stated that the existing Family and Domestic 
                                       
170 Family violence is an umbrella term that encompasses domestic violence (that is, 
abusive behaviour in an intimate relationship) and abusive behaviour perpetrated by 
other family members.  
171 A further recommendation from the 2014 Inquiry (House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2015) was for the Australian 
Government to respond to the ALRC report on Family Violence and Commonwealth 
Law as a priority. The Committee highlighted that recommendations from the 2011 
ALRC inquiry remained relevant but not yet actioned. The Government noted this 
recommendation but declined to take formal action (Australian Government 2016: 
12). 
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Violence Risk Identification and Referral process ‘ensures staff are 
actively identifying family and domestic violence concerns, and providing 
targeted referrals to specialised service providers in the community or 
departmental social workers’.  
There is a risk that fearful liable mothers already in the system may be 
overlooked because they are a group with high compliance. Fearful liable 
mothers may have different requirements than fearful payee mothers 
who are the usual target group when support needs are discussed. The 
present study suggests that liable mothers with minority-time or who 
have not spent time with the focal child or any of their children in the 
past 12 months are a particularly vulnerable group. 
  Limitations  
Four important limitations of the study warrant brief mention. First, 
some subgroups of liable mothers were small. This restricted the 
statistical tests that could be used and may have obscured associations 
between variables that would have been significant with a larger sample 
(technically termed ‘Type II’ error). Further, some significant findings 
among very small subgroups (for example, all eight liable mothers with a 
private agreement were compliant) may have occurred by chance (‘Type I’ 
error).  
Second, conclusions about gender and intensive mothering assumed 
specific expectations of ‘good’ mothering that gave less attention to 
diverse norms of mothering and to the intersection with race, ethnicity 
and sexual identity.  
Third, no questions were asked about personal values and attitudes 
about parenting and role identity. Adherence to gendered expectations of 
‘good’ mothering was inferred by answers to other questions. Thus, 
intensity of mothering was based on quantity of parenting-time, a proxy 
measure.  
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Fourth, parents who had never lived together were under-represented in 
the present study.172 This is because the sample extraction was based on 
‘date of separation’ and never-lived together parents mostly did not have 
a date of separation. This under-representation could exclude some 
younger parents with higher disadvantage in liable-father cases and may 
have under-estimated the socio-demographic differences between liable 
parents.  
The present study nonetheless makes an important contribution to 
improving understanding of liable mothers—a rarely studied group of 
separated parents. The CSRS data are a representative sample drawn 
from, and weighted to be representative of, active cases in the child 
support administrative caseload.  
  Future research  
This thesis contributes to the patchy evidence base on child support 
compliance in general and to sparsely investigated gendered differences 
in non-compliance and in-kind contributions. It identifies that non-
compliant liable mothers could be seen as ‘engaged non-compliers’. Low 
compliance reported by payee fathers here and in other recent research 
could mask the contribution that mothers are making informally.  
Several specific lines of investigation are warranted to improve 
understanding of liable-mother cases and could be further explored with 
a larger sample. For example, while non-compliance in the present study 
was measured as not in full and/or not on time, differences could exist 
between types of non-compliance: late, partial payment, none of the 
liability paid. This is particularly relevant in Private Collect cases.173  
Another important line of inquiry to pursue is compliance over time.  
Research using administrative data could follow liable-mother cases to 
explore whether changes in time with children or income was the main 
                                       
172 The sample comprised 1.5% of never lived together parents. 
173 In contrast to liable fathers, liable mothers had a similar rate of compliance in 
Private Collect and when DHS was involved in collecting and disbursing payment. 
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driver for movement between liable parent and payee role and how 
frequent this occurred in individual cases. This could draw out the policy 
implications of this more dynamic situation compared with liable-father 
cases where traditional parenting arrangements and static liable 
parent/payee roles apply and inform service delivery for parents who 
move between liable parent, payee and no current liability. Focus groups 
or other qualitative approaches with a sample of these parents could 
identify whether any additional support was required, and if so, the type 
of support needed, and whether DHS or the community sector could best 
meet this need.  
Qualitative or mixed method research would provide richer data for a 
range of new topics arising from the present study: shared-time liable 
mothers where they had the greater time; split-residence; attitudes to 
paying child support and non-compliance; and whether liable mothers 
and payee fathers identify the same meanings to child support monies as 
found for payee mothers and liable fathers (see, for example, Natalier & 
Hewitt 2014). Further, in-depth interviews could explore the meaning of 
child support monies for mothers who had been a payee and were 
currently a liable parent. This could provide insight into perceptions of 
being liable, and compliance, for mothers with episodic versus ongoing 
liability.  
Further work on a more inclusive compliance measure, such as the ‘soft’ 
compliance measure developed for the present study and used by Smyth, 
Vnuk and others (2014) encompassing in-kind contributions, agreed 
non-payment and whether the payee is satisfied with the arrangements, 
would lead to a stronger understanding of on-the-ground compliance for 
liable-mother cases, and also for the larger group of liable-father cases.  
  Parting reflections 
Family law, and child support policy, has increasingly moved to the use 
of non-gendered family-friendly language, reflecting the changing nature 
of parenting roles, expectations and responsibilities. As Behrens (2010: 
37) points out, policy analysis needs to consider ‘the gendered lives we 
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continue to live… implications for the power and choices we have, …[and] 
the tendency for there to be different expectations of self-sacrifice’. The 
data presented show that liable mothers are a distinct group within the 
liable parent population and suggest that child support compliance 
behaviour is indeed gendered. Consequently, it is important for research, 
policy and practice to not become ‘gender blind’. This is an especially 
important point in the light of the marked shift in the caseload and the 
Child Support Program’s philosophy of encouraging separated parents to 
make their own arrangements. All is assumed by policymakers to be 
okay. Key aspects of these data fly in the face of this assumption. 
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Appendix A  
Table A1  Australian literature review  
 
Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Burns (1980) 1975 
233 women (13% 
had a nonresident 
child) & 102 men 
Sydney 
Featured 
articles in 
Sydney 
newspapers & 
radio, & 
Parents 
Without 
Partners  
no S: survey 
Marriages 
that ended 
in early 
1970s 
McMurray (1992) early 1990s 43 NRM 
Western 
Australia 
Non-
probability, 
purposive: 
radio & 
newspaper ads  
yes 
Q: one-hour 
interview 
NRM defined 
as one 
whose child 
or children 
were for any 
reason not 
living with 
her  
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Funder & Smyth 
(1996) 
1996 
494 divorced 
parents: 40 NRM  
Australia 
Random from 
Telstra White 
Pages 
yes S: telephone survey 
Parents who 
had a 
dependent 
child at the 
time of 
separation & 
who had 
separated 
after 
January 
1988.  
Buskens (2002, 
2005) 
early 2000s 20 NRM  Victoria 
Non-
probability, 
purposive: 
newspaper ads  
no 
Q: 2 semi 
structured 
interviews 
Mothers who 
voluntarily 
left their 
children 
Silvey & Birrell 
(2004) 
2001 
5,023 payer 
mothers & 45,750 
payer fathers  
National 
CSA 
longitudinal 
dataset 
yes R: admin data 
Cohort of 
cases 
registered in 
1997 & still 
active in 
2001. 
Includes 
cases with 
no current 
liability. 
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Baker(2003, 
2005) 
 
early to mid-
2000s 
30 NRM & 191 
NRF 
National: 
75% WA 
Non-
probability, 
purposive: 
community 
newspapers, 
posters at 
shopping 
centres, 
McDonalds, 
email lists, 
father & mother 
support groups 
no 
S: survey: mail-
back, email or via 
website 
Only focused 
on parental 
involvement 
with their 
child's 
school 
Wolffs & 
Shallcross (2000) 
2000 
225 LM, 1,275 LF 
& 766 payees  
National 
Random 
sample of CSA 
clients 8,000 
payers & 2,000 
payees with 
minimum 
liability 
yes S: telephone survey 
Minimum 
liability 
cases  
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Natalier, Walter, 
Wulff, Reynolds 
& Hewitt (2008) 
2004–2005 
36 NRM & 353 
NRF, 585 RM & 88 
RF  
National 
Secondary data 
analysis of 
Housing, 
Income & 
Labour 
Dynamics in 
Australia 
(HILDA) Wave 
4.  
HILDA 
probability 
multi-stage 
cluster 
yes 
S: telephone 
survey, mail back  
Excluded 54 
parents who 
had both 
resident & 
nonresident 
children  
Kaspiew, Gray, 
Weston, 
Moloney, Hand, 
Qu & Family Law 
Evaluation Team 
(2009) &Weston 
(2010) 
2008 
10,000 separated 
parents: 195 LM 
Australia 
CSA sample of 
parent whose 
case was 
registered in 
2007 & 
separated 
between July 
2006 & 
December 2007 
yes S: CATI survey  
AIFS Family 
law 
evaluation: 
Longitudinal 
Study of 
Separated 
Families 
(LSSF) W1 
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Millward, Campo 
& Fehlberg 
(2011) 
2009 
60 separated 
parents  
2011 paper based 
on 2009 interviews 
with 4 LM & 7 PF 
Victoria 
Purposive 
sample: 
newspaper & 
online ads, 
brochures at 
FDR services, & 
mail-out with 
final orders 
from the Family 
Court & Federal 
Magistrates 
Court 
yes 
Q: in-depth 
interview. 
longitudinal 2009, 
2010, 2011 
Over-
sampled for 
equal & 
unequal 
shared care. 
All liable 
mothers 
interviewed 
had shared 
care.  
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Qu & Weston 
(2010) 
2009 
7,031/10,002 
LSSF W1 
reinterviewed: 163 
LM 
Australia 
Follow-up 
interview of 
LSSF Wave 1 
parents. 
Original 
sample: CSA 
sample of 
parent whose 
case was 
registered in 
2007 & 
separated 
between July 
2006 & 
December 2007 
yes S: CATI survey 
AIFS Family 
law 
evaluation: 
LSSF W2 
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
Qu, Weston, 
Moloney, 
Kaspiew & 
Dunstan (2014) 
2012 
9,028 parents: 
5,755 from LSSF 
Wave 1 & 3,273 
'top-up': 211 LM  
Australia 
Follow-up 
interview of 
LSSF Wave 1 
parents. 
Original 
sample: CSA 
sample of 
parent whose 
case was 
registered in 
2007 & 
separated 
between July 
2006 & 
December 
2007. 'Top-up': 
CSP sample of 
parents who 
registered 
between 
January 2008 
& May 2008 & 
separated 
between July 
2006 & 
December 2007 
Yes S: CATI survey 
AIFS Family 
law 
evaluation: 
LSSF W3 
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Researchers Year of study Participants Location How recruited Child support Type of study Comments 
De Maio, 
Kaspiew, Smart, 
Dustan & Moore 
(2013)  
2012 
6,119 parents, 
251 LM 
Australia 
CSP sample of 
recently 
separated 
parents who 
registered their 
case in 2012 
yes S: CATI survey 
Baseline 
data for 
evaluation of 
the 2012 
family 
violence 
reforms to 
the Family 
Law Act: 
Survey of 
Recently 
Separated 
Parents 
(SRSP) 2012  
Kaspiew, Carson, 
Dunstan, De 
Maio, Moore, 
Moloney, Smart, 
Qu, Coulson & 
Tayton (2015) 
2014 
6,079 parents: 5% 
of mothers 
identified as liable 
Australia 
CSP sample of 
recently 
separated 
parents who 
registered their 
case in 2014 
yes S: CATI survey 
Evaluation 
of the 2012 
reforms to 
the Family 
Law Act: 
Survey of 
Recently 
Separated 
Parents 
(SRSP) 2014 
Key: NRM=nonresident mother, NRF=nonresident father, RM=resident mother, RF=resident father, LM=liable mother, PF=payee father, CSA=Child 
Support Agency, CSP=Child Support Program. 
S=survey, Q=qualitative study, R=representative administrative data 
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Table A2  International literature review 
Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Todres (1978) Canada 1975 38 NRM Toronto 
Non-probability, 
purposive: radio & 
newspaper ads  
no 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews 
Married women 
who left their 
husband & 
children with at 
least one child 
under 18 years 
Paskowicz 
(1982) 
USA 1979 100 NRM 
27 US 
states, 3 
Canada, 1 
UK 
Non- probability: 
MS magazine ads 
& snowballing 
no 
M: mixed 
methods -mail 
back survey & 
interviews 
Personal 
experience 
Keller (1975) USA 1970s 15 NRM California not known no 
M: interviews & 
psychological 
tests  
Mothers who 
chose to leave 
their children 
Polson (1977) USA 1970s 
30 NRM, 30 RM & 
30 married mothers 
California not known no 
M: survey & 
interviews (15 
NRM) 
Compared NRM, 
RM and married 
mothers with 
adolescent 
children  
Berke (1979) USA 1970s 99 NRM California 
Word of mouth & 
newspaper ads 
no S: survey 
Mothers who 
chose to leave 
their children 
Isenhart (1979) USA 1970s 18 NRM & 17 RM California not known no 
M: survey and 
10 question 
interview 
Compared NRM 
& RM 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Fischer & 
Cardea (1982) 
USA 1980 17 NRM 16 RM 
27 Texas & 
5 out of 
state 
Convenience 
sample, Texas 
media, - article in 
Divorce 
Newsletter, 
personal contacts 
via friends, 
students &, 
colleagues, 
snowballing  
no 
M: semi-
structured 
interviews & 
fixed format 
questionnaires 
NRM who have 
one or more 
children living 
apart from them 
half or more of 
the time 
Glubka (1983) USA 1983 personal narrative   Personal no 
PN: personal 
narrative  
Ebaugh (1988) USA 1983 
106 people who had 
exited a role: 10 
NRM 
Texas 
mainly 
Snowballing,  no 
Q: 2-hour 
interviews: set 
questions then 
open ended 
Role exit 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Meyers & Lakin 
(1983) 
USA 
early 
1980s 
70 NRM, 12 RF & 
professionals 
(attorneys & 
therapists) 
USA 
Non-probability, 
purposive 
minimal 
Q: in depth 
intensive 
interviews 
Voluntary 
relinquished. 
Includes 
personal 
experience 
Koehler (1982) USA 1982 3 NRM 
Washingto
n DC area 
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
personal contacts  
no Q: interviews 
Includes 
personal 
experience 
Rosenblum 
(1984, 1986) 
USA 1981-83 20 NRM 
Washingto
n DC area 
Non-probability, 
purposive: half 
personal contacts 
& half from 
support group 
Offspring 
no 
Q: semi 
structured 
interviews 
Voluntary 
relinquished & 
less than 50% 
care & child 14 
years or younger. 
Includes 
personal 
experience  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Constantatos 
(1984) 
USA 
early 
1980s 
20 NRM, 20 RM & 
20 married mothers 
Texas not known no 
M: survey & 
semi-
structured 
interview (NRM 
& RM only)  
Compared NRM, 
RM & married 
mothers 
Herrerias 
(1984)(1995) 
USA  1983 130 NRM 
Southwest 
USA 
(mainly 
Texas) 
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
newspaper ads, 
support groups, 
university 
billboard, featured 
article in 
newspaper.  
minimal 
M: mixed 
methods. Face-
to-face or mail 
back survey, 
life history 
questionnaire 
& 102 in-depth 
interviews 
Primary parent 
for at least 6 
months & 
voluntary 
relinquished at 
least 6 months 
previously. 
Includes 
personal 
experience  
Greif & Pabst 
(1988) & Greif 
(1986) 
USA & 
Canada 
1983-
1987 
517 NRM 
45 USA 
states & 
Canada 
Non-probability, 
purposive: -
questionnaire in 
June 1983 Single 
Parent magazine 
(Parents Without 
Partners), sent to 
chapters of 
Mothers Without 
Custody & review 
of 400 divorce 
decrees in 
Baltimore County 
1968-87. 
1987 follow up 
interviews 
yes 
M: mail back 
questionnaire 
& interviews of 
subset of 
respondents 
Mothers who did 
not have primary 
custody of at 
least one child 
18 years or 
younger  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Chesler (1986) 
USA & 
Canada 
1960-
1981 
60 NRM & 55 RF 
USA & 
Canada 
Non-probability: 
snowballing  
yes 
Q: 2-10-hour 
interviews & 
court 
documents 
Primary 
caretaker 
mothers who 
were ‘custodially 
challenged’ 
 
Edwards (1989) 
USA, 
Canada, 
New 
Zealand, 
UK & 
Australia  
1981-82 100 NRM 
USA, 
Canada, 
New 
Zealand, 
UK & 
Australia 
Non-probability, 
purposive: ad in 
MS magazine  
minimal 
M: mail back 
questionnaire 
with open 
ended pages for 
narrative 
Voluntary 
relinquished. 
 Includes 
personal 
experience 
Larsen (1987) Canada 1987 17 NRM 
Vancouver 
Canada 
Word of mouth, 
bulletin boards of 
community 
centres, 
universities, 
libraries & 
women's centres & 
ads in local 
newspaper  
no 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews 
Mothers who 
voluntarily 
relinquished 
custody of a least 
one child to their 
ex-partner. 
Includes 
personal 
experience 
Christensen, 
Dahl and Rettig 
(1990)  
USA 1986 114 NRM 929 NRF Minnesota  
Random sample of 
30% of divorces 
with children 
finalised in 1986 
in 10 counties & 
all cases where 
less than 150 in 
that year: final 
sample 1,153 
yes 
R: analysis of 
court records  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
court cases 
Benson & 
Pasley (1993) 
USA 1985 
10 NRM 33 NRF 11 
RF 29 RM 
Kentucky  
Sample of 
remarried couples 
from Fayette 
county marriage 
license records 
between 1980 & 
1985 & random 
list of 698 
households. 
yes 
S: mail out 
questionnaire 
Paper based on 
subsample of 
remarried 
parents who pay 
or receive child 
support 
Franks (1990) UK 
late 
1980s 
23 NRM National 
Non-probability, 
purposive, 
Mothers Living 
Apart from Their 
Children (MATCH) 
members 
minimal Q: interviews 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Zuravin & Greif 
(1989) 
USA 
late 
1980s 
8 NRM  Baltimore 
Purposive: 8 cases 
from a dataset of 
518 low-income 
urban single 
parent mothers 
selected from 
known to Child 
Protection for 
abuse or neglect 
(n=237) from a 
sample frame of 
1,744 families 
using the services 
in Jan 1984 & a 
control group on 
welfare (n=237) 
selected from a 
sample frame of 
cohort of 37,158 
families  
no 
M: closed 
question face to 
face survey 
interviews & 
child protection 
case record 
data  
Mothers with 
child in foster 
care who lost 
custody of the 
child between 
sampling & 
interview 
Maccoby & 
Mnookin (1992) 
USA 
1985-
1989 
1124 families (364 
not mother sole 
care) 
California 
Court records for 
cohort of families 
divorcing between 
Sept 1984–March 
1985 in 2 counties 
yes 
M: longitudinal 
cohort survey. 
3 telephone 
survey 
interviews with 
each parent & 
content 
analysis of 
court records 
Divorced families 
with at least one 
child under 16  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Stewart 
(1999a, 1999b) 
USA 
1987-88 
NSFH 
Study 1: 156 NRM 
& 531 NRF.  
Study 2: 139 NRM 
& 479 NRF 
National 
National Survey of 
Families & 
Households 
(NSFH): national 
probability sample 
of 13,008 
respondents 
yes 
S: National 
survey 
Respondents 
who reported not 
living with a 
biological child 
aged 18 or 
younger  
Greif & Emad 
(1989) 
USA 1988 39 NRM  National 
Follow up calls to 
517 NRM from 
original sample  
yes 
S: phone 
interviews & 
mail out 
questionnaire 
Follow up from 
previous study 
Arditti & 
Madden-
Derdich (1993) 
USA 
1986-
1990 
13 NRM 
2 counties 
in south 
western 
Virginia  
Selected from 
court records.: 
letters sent to 40 
NRM 
yes 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews-face 
to face 
interviews 
Divorced 1986-
92 with children 
& have been or 
are currently 
noncustodial 
parents 
Clumpus 
(1996) 
UK 
Early 
1990s 
10 NRM National 
Non-probability, 
purposive: MATCH 
members 
no 
Q: semi 
structured 
interviews 1-3 
hours 
Women who lost 
care of their 
children & 
previously 
primary carers 
includes 
personal 
experience  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Jackson (1994) UK 
early 
1990s 
60 NRM National 
Non-probability: 
personal contact, 
MATCH & 
snowballing 
no 
Q: narrative 
interviews & 
letters  
Voluntary 
relinquished: not 
adoption, 
fostering, racial 
difference, in 
prison or mental 
or physical 
disability of 
mother or child. 
Includes 
personal 
experience  
Kielty 
(2005,2008) 
UK 
early 
1990s 
20 NRM National 
Non-probability, 
purposive: MATCH 
members, 
personal contact & 
snowballing 
no 
Q: psycho-
social narrative 
interviews 
Women who were 
divorced or 
separated from 
their children's 
father & living 
apart from their 
children  
West & 
Kissman (1992) 
 
USA 1991 
 
    no 
TCS: case 
studies 
Treatment issues 
Basham (1990) USA 1990 28 NRM 
Washingto
n DC area 
Convenience 
sample: 
Separation & 
Divorce Support 
Network & 
Mothers Without 
Custody, mental 
health workers, 
attorneys & 
snowballing 
no 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews & 
testing using 
standardised 
tests related to 
moral 
dilemmas 
14 voluntary & 
14 non-voluntary 
NRM 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Heikes (1993) USA 1991-92 7 NRM & 20 RF Texas  
Convenience 
sample: public 
court records, 
Parents Without 
Partners, Big 
Brothers/Big 
Sisters, local 
support group for 
noncustodial 
mothers, 
newspaper ads, 
snowballing 
Yes 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews 
 
Pearson & 
Anhalt (1994)  
USA 
early 
1990s 
394 parents: 100 
father custody 
cases 
Florida, 
Michigan, 
Arizona, 
Kansas & 
Los 
Angeles 
Participants in 5 
visitation 
enforcement 
programs 
yes 
M: Telephone 
survey & site 
visits: 
observations & 
interviews with 
staff, lawyers, 
judges & court 
administrators.  
 
Jensen & 
Clausen (1997) 
Norway 1996 
46 NRM, 531 NRF, 
620 RM & 59 RF 
Norway 
Two separate 
samples of RP & 
NRP selected by 
Statistics Norway 
no 
S: Telephone or 
postal survey  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Maclean & 
Eekelaar (1993) 
 
UK 1994 249 parents: 5 NRM 
England & 
Wales 
Screening 
question in large 
continuous 
omnibus survey 
run by market 
research company 
to locate possible 
participants to 
contact later for 
interview 
yes, but 
not NRM or 
RF 
S: survey -
interview 
Parents who had 
a child who was 
living apart from 
their other 
parent.  
Child support 
section only 
reported RM & 
NRF  
Greif (1997) 
US & 
Canada 
1990s 109 NRF & 76 NRM  
US & 
Canada 
Convenience 
sample: survey 
sent to members 
of Parents Without 
Partners 
yes 
M: survey & 
interviews with 
subsample 
Previously 
married parents 
who have lost 
contact with 
their child 
Ferguson 
(1994) 
USA 1994 
 
    no 
TCS: case 
studies 
Social work 
practice 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Babcock 
(1995,1997) 
USA 
mid 
1990s - 
30 NRM interviews, 
20 NRM survey 
respondents 
Idaho 
Non-probability, 
purposive: sample 
of public divorce 
records between 
1989 & 1994 (500 
cases where 
fathers awarded 
custody), ads, 
support groups & 
snowballing 
yes 
Q: face to face 
interviews 1-5 
hours or mail 
surveys 
Divorced 
mothers living 
apart from at 
least one minor 
child as a result 
of a custody 
decision made 
through the 
courts or in a 
family setting 
Santora & 
Hays (1998) 
USA 
mid 
1990s  
26 NRM 
Seattle 
area 
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
community 
newspaper ads at 
universities & 
family law center, 
NOW Newsletter 
Seattle & personal 
referrals & 
snowballing 
minimal 
Q: semi 
structured 
interviews  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Smock & 
Manning 
(1997) 
USA 
1994 
PSID 
42 NRM/RF couples 
& 178 NRF/RM 
couples 
National 
Subset of Panel 
Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) 
1994 Wave  
yes 
S: National 
longitudinal 
survey 
 
Mayer (1997) USA 
mid 
1990s 
42 NRM & 57 RM 
Ohio & 
nearby 
states 
Non-probability, 
purposive: county 
courthouse 
divorce records, 
Parents without 
Partners, other 
social service 
organisations, 
newspaper ads, 
internet & word of 
mouth 
no 
M: mail back 
questionnaire 
Compared role 
adjustment & 
functioning of 
NRM & RM 
Thacker (2005) Canada 
1997-
1999 
10 NRM 
North 
central 
British 
Columbia  
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
networking & 
snowballing  
no 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews with 
open ended 
questions 
Mothers of a 
child (born or 
adopted) aged 
less than 17 
years at time of 
research & with 
whom she didn't 
live  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Pagano (2000) USA 
mid to 
late 
1990s 
9 NRM 
New 
Hampshire  
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
support group 
MOM-LAC  
minimal 
Q: in depth 
intensive 
interviews 
 
Bailey (2003), 
Bailey & 
Zvonkovic 
(2003) 
USA 
late 
1990s 
6 NRM & 30 NRF National 
Non-probability, 
purposive: letters, 
flyers & email to 
Family List Server 
minimal 
Q: in depth 
telephone 
interviews, 
semi structured  
Nonresident 
divorced parents 
with at least one 
child aged 5-17 
who lived a 
minimum of 50 
miles from their 
children & had 
contact. 
Gustafson 
(2005) 
Canada 2001 
Author's personal 
experience as NRM  
  yes 
PN: personal 
narrative 
Personal 
experience 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Lau (2004, 
2005, 2007) 
Hong Kong 
Early 
2000s 
13 NRM, 32 NRF & 
64 RP 
Hong Kong 
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
referrals from 
welfare agencies 
yes 
S: survey, data 
collected from 
RP, NRP & 
child  
Chinese divorced 
couples with at 
least one child 
aged 6–17 & NRP 
making at least 
one contact (in 
person or on the 
phone) with the 
sampled children 
in the previous 3 
months.  
Child support 
reported in 
aggregate. 
Horwood 
(2004) 
New 
Zealand 
2002-03 
1,003 cohort 
participants: 49 
NRP (8 NRM) 
New 
Zealand 
1977 
Christchurch 
Birth Cohort 
Study  
yes S: survey 
Longitudinal 
cohort study: 
information 
collected at aged 
25 years 
   
303 
 
Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Thuen (2006) Norway 
2001-
2002 
1,813 nonresident 
parents, 145 NRM 
Norway 
Nonresident 
parents were 
recruited through 
the National 
Insurance register 
& membership 
records of the 
Norwegian Joint 
Custody 
Association 
no S: Postal survey 
Mainly about 
contact & 
psychological 
adjustment after 
separation 
McKay & 
Atkinson 
(2005) 
UK 2002 
312 NRP (34 NRM) 
& 649 RP (45 RF) 
UK 
A module on 
nonresident 
parental contact 
was run on the 
National Statistics 
Omnibus Survey 
in April to 
November 2002. 
yes 
S: Telephone or 
postal survey 
Unpublished 
report cited in 
Atkinson & 
McKay (2005) 
Eicher-Catt 
(2001, 2004) 
USA 2000s Personal narrative 
 
NA minimal 
PN: personal 
narrative 
Personal 
experience 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Sousa & 
Sorensen 
(2006) 
USA 
2002 
NSAF 
2.2m NRM & 7.8m 
NRF (weighted data) 
National 
National Survey of 
America’s Families 
(NSAF): National 
random sample of 
100,000 people 
(42,000 
households) in 13 
representative US 
states 
yes 
S: national 
representative 
survey, 
telephone 
survey 
 
Becerra & Ong 
(2001) 
USA 2001 
44 NRM, 830 NRF 
& 450 RM 
Los 
Angeles  
Random sample 
from one LA 
county of 10,000 
NRP in arrears, 
874 NRP & 450 
RM matched to 
NRF 
yes 
S: closed ended 
paper & pencil 
(NRP), 
telephone 
interview 
survey (RP)  
RP on welfare & 
NRP at least 3 
months behind 
on child support 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Stirling & 
Aldrich (2012) 
USA 2000-01 622 NRF & 81 NRM 
Washingto
n State 
All child support 
orders from the 
Washington State 
Division of Child 
Support between 
Oct 2000 & March 
2001  
yes 
R: analysis of 
court records 
Analysis of child 
support orders 
Brown, Joung 
& Berger (2006) 
USA 
1996-
2001 
598 shared care & 
595 sole mother 
cases 
Wisconsin Court Records yes 
S: Telephone 
survey 
Comparison of 
cohort of divorce 
cases 2000-2001 
with earlier 
divorce cases 
1996–1998 to 
observe change 
in custody law 
   
306 
 
Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Myers (2004) USA  
1999-
2001 
490 NRM & 6,163 
NRF 
Virginia 
A random sample 
of 6,653 cases, 
representing 
noncustodial 
parents with at 
least one case in 
arrears, drawn 
from the sub-
population of 
182,564 arrears 
cases in Virginia. 
(5,151 cases 
followed to July 
2001) 
yes 
R: longitudinal 
administrative 
records 
Child support 
payers with 
arrears only  
Lyngstad 
(2010)  
Norway 2004 
2,692 separated 
parents, 155 NRM. 
1,020 ex-couple 
dyads. The child 
support research 
used data from 662 
couples.  
Norway 
Statistics Norway 
survey: Contact 
Arrangements & 
Child 
Maintenance 
2004: sample of 
3,582 parents 
with a child under 
18 years living in 
Norway & with 
only one parent 
registered as living 
with the child. 
Two samples were 
drawn; first 
children were 
defined & then 
one with RPs& 
other NRPs.  
yes 
S: telephone 
survey with 
follow-up 
postal. Some 
register 
administrative 
data. 
Used ex-couple 
dyad data from 
the Contact 
Arrangements & 
Child 
Maintenance 
2004 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Kitterod & 
Lyngstad 
(2011) 
Norway 2004 
2,692 separated 
parents, 155 NRM. 
1,020 ex-couple 
dyads.  
Norway 
Statistics Norway 
survey: Contact 
Arrangements & 
Child 
Maintenance 2004 
(see Lyngstad 
(2010)  
no 
S: telephone 
survey with 
follow-up postal 
and 
(administrative 
data. 
 
Pieterse (2007) 
South 
Africa 
mid 
2000s 
15 NRM 
Eastern & 
Western 
Cape 
Non-probability, 
purposive: 
newspaper ads, 
professional 
contacts & 
snowballing  
no 
Q: in depth 
interviews, 
focus groups, 
case studies 
Any divorced 
mother without 
custody of her 
children whether 
situation reached 
amicably or after 
protracted 
conflict 
Hart (2008) UK 2000s 
counselling case 
studies  
Case studies from 
professional 
practice in UK 
minimal 
TCS: case 
studies 
Self-help 
includes 
personal 
experience 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Herrerias 
(2008) 
USA 
Mid 
2000s 
285 NRM National 
Non-probability, 
purposive: print 
media & internet 
based-online 
support groups  
Yes 
M: mail back 
questionnaire: 
forced choice & 
clinical 
measures 
survey & open-
ended 
questions. 
 
Bemiller (2005, 
2008) 
USA 2004 16 NRM Ohio 
Convenience 
sample: flyers, 
university, 
laundromat, 
therapeutic 
settings, county 
court records, 
personal contact & 
snowballing 
yes 
Q: semi -
structured 
interviews, face 
to face  
 
Kruk (2010, 
2015) 
Canada 2009? 14 NRM 
British 
Columbia 
Research co-
designed with 
support group, 
respondents from 
group & 
snowballing 
no 
Q: narrative & 
semi-
structured 
interviews  
Mothers who lost 
custody  
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Colmar 
Brunton (2009) 
New 
Zealand 
2008 
1,062 separated 
parents (survey): 
107 female payers 
& 50 interviews (5 
NRM, 4 shared care 
mothers) 
New 
Zealand 
Self-complete 
questionnaires 
sent to 10,000 
separated parents 
who paid or 
received child 
support through 
Inland Revenue or 
who indicated on 
their application 
for tax credits that 
they had a private 
arrangement for 
child support. 
Parents selected 
for in-depth 
interviews were 
from Colmar 
Brunton's panel of 
potential research 
participants & 
snowballing.  
Yes 
M: mail out 
survey & 
interviews with 
subsample 
Reporting & 
analysis in 
aggregate and 
not by gender 
Snowdon & 
Kotze (2012) 
New 
Zealand 
2007 3 NRM 
New 
Zealand 
Participants from 
Snowdon's 
therapy practice.  
minimal 
Q: narrative & 
personal 
narrative 
Personal 
experience 
Atkinson & 
McKay (2005) 
UK 2005 
78 NRP ('most' NRF: 
number NRM not 
stated) 
UK 
78 interviews from 
sample of 988 
employed NRP 
drawn from CSA 
records  
yes 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews 
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Researchers Country 
Year of 
study 
Participants Location How recruited 
Child 
support 
Type of study Comments 
Kartch (2013) USA 2011 20 NRM & 20 NRF Wisconsin 
Facebook, 
Craiglist and 
university 
no 
Q: in-depth-
interview face-
to-face or by 
telephone 
 
Cozzolino 
(2014) 
USA 2013 
2 NRM, 6 NRF, 7 
RM & 6 adult 
children with 
divorced parents  
Texas 
University, 
Community 
College and 
Craiglist 
yes 
Q: semi-
structured 
interviews 
Explores 
appropriate use 
of child support 
Key: NRM=nonresident mother, NRF=nonresident father, RM=resident mother, RF=resident father, LM=liable mother, PF=payee father, 
NRP=nonresident parent, RP=resident parent 
S=survey, Q=qualitative study, R=representative administrative data, M=mixed methods, PN=personal narrative, TCS=therapeutic case studies.  
Notes: ‘Includes personal experience’ means the researcher refers to their experience as a nonresident mother or a liable mother, whether personal 
narrative or other study. 
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Appendix B  
 
Table B1  Fearful parental relationships: 
all parents 
 Fearful  
(%) 
Not fearful  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
All parents (by 
sex)  
   
Mothers 
(n=2,793) 
9.6 90.4 100.0 
Fathers (n=2,217) 6.4 93.6 100.0 
p=.047    
All parents (by 
child support 
role) 
   
Liable mothers 
(n=184) 
17.7 82.3 100.0 
Liable fathers 
(n=1,681) 
6.4 93.7 100.0 
Payee mothers 
(n=2,283) 
9.2 90.8 100.0 
Payee fathers 
(n=206) 
7.3 92.7 100.0 
Neither (n=656) 7.3 92.7 100.0 
p=.029    
All mothers     
Liable mothers 
(n=184) 
17.7 83.3 100.0 
Other mothers 
(n=2,609) 
9.0 91.0  
p=.017    
Notes: Data are weighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. Numbers 
for some variables are less due to missing data.   
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Table B 2  Liable-mother dyads: socio-
demographics and family dynamics  
 Liable mothers 
n=78 
Payee fathers 
n=78 
Age (years) (mean) 40.50 45.62 
Household 
composition (%) 
  
Lived alone or shared 
with other adults 
20.5 6.4 
Resident children and 
no partner 
38.5 68.1 
Partner and no resident 
children 
11.5 0.0 
Partner and resident 
children 
29.5 25.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Has a degree or higher 
qualification (%) 
34.6 22.1 
Net annual personal 
income (mean) 
$42,532 $39,893 
Net annual household 
income (mean) 
$58,613 $45,940 
Main income source 
(%) 
  
Salary or wages 87.0 53.9 
Self-employment/other 5.2 23.1 
Government payment 7.8 23.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Employment (%)   
Not in paid employment 11.5 21.8 
Short part-time (1–20 
hours) 
14.1 12.8 
Long part-time (21–34 
hours) 
19.2 3.9 
Standard full-time (35–
44 hours) 
35.9 38.5 
Long full-time (45 hours 
or more) 
19.2 23.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Self-assessed poor 
financial 
circumstances (%) 
16.7 19.2 
Experienced hardship 
in last 12 months (%) 
26.9 29.5 
Years together  
(mean) 
12.18 12.43 
Previously married (%) 84.6 83.3 
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 Liable mothers 
n=78 
Payee fathers 
n=78 
Number of former 
relationship children 
(mean) 
2.07 2.06 
Years separated (mean) 6.08 5.92 
Age of child (years) 
(mean)  
11.40 11.41 
Age of youngest child 
(years) (mean) 
10.56 10.63 
Where child lives (%)   
All or more than 50% of 
the time with father 
47.4 47.4 
Roughly 50/50 split 33.3 39.7 
More than 50% or all the 
time with mother  
19.2 12.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Mother’s time with 
child in last 12 months 
(%) 
  
No time 4.1 2.6 
Daytime-only 4.1 6.6 
Some overnights 91.9 90.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Original Scheme time 
categories (%) 
  
Mother minor (0–109 
nights) 
35.1 40.8 
Mother substantial 
(110–145 nights)  
5.2 6.6 
Shared (146–219 nights) 42.9 42.1 
Mother major (220–255 
nights) 
9.1 5.2 
Mother sole (256–365 
nights) 
7.8 5.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Mother’s overnights in 
last 12 months (mean) 
145.3 128.6 
Sex of former 
relationship children 
(%) 
  
All boys 21.8 21.8 
All girls 34.6 35.9 
Both sexes 43.6 42.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Distance between 
parents’ houses (mean) 
117.3 km 119.1 km 
   
314 
 
 Liable mothers 
n=78 
Payee fathers 
n=78 
Arrangements for 
former relationship 
children (%) 
  
All mainly with father 38.5 37.2 
All equal-time 30.8 37.2 
All mainly with mother 14.1 7.7 
Split-residence 16.7 18.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Parental relationship 
quality in the last 12 
months (%) 
  
Friendly 14.1 11.5 
Cooperative 25.6 20.5 
Distant 18.0 30.8 
Lots of conflict 24.4 29.5 
Fearful 18.0 7.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Great deal or some 
conflict in the last 12 
months (%) 
60.3 56.4 
Frequently or 
sometimes argued over 
money in last 12 
months (%) 
33.3 26.9 
Parenting arrangement 
decision (%) 
  
Parents agreed or 
parents and child agreed 
36.4 39.7 
Judge decided 29.9 29.5 
Mother decided 6.5 5.1 
Father decided 11.7 5.1 
Child decided 9.1 14.1 
Other 6.5 6.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. 
Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. One liable mother and two 
payee fathers had missing data on nights. ‘Child’ means focal child. ‘Distant’ includes 
‘no contact with former partner in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. ‘Great deal or 
some’ includes ‘varies’. ‘Did not talk about money’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 
months’ and ‘no contact ever’.  
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Table B 3  Comparison of reports of 78 
former couple liable mother and payee 
father: full payment 
 
Payee 
father in 
full (%) 
Payee 
father not 
in full or 
should 
receive (%) 
Payee father 
other 
arrangement 
(%) 
Payee father 
unable to 
determine (%) 
Liable mother 
in full (%) 
44.9 10.3 1.3 15.4 
Liable mother 
not in full or 
should pay (%) 
3.8 6.4 5.1  
Liable mother 
other 
arrangement 
(%) 
1.3 5.1 Not applicable 1.3 
Liable mother 
unable to 
determine (%) 
3.8   1.3 
Notes: Data are unweighted. Sum of percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding 
Percentages in bold represent concordant reports and those in italics possible 
concordant reports where one parent had another arrangement and the other parent 
reported full payment. ‘Should pay’ or ‘should receive’ deemed not in full and includes 
did not know expected amount or amount varies. ‘Unable to determine’ are parents who 
paid or received child support but did not know expected and/or actual or the expected 
and/or actual amount varies.  
 
 
Table B 4  Liable-mother dyads: 
concordance between reports of former 
partners on whether payment made in 
full  
 
Payee father: in full (%) Payee father: not in full 
(%) 
Liable mother: in full 
(%) 
68.6 15.7 
Liable mother: not in 
full (%) 
5.9 9.8 
Notes: Data are unweighted. n=51 dyads. Sum of percentages may not total 100.0% due 
to rounding. Percentages in bold represent concordant responses. Should pay or receive 
treated as not in full. Excludes 16 dyads where one or both parents had missing 
information and 11 where one parent reported another arrangement. 
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Table B 5  Comparison of reports of 78 
former couple liable mothers and payee 
fathers: timeliness  
 
Payee 
father 
always 
received 
on time 
(%) 
Payee 
father 
mostly 
received 
on time 
(%) 
Payee father 
sometimes 
to never 
received on 
time or 
should 
receive (%) 
Don’t 
know 
(%) 
Payee father 
has other 
arrangement. 
(%) 
Liable 
mother 
always paid 
on time (%) 
32.1 12.8 15.4 2.6 2.6 
Liable 
mother 
mostly paid 
on time (%) 
1.3 1.3 7.7 1.3  
Liable 
mother 
sometimes 
to never paid 
on time or 
should pay 
(%) 
 2.6 6.5  3.9 
Don’t know 
(%) 
1.3  1.3   
Liable 
mother has 
other 
arrangement. 
(%). 
2.6  5.1   
Notes: Data are unweighted. Sum of percentages may not total 100.0% due to rounding. 
Percentages in bold represent concordant reports and those in italics possible 
concordance where one parent had another arrangement and the other parent reported 
always on time. 
 
Table B 6  Liable-mother dyads: 
concordance of former partners reports 
of whether payment always made on 
time  
 Payee father: always on 
time (%) 
Payee father: not 
always on time (%) 
Liable mother: always 
on time (%) 
40.3 35.5 
Liable mother: not 
always on time (%) 
1.6 22.6 
Notes: Data are unweighted. n=62 dyads. Sum of percentages may not total 100.0% due 
to rounding. Percentages in bold represent concordant reports. Parents who should pay 
or should receive were not asked about timeliness and were treated as not on time. 
Excludes 11 dyads where one parent reported having another arrangement and five 
where one parent did not know regularity. 
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Table B 7  Liable mothers with another 
arrangement  
Details of 
arrangement 
Assessment Child 
Support 
Collect 
Expected 
amount 
Mother’s 
time: all 
children 
Mother’s 
nights 
Pays for all 
expenses 
Yes Yes $12,480 Less: 1 
child 
120 
Pays child 
directly 
Yes Yes $676 Less: 2 
children  
90 
Neither owes 
anything 
Yes Yes $1,200 Split: 2 
children 
24 
Pays school 
fees 
Yes Yes $0 Equal: 1 
child 
183 
Father won’t 
accept money 
Yes Yes $444 More: 2 
children  
245 
Pays costs 
when children 
with her  
Registered 
agreement 
No $0 Less: 4 
children 
80 
Pays all costs Yes No Don’t know More: 1 
child 
287 
Share all 
costs 50/50 
Private 
agreement 
No Varies Equal: 1 
child 
209 
Pay half costs Private 
agreement 
No Varies Less: 2 
children 
90 
Share costs 
pro-rata  
Don’t know No Varies More: 2 
children  
240 
Father pays 
school fees & 
expenses for 
one child 
Private 
agreement 
No $6,096 Equal: 2 
children  
183 
Father pays 
school fees  
Registered 
agreement 
No Don’t know More: 1 
child 
365 
Share costs 
50/50 
Yes No $312 Equal: 3 
children 
183 
Father gives 
money for 
groceries 
Registered 
agreement 
No $1,560 Split: 4 
children  
26 
Don’t know Don’t know No Don’t know Less: 1 
child 
0 
Own 
agreement 
Yes No Don’t know Equal: 2 
children 
183 
Split costs Private 
agreement 
No Varies Equal: 1 
child 
157 
No money 
changes 
hands 
Yes No $1,080 More: 2 
children 
235 
Pays for 
children’s 
expenses 
Yes No $7,200 Equal: 2 
children 
183 
Half school 
fees and other  
Yes No $0 Equal: 2 
children 
183 
Half school 
fees/other  
Yes No Don’t know More: 1 
child 
335 
Share costs Private 
agreement  
No $0 Equal: 3 
children 
183 
Joint account 
for school 
fees. 
Registered 
agreement 
No $2,600 Equal: 2 
children  
183 
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Details of 
arrangement 
Assessment Child 
Support 
Collect 
Expected 
amount 
Mother’s 
time: all 
children 
Mother’s 
nights 
No money 
changes 
hands 
Yes No $336 More: 1 
child  
Don’t know 
Notes: n=24 liable mothers 
Table B 8 Liable parents: satisfaction 
and fairness of child support payment  
 Liable mothers 
n=180 
Liable fathers 
n=1,652 
Satisfaction with 
amount paid (0=totally 
dissatisfied, 10=totally 
satisfied) (mean) 
5.12 5.37 
SE, CI 0.38, CI 4.37–5.86 0.17, CI 5.04–5.70 
p=.540   
Fairness of child 
support arrangement 
(0=totally unfair, 
10=totally fair) 
  
For child (mean) 4.86 5.21 
SE, CI 0.42, CI 4.03–5.69 0.17, CI 4.87–5.55 
p=.445   
For you (mean) 4.57 4.51 
SE, CI 0.38, CI 3.82–5.33 0.17, CI 4.18–4.84 
p=.882   
For former partner 
(mean) 
8.58 8.18 
SE, CI 0.21, CI 8.17–8.98 0.12, CI 7.94–8.41 
p=.093   
For current partner 
(mean) 
6.01 4.18 
SE, CI 0.62, CI 4.78–7.23 0.30, CI 3.58–4.77 
p=.008   
Overall fairness 
(0=totally unfair for all, 
30=totally fair for all) 
(mean) 
17.95 17.95 
SE, CI 0.84, CI 16.31–19.59 0.34, CI 17.29–18.61 
p=.100   
Notes: Data are weighted. Numbers for some variables are less due to missing data. 
‘Child’ means focal child. Overall fairness based on liable mothers (n=151) and liable 
fathers (n=1,155) who had valid responses on fairness for child, liable parent and former 
partner.  
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Table B 9  Logistic regression model of 
odds of non-compliance for liable 
mothers: Full model 
Factor Odds ratios  
Mother’s overnights in last 12 months 
(for each additional night) 
1.01 
(p<.001) 
Mother has biological children from more than one 
relationship 
(ref: only former relationship children) 
children from more than one relationship 
0.54 
(p=.397) 
Fearful relationship 
(ref: no) 
fearful 
0.41 
(p=.329) 
Main income source 
(ref: salary or wages) 
self-employed/other 
59.94 
(p<.001) 
government income support 
1.60 
(p=.634) 
Time since separation 
1.13 
(p=.064) 
Conflict over money in last 12 months 
(ref: frequently or sometimes argued) 
rarely or never argued or did not talk about money  
3.73 
(p=.059) 
Number of liable mothers 136 
F  
4.95 
F(7, 4,990) 
Prob> F p<.001 
Notes: Data are weighted. Overnights represent time with the focal child. ‘Biological 
children’ include adopted children but not stepchildren. ‘Did not talk about money’ 
includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 
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Table B 10  Logistic regression model of 
odds of non-compliance for liable 
mothers: parenting arrangements of all 
former relationship children- 
Factor Odds ratios 
Arrangements of former relationship children  
(ref: all children mainly with the father) 
all children mainly with the mother 
19.23 
(p=.001) 
all equal-time 
5.13 
(p=.055) 
split-residence  
10.28 
(p=.002) 
Conflict over money in last 12 months 
(ref: frequently or sometimes argued) 
rarely or never argued or did not talk about money  
10.45 
(p=.001) 
Number of liable mothers 146 
F  
4.52 
F(4,5003) 
Prob> F p=.001 
Notes: Data are weighted. Overnights and equal-time variables represent time with the 
focal child. ‘Former relationship children’ mean those 18 years or younger. ‘Did not talk 
about money’ includes ‘no contact in last 12 months’ and ‘no contact ever’. 
  
   
321 
 
Appendix C 
The 2014 Inquiry 
In 2014, the Child Support Program was again the subject of a 
Parliamentary Inquiry (House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2015) (hereafter ‘the 2014 Inquiry’). The 
Committee’s terms of reference appear to ‘essentially represent some of 
the key pressure in the revised Scheme’ (Vnuk, Smyth & Archer 2015: 
157). As Vnuk, Smyth and Archer (2015) note, the bulk of the 25 
recommendations made by the Committee focused on service delivery 
and minor policy and procedural matters. However, five proposals were 
more substantial, requiring ‘significant changes to systems and 
resourcing’ (Vnuk et al. 2015: 162). Vnuk, Smyth and Archer (2015: 155) 
foreshadowed ‘little capacity or political will to act on…[these] 
recommendations in the current economic climate’. To a great extent this 
view was confirmed when the Australian Government (2016) responded 
to the Committee’s report in August 2016. Of the ‘big five’ proposals 
(Vnuk et al. 2015: 162), the Government (2016: 4) accepted the 
recommendation to review the Cost of Children Table and some aspects 
of the formula, but appeared to reject the ‘income management’ 
component of this recommendation.1 This part proposed ‘child support 
income management where there are substantiated allegations of child 
support payments not being adequately spent on the needs of the child’ 
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal 
Affairs 2015: xviii).  
The Government accepted two other, related, recommendations ‘in 
principle’. These two recommendations proposed an extension of 
mediation (also known as ‘family dispute resolution’) to child support via 
the network of government-funded community sector-run Family 
Relationship Centres (FRCs) already used for disputes about parenting-
                                       
1 The Australian Government’s (2016: 4) response to this was somewhat ambiguous: 
‘the Government would only consider income managing child support where the 
person also receives an income support payment which is already subject to income 
management’. The Government than went on to list some logistical and costs issues 
that would be obstacles to the progression of this proposal.  
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time and children’s matters. The first recommendation proposed that 
FRCs be used to resolve financial disputes, particularly for newly 
separated parents, and for financial counselling. One option floated was 
to encourage parents to reach an agreement on the amount of child 
support payable which could be registered by DHS as a child support 
agreement. The second recommendation proposed that FRCs be used 
when parents apply for a change of assessment under one of the special 
circumstances grounds or lodge an objection to a DHS decision.2  
The two recommendations involving FRCs—particularly the first and 
more expansive one—would be expensive and complex to implement. 
Family Dispute Resolution Practitioners (that is, mediators who work in 
the FRCs) have mixed views about whether child support is an 
appropriate issue to mediate (House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2015: 36). 
Two other recommendations were not accepted by the Government. The 
first, strongly advocated by mothers’ groups (i.e., representing payees’ 
interests), was to trial a ‘guaranteed maintenance payment’ model and 
then extend guaranteed payment to some or all payees. This would 
necessitate DHS taking on responsibility to collect child support from 
liable parents and therefore bear the full cost of non-compliance rather 
than payees (Australian Government 2016: 14). The second rejected 
proposal was an investigation of ‘contact enforcement agencies’ that 
operated in other countries with the option to introduce such an agency 
into Australia (Australian Government 2016: 6). This proposal, supported 
by fathers’ groups, was recommended by an earlier Parliamentary inquiry 
and subsequently rejected by the Government of the time (Australian 
Government 2005).  
 
 
                                       
2 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 
(2015) for details of these proposals and Vnuk, Smyth & Archer (2015) for 
commentary on potential challenges with the implementation. 
